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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

A MEANING FOR TURNER'S FRONTIER

PART I: DEMOCRACY IN THE OLD NORTHWEST

1

IT would be difficult today, now that sixty years have passed, to revive the sense of intellectual ardor with which Frederick Jackson Turner's paper on the American frontier was greeted so soon after its first inauspicious reading.[1] So full of promise did the remarkable theory then appear, so charged with import, that its present status as an academic curiosity seems to symbolize some profound intervening disillusionment. A crucial motif of American spiritual experience seemed at one time to have found its fittest expression in Turner's inspired essay, and with his ceremonial "closing" of our frontier in 1893 a generation of publicists began finding the terms, products of convictions already deeply felt, whereby great stretches of American history might at last be given meaning. Persistent echoes of these convictions are heard even today.[2] And yet by now nearly every attempt to impose conceptual structure upon the lyricism of Turner and his followers has been abandoned. Intuition and cool reason appear to have succeeded in baffling each other.

It needs little prompting to recall the "frontier thesis", with its message that the presence of cheap land and an ever-receding frontier "explain" American development; its arguments, indeed,

[1] "The Significance of the Frontier in American History", read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association at Chicago in July 1893.

[2] See Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge, 1950) for proof that on a poetic level the frontier idea still has its fascinations. See also Walter Prescott Webb's *The Great Frontier* (Boston, 1952).

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could be assorted under three rough headings. Turner's first claim for American culture was one of "uniqueness"; in mutiny against the Johns Hopkins "germ theorists" of the 1880s and their genealogical accounts of American political institutions traced back to England, back even to the gloomy forests of central Europe, Turner felt that these institutions and their character were to be accounted for most plausibly in terms purely American. Next, he produced a metaphor: the open frontier with its easily available land was a "safety valve" for underprivileged Easterners, its promise serving as a minimizer of urban unrest. The third claim, an extension of the first, was a report, again metaphoric, of the origins of true democracy. As settlers pushed out beyond the mountains, ties with the East and with Europe were steadily weakened, ancestral memories grew dim, and a "shearing-off" process took place: "layers" of civilization were removed until the pioneer stood in native worth, self-reliant, individualistic, a democrat of Jacksonian model. "American democracy was born of no theorist's dream; it was not carried in the *Susan Constant* to Virginia nor in the *Mayflower* to Plymouth. It came out of the American forest, and it gained new strength each time it touched a new frontier."[3]

A new phalanx of critics has now demolished the Turner conception. His vagueness, his abstraction, his hopeless imprecision, his poverty of concrete example, have each been held up to the scientific eye. Turner, in all but ignoring the English origins of our institutions, gains nothing but misunderstanding by his "ungracious exclusion of Locke and Milton."[4] The "safety valve", moreover, is at best a misleading poetic figure. How could the Eastern worker, poverty-stricken and ignorant of agriculture, think seriously of so staggering a project as removing to the West? The new Western farmer was most typically a recent Eastern farmer who had emigrated with at least a little money in his pocket, and the cities themselves, ironically indeed, eventually came to serve as safety valves for all farmers embittered with the agrarian life. But the deadliest

[3] *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920), p. 293.

[4] Benjamin F. Wright, Jr., "Political Institutions and the Frontier", in D.R. Fox, ed., *Sources of Culture in the Middle West* (New York, 1934), p. 36.

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criticisms of all are reserved for the Turneresque vision of the frontier's rôle in the birth of American democracy. Turner's state of nature, his shearing-off of civilized corruption, hints at a pastoral anarchy neither realized nor remotely desired by the bands of settlers in their wilderness outposts. The first efforts of these pioneers were to set up and to stabilize those very political institutions, parallel in as many ways as might be, which they had left behind them in the East. A kind of primitive geopolitics is brusquely challenged by a riddle which Turner could not have answered: why the *American* forest—why didn't democracy come out of other "forests"—why not the Siberian frontier?[5] The few remaining defenders of Frederick Jackson Turner have been able to produce very little in the way of rejoinder.

And yet, though conviction now burns so low, it remains to be noted that even the unkindest of Turner's critics have conceded, with a kind of bedeviled monotony, that *some* relation most likely does exist between our history and our frontier. The fact thus stands that, in this direction at least, no advance has yet been made beyond Turner's own dazzling abstraction. The problem is still there, its vitality unextinguished. It is no further resolved than ever.

If we examine with suspicion the body of critical work, we discover an interesting paradox. Turner and his teachings have been approached with deadly seriousness on their own terms—no other—and handled with what turns out to be *textual* criticism: a method which is illuminating but whose value for the analysis and correction of theoretical material is acutely limited.[6] The result has been to demonstrate the absurdities of Turner's internal logic—which is an undoubted contribution

[5] An excellent symposium of these critical views, containing all the subtleties denied them here, may be found in *The Turner Thesis*, Number 2 of the Amherst *Problems in American Civilization*, George R. Taylor, ed. (Boston, 1949). The criticism is well summarized in Richard Hofstadter, "Turner and the Frontier Myth", *American Scholar*, XVIII, 433–43 (Oct. 1949).

[6] The "textual" approach has been used with more success in the analysis of modern poetry and is the principal tool of the "New Criticism". There are indications, however, that even here the method's shortcomings are beginning to be felt. See "The New Criticism", a forum discussion by William Barrett, Kenneth Burke, Malcolm Cowley, Robert Gorham Davis, Allen Tate, and Hiram Haydn, *American Scholar*, XX, 86–104, 218–31 (Jan.-Apr. 1951).

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to perspective. Yet it should still be recognized that no concrete attempt to restate Turner's idea has ever actually been undertaken. Now might there not, after all, be a way of rescuing Turner? Is it possible to ask the great question itself in a form permitting a concrete answer?

Turner's critics may be allowed the most sweeping of concessions. Nearly everything[7] could be sacrificed—everything, that is, except the one thing that matters: the development of political democracy as a habit and the American as a unique political creature. This was the supreme fact which overwhelmed Tocqueville in the 1830s; every American still knows in his heart that the frontier had something to do with it. "What?" is, of course, the crucial question. It has always been difficult to ask it, if only because it has never seemed very important to discover a working, functional definition of "political democracy". "Democracy" is alluded to, invoked, celebrated, its collapse predicted daily. Democracy, in our traditions, has rich connections with the yeoman farmer (involving, as it were, "grass roots" and freedom from the urban banker); it is at once individualistic and coöperative, equalitarian and fraternal; hand in hand with stout self-reliance goes the civic exercise of universal suffrage. For most of our daily purposes democracy is a synonym for all that is virtuous in our social traditions and on the public scene.

Yet it still appears that we need a *working* definition of political democracy. It should in some way account for concepts central to most traditional notions, but it should also be functional, in the sense that its terms may be tested. Its focus should undoubtedly be upon participation—participation by large numbers of people in decisions which affect their lives. But it should be real, not ceremonial, participation. The extent of the suffrage would not be its most dependable measure, any

[7] This would involve principally the claim for institutional "novelty" (which puts an extra burden on the theory) and the "safety valve" (which isn't necessary). For that matter, although the frontier assuredly had little to say to the "underprivileged", its *real* "safety valve" aspect is all too seldom stressed. To the part-time real estate operator, whether tobacco planter of the early Tidewater or wheat farmer of the pre-World War Middle Border, the frontier as a safety valve against agricultural bankruptcy has always made perfect sense.

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more than the casting of one man's vote is the quickest way of influencing a political decision. Awareness of the community's affairs should have something to do with it, but only to the extent that individuals themselves feel capable of interfering in those affairs. Would this be to the community's best interest? Often, but not always; yet here we are not required to think of democracy as a community virtue. Some have, indeed, called it a national vice.

Suppose that political democracy be regarded as a manipulative attitude toward government, shared by large numbers of people. Let it be thought of as a wide participation in public affairs, a diffusion of leadership, a widespread sense of personal competence to make a difference. Under what conditions have such things typically occurred? When have the energies of the people been most engaged? What pushes a man into public activity? It appears that nothing accomplishes this more quickly than the formation of a settlement.

Our national experience, indeed, furnishes us much material for a hypothesis. Political democracy evolves most quickly during the initial stages of setting up a new community; it is seen most dramatically while the process of organization and the solving of basic problems are still crucial; it is observed to best advantage when this flow of basic problems is met by a homogeneous population. Now "homogeneity" should here involve two parallel sorts of facts: not only a similar level of social and economic status and aspirations among the people, but most particularly a lack of, or failure of, a traditional, ready-made structure of leadership in the community. A simple test of the effectiveness of structured leadership is its ability to command acceptance and respect.[8]

With a heavy flow of community problems, in short, and without such a structure of natural leadership, democracy pre-

[8] "Not only is leadership limited objectively by given patterns of authority but the will to lead of the leader is vitiated if what he stands for cannot command a following. . . . [The leader's] effectiveness in no small measure derives from how much loyalty he can count upon." Jeremiah F. Wolpert, "Toward a Sociology of Authority", in Alvin W. Gouldner, ed., *Studies in Leadership* (New York, 1950), p. 681. This is the point made by Guglielmo Ferrero in his discussion of "legitimacy"; see *The Principles of Power*, trans. by Theodore Jaeckel (New York, 1942), p. 23.

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sents itself much less as a bright possibility than as a brutal necessity. The very incomprehensibility of alternatives has always made it most unlikely that an American should see this. But Tocqueville saw it instantly. "In aristocratic societies," he wrote, "men do not need to combine is order to act, because they are strongly held together".

> . . . Among democratic nations, on the contrary, all the citizens are independent and feeble; they can hardly do anything by themselves and none of them can oblige his fellow men to lend him their assistance. They all, therefore, fall into a state of incapacity, if they do not learn voluntarily to help each other.[9]

Before turning to history for a trial of this so simple yet interesting idea, let us set it in yet another dimension by examining a series of extremely important findings in contemporary sociology. Robert K. Merton has conducted a study, whose results are soon to be made public, of social behavior in public housing communities.[10] A theory of political democracy which would meet all our criteria may be derived from Mr. Merton's work; there is little that we shall say from a historical viewpoint which has not already, in a present-day setting, been thoroughly documented by him.

He and his associates have observed two public housing projects, one being designated as "Craftown" and the other as "Hilltown". Craftown, located in southern New Jersey, administered by the Federal Public Housing Authority, and set up originally to house warworkers, was much the more active and interesting of the two. The key to the activity there was a "time of troubles" in the initial stages of the community's existence. The people who settled in Craftown ("homogeneous" in the sense that a majority were employed in nearby shipyards and defense plants) were immediately faced by a staggering series of problems of a fundamental sort, affecting the entire community. These bore on law and order, government, public

[9] *Democracy in America* (Oxford Galaxy Ed., New York, 1946), p. 320.

[10] The study's working title is *Patterns of Social Life: Explorations in the Sociology of Housing*, by Robert K. Merton, Patricia S. West and Marie Jahoda. We are greatly indebted to Mr. Merton for his generosity in allowing us to examine the material in manuscript.

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health, housing, education, religion, municipal services, transportation, and markets. Slovenly construction had resulted in leaky roofs, flooded cellars, and warped floors. There were no schools, no churches, no electricity, no community hall, no grocery stores. Bus service was irregular and the nearest depot was a mile away. There were no hard-surfaced roads or sidewalks and much of the area was flooded during the rainy season. There was a wave of vandalism and no organization for its suppression. There was an epidemic of poliomyelitis. There were no municipal services of any kind; the environing township did not want to assume the cost of such services and by legislative action Craftown was gerrymandered into an independent township—which meant that it had to set up its own institutions for government and for the maintenance of law and order.

Craftown did have a ready-made structure, as it were, of leadership; its affairs were under the administration of a federal bureau, the Federal Public Housing Authority, and handled by a resident manager and staff. Under stable conditions such a structure would have been adequate for most of the community's basic concerns. Yet the problems in Craftown were so overwhelming, so immediate, so pressing, that the residents could not afford to wait upon the government for action. They were therefore forced to behave in that same pattern which so fascinated Tocqueville: they were driven to "the forming of associations". Mass meetings, committees and subcommittees were organized, a township board was set up, officials of great variety were elected; a volunteer police force, fire department and local court were established, with residents serving as constables, firemen and judges. A coöperative store soon came into existence. An ambulance squad, a nursery and child care center, and a great variety of organizations devoted to community needs made their appearance during this critical period. Pressures brought upon the bus company and the government agencies resulted in the improvement of transportation, the paving of streets, repair of houses, drainage of swamps, and the erection of buildings for education, worship and other functions of the community.

This experience resulted in an extraordinary level of public

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participation by people who for the most part had never had previous political experience; and it produced a political life charged with the utmost energy. Many jobs were created by the crisis—by the flow of problems—and they had to be handled by someone; many rôles were created, someone had to fill them. The key was necessity. Persons who had previously never needed to be concerned with politics[11] now found themselves developing a familiarity with institutions, acquiring a sense of personal competence to manipulate them, to make things happen, to make a difference. Thus the coin of necessity had its other side: there were compensations for the individual. With many offices to be filled, large numbers of people found themselves contending for them; the prestige connected with officeholding, the sense of energy and power involved in decision-making, became for the first time a possibility, a reality, an exploitable form of self-expression.[12]

Now Hilltown, in contrast to Craftown, may be regarded as something of a control case. Many factors present in Craftown were present here—but a crucial one was missing. Hilltown, like Craftown, was a public housing project in an industrial area; it too was managed by the Federal Public Housing Authority; its population was likewise characterized by "homogeneity"—insofar as that involved a similar level of social and economic status among the residents. What Hilltown did not experience was a "time of troubles". Unlike Craftown, it was well planned and operated, it was not faced with a failure of municipal services, it was not confronted by lack of transportation, stores, electricity, or facilities for education and religion. The residents, to be sure, had their individual problems—occasional badly fitting doors and the like—but they were not of a community nature,

[11] Mr. Merton offers various graphs and tables to establish this. In one of them, 88 per cent of the early comers were found to be more highly active in Craftown organizations than in their former communities; only 8 per cent had had the same degree of participation in both communities.

[12] Two other communities, each of which underwent a similar experience in similar circumstances, were Park Forest, Illinois, and Shanks Village, New York, described in William H. Whyte, Jr., "The Future, c/o Park Forest", *Fortune*, June 1953, pp. 126–31, 186–96; and Bernard Horn, "Collegetown: A Study of Transient Student Veteran Families in a Temporary Housing Community" (unpub. M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1948).

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not of a sort that made community organization seem indispensable. Widespread public participation in community affairs was never needed there, and it never took place. Sporadic efforts toward the establishment of a council, the election of officers, and the setting up of community activities aroused little interest and met with failure. The original structure of leadership—the federal agency and its local office—proved quite adequate for the handling of Hilltown's concerns, it was never seriously challenged, and it required no supplementation by resident activity.[13] "Democracy", in short, was unnecessary there.

One more reference to the Craftown episode should be made, in order to note two interesting subsidiary consequences of this problem-solving experience, this wide participation, this sense of individual competence spread among such great numbers. One was a close supervision of the officialdom which the Craftowners themselves had created—and a lesser degree of respect for it[14] than had apparently been the case in their previous communities. The other was a body of shared "traditions", with a common vocabulary, rich with meaning, whereby the experience might be relived and reshared. Although the level of activity was never as high in later times as it was in the beginning—the problems by then had been solved—the intensity of the "time of troubles" served to link the "pioneers" and the later-comers together by a kind of verbal bond. Talking about it was important: once this experience had been undergone, it was not lost. In such a usable fund of tradition, resources

[13] Thus "homogeneity"—in the total sense which we have given that concept—did not exist in Hilltown. There was a clear distinction—to extend the analogy—between "the rulers and the ruled".

[14] These facts seem to go together. An illuminating Craftown anecdote concerns a woman who was fined $5 by one of the locally elected judges for letting her dog run loose. "Well, that's just like working men", she declared. "A rich man wouldn't be so interested in money. . . .I don't think any working man should mix in politics. I think a man that has money is better able to rule." It is at the same time quite possible to imagine the same woman making *this* statement (also recorded at Craftown): "I never voted in the city for mayor or things like that. I just didn't have the interest. In the city they get in anyhow and there's nothing you can do about it. Here they're more connected with people."

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for meeting a new crisis, should one appear, would remain always available.[15]

How might such a contemporary model square with the pioneer frontier? No sorcery of forest or prairie could materialize the democrat, yet it should be safe to guess that the periods of wholesale migration to the West forced a setting in which such an experience as that just outlined had to be enacted a thousand times over: an experience crucial in the careers of millions of Americans. Frederick Jackson Turner has stated the undeniable fact—that an organic connection exists between American democracy and the American frontier. The insight is his. But Turner never offered a conceptual framework by which it might be tested. We are proposing such a model; it involves the establishment of new communities. Its variables are a period of problem-solving and a homogeneous population whose key factor is the lack of a structure of leadership. We shall test these terms in various ways by the examination of three frontiers, each of which should illustrate a special dimension of the argument. They are the Old Northwest, the Southwest frontier of Alabama and Mississippi, and the Puritan frontier of Massachusetts Bay.

2

"The frontier", to Turner and his followers, as well as to most others, seemed almost automatically to mean the Old Northwest—the "valley of democracy"—whose settlement took place during the first third of the nineteenth century. To discover why the connection should be made so naturally, let us select

[15] Mr. Merton points out that this phenomenon was taken as a concrete cultural fact by Malinowski, who called it "phatic communion". "Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other . . . language appears to us in this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action." Bronislaw Malinowski, in C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (New York, 1923), pp. 478–79. The connection between this kind of thing and the folklore of democracy is seldom appreciated: consider, for example, the typical American reaction to disaster—the ease with which the traditions of the frontier are converted into spontaneous organizational techniques for coping with the emergency. The community response to the tornado which struck Flint, Michigan, in 1953 provides a perfect case in point; examples like it are numberless.

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this region, with its key states Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, as the first frontier to be observed.

The chronicles of these states abound with reminiscences of the pioneer; close upon them in the county histories came haphazard statistics which proudly mark progress from howling wilderness to fat countryside and prosperous burgs. Between these points come many a crisis, many a relished success. We should consider not the solitary drifters, the Daniel Boones, but the thousand isolated communities each of which in its own way must have undergone its "time of troubles". There, the basic problems of organization were intimately connected with matters of life and death. They were problems to be met only by the united forces of the community. Think of the basic question of housing itself, and how its solution was elevated by necessity, throughout the Old Northwest, to the status of institution and legend: the cabin-raising.[16] The clearing of the forest and the manner in which this was accomplished gave an idiom to our politics: the logrolling.[17] Defense against the Indians required that the experience of the Marietta settlers, forced to raise their own militia in the 1790s, be repeated elsewhere many times over at least until after the War of 1812.[18] And there was the question of law and order: the traveler Elias Fordham, stopping one night in 1818 at a cabin near Paoli,

[16] "When the time comes, and the forces collect togeather, a captain is appointed, and the men divide into proper sections, and [are] assigned to their several duties." Henry B. Curtis, "Pioneer Days in Central Ohio", *O. State Arch. and Hist. Pubs.*, I, 245 (1887). Almost any state or county history or pioneer memoir will refer to or describe this familiar social function; see, e.g., William T. Utter, *The Frontier State* (Columbus, 1942), pp. 138, 139–41; W. C. Howells, *Recollections of Life in Ohio* (Cincinnati, 1895), pp. 144–51; etc., etc.

[17] There is a vivid contemporary description of a combined logrolling and political rally in Baynard Rush Hall, *The New Purchase*, James A. Woodburn, ed. (Princeton, 1916), pp. 202–205. See also Logan Esarey, *History of Indiana* (Indianapolis, 1915), pp. 421, 425–26.

[18] Beverly W. Bond, Jr., *The Civilization of the Old Northwest* (New York, 1934), pp. 249, 268, 351, 357. "The shrill whistle of the fife and the beat of the drum, calling to arms for the defense of their countrymen, was answered by many a gray-haired sire and many a youthful pioneer." H. W. Chadwick, comp., *Early History of Jackson County* (Brownstown, Ind., 1943), p. 14. The War of 1812 in the Northwest, particularly in Ohio, had as much or more to do with hostile Indians as with the British, and defense was typically handled by the raising of local militia. See "Ohio and the War of 1812", ch. iv in Utter, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–119.

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Indiana, found himself in the midst of preparations by the citizenry for apprehending a gang of brigands. How often must such a scene—the formation of *ad hoc* constabularies, the administration of emergency justice—have been enacted in those days?[19]

Close behind such supreme needs came that of educating the young, which claimed an early order of concern throughout the Northwest. Traveling instructors were often employed to go from house to house; later, when the children could pass through the forest without danger, they might gather for a time at one of the settlers' houses until community labor could be assembled to put up a school.[20] The demand for religion was little less urgent; first came the circuit rider to a house or barn designated for worship; denominational differences might then have to be submerged in the erection of a common chapel until each sect could build its own meeting house.[21] Even problems of public health, with no hospitals and few doctors, had to be solved occasionally under heroic circumstances. When cholera struck Jacksonville, Illinois, in 1833, the cabinetmaker John Henry boarded thirteen persons at his house for three weeks, supervised a crew of assistants in the building of coffins for each of the fifty-five dead, personally visited each house of sickness, took fifty-three corpses to the burying ground,

[19] Elias P. Fordham, *Personal Narrative*, ed. by Frederic Ogg (Cleveland, 1906), pp. 154–55; Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 196; Charles Francis Ingals, "A Pioneer in Lee County, Illinois", ed. by Lydia Colby, *Ill. State Hist. Soc. Jour.*, XXVI, 281 (Oct. 1933).

[20] "As soon as conditions were favorable the pioneers of the neighborhood constructed a rude cabin schoolhouse. . . . There was no school revenue to be distributed, so each voter himself had to play the part of the builder. The neighbors divided themselves into choppers, hewers, carpenters, and masons. Those who found it impossible to report for duty might pay an equivalent in nails, boards, or other materials. The man who neither worked nor paid was fined thirty-seven and one-half cents a day." William F. Vogel, "Home Life in Early Indiana", *Ind. Mag. of Hist.*, X, 297 (Sept. 1914).

[21] The "interfaith chapel" was invariably the early solution to this problem (there was one in Craftown, also in Park Forest and Shanks Village). "The first church . . . was free to all denominations, and here, for miles and miles came the pioneer and family on the Sabbath day to worship God." Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p. 35. See also Vogel, *loc. cit.*, p. 291; Morris Birkbeck, *Letters from Illinois* (London, 1818), p. 23; John D. Barnhardt, Jr., "The Rise of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Illinois from the Beginning to the Year 1832", *Ill. State Hist. Soc. Jour.*, XII, 149–217 (July 1919).

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and, assisted by two farmers, a blacksmith, a shoemaker, a brickmaker and a carpenter, dug the graves and interred the dead—a series of functions quite above the line of normal business.[22]

Now as these communities toiled through the process of stabilizing their affairs, what effect must such an experience have had upon the individuals themselves, exposed as they were to the sudden necessity of making great numbers of basic and vital decisions, private and public? With thousands of ambitious men, predominantly young men[23] looking for careers, pouring into vast unsettled tracts, setting up new communities, and being met with all the complex hazards of such an adventure, the scope and variety of new political experience was surely tremendous. A staggering number of public rôles was thrust forward during such an enterprise, far too many to wait upon the appearance of seasoned leaders. With the organization of each wilderness county and pioneer township, the roster of offices to be filled and operated was naturally a perfect blank (how long had it been since this was so in Philadelphia?); somebody, willing or unwilling, must be found to fill each one.

Whether farmers, lawyers, merchants, artisans, or even men of means, the "leading citizens" in county after county were typically men of no previous political experience.[24] For example, there was Morgan County, Illinois. Its first settler was Seymour Kellogg, who brought his wife and seven children from New York State, was made a commissioner at the first election and shortly afterward became justice of the peace.

[22] C. H. Rammelkamp, ed., "The Memoirs of John Henry: A Pioneer of Morgan County", *Ill. State Hist. Soc. Jour.*, XVIII, 55 (Apr. 1925).

[23] In a history of the town of Lancaster, Ohio, which was founded in 1800, there is a longish series of biographical sketches of its "leading pioneers". Twenty-seven of these sketches concern settlers who arrived within the first ten years of the town's existence and who held office, and of these 27, age data are given for 15. For what such a haphazard sample is worth, the average age of this group at the date of the town's founding was twenty-four. C. M. L. Wiseman, *Centennial History of Lancaster* (Lancaster, 1898).

[24] The county histories make every effort to secure the immortality of their leading citizens by reciting as many of their accomplishments as are known. Thus if the biographical sketches make no mention of public office held elsewhere, it should be safe to assume that at least in most of the cases their civic careers began in the new settlement.

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Murray McConnel, who read law on his farm at odd hours and became Jacksonville's first lawyer, was forthwith sent to the legislature (though unwillingly) and later served the community in various other capacities. Jacksonville's first cabinetmaker, the aforementioned John Henry (scarcely literate), was drawn into politics immediately, and before his career was over had been an assemblyman, state senator and member of Congress, not to say superintendent of the local insane asylum and patron of learning to the Female Academy. The first printer there was Josiah Lucas, who had arrived from Maryland ("without friends") and established a paper with local support. Championing Henry Clay, he was shortly in a maelstrom of politics, and the experience thus gained netted him a postmastership to the House of Representatives and "many offices both civil and military", culminating in a minister's post in Europe.[25] Variations on this typical pattern are to be found in county after county in the Old Northwest.[26]

What we exhibit here are the elements of a simple syllogism; the first settlers anywhere, no matter who they were or how scanty their prior political experience, were the men who had to be the first officeholders. This meant that the pioneers, in the very process of establishing and organizing their settlements, were faced with a burden of decision-making disproportionate to that exacted of the later-comers. The political lore, the manipulative skills, which must have been acquired in that process should somehow be kept in the foreground when judging the ferocious vitality, the extravagant energy, of early political life in the Old Northwest.

[25] Frank S. Heinl, "The First Settlers in Morgan County", *Ill. State Hist. Soc. Jour.*, XVIII, 76–87 (Apr. 1925); Rammelkamp, *loc. cit.*, pp. 39–40 and *passim;* George Murray McConnel, "Some Reminiscences of My Father, Murray McConnel", *Ill. State Hist. Soc. Jour.*, XVIII, 89–100 (Apr. 1925).

[26] The seemingly fabulous Wesley Park—who was the first settler at Auburn, Indiana, and DeKalb County's first sheriff, road commissioner, road supervisor, jail commissioner, and clerk of the first county board—was actually a figure quite typical. We see blacksmith-judges and carpenter-sheriffs everywhere. See S. W. Widney, "Pioneer Sketches of DeKalb County", *Ind. Mag. of Hist.*, XXV, 116, 125–26, 128 (June 1929). "Few of the officials prior to 1850 [in Parke County, Indiana] were men of education. For years it was the custom to elect a coroner from among the stalwart blacksmiths. . . ." Maurice Murphy, "Some Features of the History of Parke County", *Ind. Mag. of Hist.*, XII, 151 (June 1916).

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Inasmuch as many new political rôles were being created by the needs of this new society, both necessity and opportunities for political careers might more and more be seen reflected in the long lists of candidates and high level of participation. In Hamilton County, Ohio, there was an election of delegates to the constitutional convention of 1802, and for ten openings there were ninety-four candidates—twenty-six of them receiving from 121 to 1,635 votes apiece.[27] The personal canvass, the practice of hawking one's political appeal from door to door, not generally assumed to have entered American politics until the Jacksonian era, was familiar in the Northwest well before 1824. A cabin-dweller's effusion in the *Illinois Intelligencer* of July 1, 1818, describes how hosts of candidates, at the approach of an election, would descend upon him with whisky, trinkets for the children, compliments, and grand promises.

> But what most rarely does my good wife please,
> Is that the snot nos'd baby gets a buss![28]

"And every body", wrote Baynard Rush Hall of Indiana's New Purchase, "expected at some time to be a candidate for something; or that his uncle would be; or his cousin, or his cousin's wife's cousin's friend would be; so that every body and every body's relations, and every body's relation's friends, were for ever electioneering." Even boys verging on manhood were "feared, petted, courted and cajoled."[29] Such arts of cajolery could be appropriate and necessary only to a society in which officials were watched far more closely and respected far less than was the magistrate of Boston or the justice of the peace in Fairfax County, Virginia. Hall, an Easterner of refinement, reflected with deep distaste that if "eternal vigilance" were the price of liberty it was well paid in the New Purchase, the "sovereign people" there being "the most uncompromising task masters": "Our officers all, from Governor down to a deputy constable's

[27] Bond, *op. cit.*, pp. 102, 124.

[28] Quoted in Solon J. Buck, *Illinois in 1818* (Springfield, 1917), p. 260. Consider again the power of "phatic communion": in the 1952 presidential election the governor of that same great state of Illinois might have been seen blandly kissing babies.

[29] Hall, *New Purchase*, p. 178.

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deputy and fence-viewer's clerk's first assistant, were in the direct gift of the people. We even elected magistrates, clerks of court, and the judges presiding and associate!" [30]

Thus the extraordinary animation with which the people of Craftown flung themselves into political activity may be seen richly paralleled in the life of the Old Northwest. Every militia muster, every cabin-raising, scow-launching, shooting match, and logrolling was in itself a political assembly where leading figures of the neighborhood made speeches, read certificates, and contended for votes. Sometimes at logrollings rival candidates would take charge of opposing sections of workers, fitness for office having much to do with whose group disposed of its logs first. The enterprising farmer understood, it is said, that this political energy could be exploited at its height about a month before election time, and tried to schedule his logrolling accordingly.[31]

Our concept of political democracy, it may be remembered, involved a homogeneous population. Can it be asserted that these early Northwest communities were characterized by such a population? There is striking evidence that both attributes of "homogeneity"—a similar level of aspiration and status, and conditions rendering impossible a prior structure of leadership—were widely present here, just as they were in Craftown. A leading symptom of this may be found in the land arrangements. Beverly Bond has made calculations, based on lists of lands advertised for delinquent taxes, as to typical holdings in the Northwest about 1812, and concludes that the "average farm" at that time was probably less than 250 acres.[32] Though such tentative statistics are embarrassing in themselves, the limiting conditions which make them plausible are clear enough—uniform conditions not only permitting but forcing a reduced scale of holdings. Much has been made of large engrossments of land by speculators in the Northwest Territory, yet before the admission of Ohio in 1803, and many years before that of

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 200–201, 177.

[31] Vogel, *loc. cit.*, p. 309. "Our candidates certainly sweat for their expected honours", Hall remarks. ". . . Nay, a very few hundreds of rival and zealous candidates would, in a year or so, if judiciously driven under proper task masters, clear a considerable territory." *Op. cit.*, p. 205.

[32] *Civilization of the Old Northwest*, pp. 331–32.

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Indiana and Illinois, it was apparent to all that the day of the great land magnate was at an end. His operations were doomed by the very techniques of settlement and by the measures taken by the settlers themselves to thwart his designs.

Despite large quantities of government land on the market, much of which was bought by speculators, the attraction of choice locations led regularly to settlement in advance of purchase—squatting, in short—especially when sales were delayed, as they often were. Thousands of such petty *faits accomplis* all over the Northwest frontier could hardly be reversed,[33] no matter how powerful the petitioners, and the terms of sale, reflected in a series of land laws ever more generous,[34] were but one indication of such a state of things. An even more formidable token of doom to the great absentee holder was revealed in the tax rates levied on unimproved land by the early legislatures. While all these future states were still under one territorial assembly, that body at its first session passed a law taxing three grades of land—a law which was only the first of several, each more severe than its predecessor, consecrated to the mission of breaking up large unimproved tracts held by nonresidents. Increasing powers were given to local sheriffs presiding over the sales of delinquent holdings.[35] This meant that in practice the large speculator, forced as he was to pay cash for these tracts, must effect relatively quick turnovers in a buyer's market: there was really plenty of land to be had and the costs of holding it for a rise were becoming higher year by year.[36] For the rest, with labor costs uniformly high and

[33] Buck, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 54–55. "The situation was so serious that the matter was taken up with the secretary of state, and the president issued a proclamation directing that after a certain day in March, 1816, all squatters on the public lands should be removed. Against the execution of this proclamation, Benjamin Stephenson, the delegate from Illinois territory, protested vigorously. . . . The marshal of the Illinois territory actually made preparations to remove the intruders; but the secretary of the treasury wrote him on May 11, 1816, recommending 'a prudent and conciliatory course'; and nothing seems to have been accomplished." *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[34] Notably the Congressional legislation of 1796, 1800 and 1804.

[35] Bond, *op. cit.*, pp. 337–38.

[36] A special situation in Illinois added to the difficulty of amassing large absentee holdings; actual sales of public land could not begin there until 1814 owing to the perplexity of the French claims, and the result was a growing population of squatters and slim pickings for speculators. Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

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with a population whose average resources, either in land or in liquid wealth, must initially be moderate, the great farm on the Southern model could never be a widespread reality. What this particularly indicates is that a land-holding élite—with all the traditional functions, social and political, that such an élite would certainly exercise—was rendered quite out of the question. The leadership of *this* society would have to be recruited on manifestly different terms.

Who was it, then, that organized the pressure for these land acts; who goaded the federal Congress into passing them; who connived in the legislature; who wrote the tax laws? Who indeed but the frontier politician who kissed the "snot nos'd baby" in that lonely cabin? He well understood how his majorities depended upon the zeal with which he and his friends could manipulate the government on their constituents' behalf. Their problems were concrete; the guaranteeing of preëmption rights was an urgency of the topmost order; this was the primary stimulus which forced the tax laws, the universal suffrage clauses in the state constitutions, and the Congressional land legislation. The "sovereign people" of the Old Northwest was a "most uncompromising task master" to its servants. Symbolic of the future was the case of William Henry Harrison, to whom fell the unhappy office of mediating, so to speak, between "the people" and the Northwest's greatest land speculator, John Cleves Symmes. Harrison, as territorial delegate to Congress, was successful in bringing about the Land Act of 1800 in the interests of the settlers but a dismal failure in his efforts to get justice for Symmes, his father-in-law, whose vast holdings in Ohio were crumbling away in an avalanche of claims and judgments. The unfortunate Symmes was no match for a thousand ruthless frontier manipulators.[37] The democracy

[37] Symmes had sold, in advance, a number of tracts outside his 1792 patent, expecting to take them up at 66⅔ cents an acre. Subsequently the price rose to $2.00, on which Symmes could not possibly make good. An original contract for 1,000,000 acres had been partly paid for in Continental certificates, and the patent of 1792 gave him title to those lands for which he had paid. Neither his influence nor that of Harrison was ever able to guarantee the entire claim of 1,000,000 acres. Meanwhile the Scioto Company had completely collapsed, and the representations of the Illinois and Wabash companies met with even less success than did those of Symmes.

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of the Northwest would be that of the squatter, the frontier business man, and, no doubt, that of the *small* speculator.

Granted that a structure of *landed* political leadership was impossible, might not a different species of élite appear, say an élite of lawyers? It is true that admission to the bar in the early days was a virtual guarantee of political advancement. But the stability of any such structure must be certified by some recognized assurance of self-perpetuation. The very recruitment patterns, the conditions under which political preferment had to be gained and held in the Northwest, should make us think twice before considering the great majority of lawyers in politics there as constituting such a structure. Every lawyer was literally on his own. It was the desperate need for wits and talent on the frontier that gave him his chance, a chance renewed by the community as long as he continued to deliver. Here the rôles of patron and client are reversed; it is difficult for a "ruling class" to establish and guarantee tenure under such conditions. Murray McConnel, the self-made lawyer of Jacksonville, was once warned that his politically ambitious young clerk—Stephen Douglas—was using him as a stepping-stone. "No matter," he replied, "his ambition will probably prove of more worth to the nation than all our modesty." [38] This was about the only kind of laying on of hands possible in the Northwest: the embodiment of success, of frontier virtue, was the self-made man.

What we have done so far is to discover a kind of "primitive" level of the frontier experience, a level at which a vast flow of problems forced a high degree of participation in the making of decisions, an acute pitch of political awareness among the settlers. The traditions of the pioneers remind us that this experience was not lost. An egalitarian tone was set, and ceremonial observances by which the experience was reinvoked and reshared made their way into the social habits of the people. Stephen Douglas, for one, understood its obligations, and by stopping at Geneva on one of his county canvasses to assist at a logrolling he was performing a symbolic act.[39]

[38] McConnel, *loc. cit.*, p. 95.

[39] Heinl, *loc. cit.*, p. 84. See also *supra*, note 15.

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Now another frontier was being developed at this same period in the Southwest, the frontier of Alabama and Mississippi, where scenes more or less similar were enacted. Yet we are unable to speak of "democracy" there with quite the same lack of ambiguity as we may with the Northwest. One reason for this is that throughout the Northwest the "problem-solving" experience did not generally stop with the taming of the savages and the establishment of law and order, but was continued, and indeed more or less perpetuated, on another level.

This second level of experience may be called that of town life. Let us remember that our focus has been fixed upon the *community* character of political democracy, involving a setting in which the people are close enough together to make common efforts possible, and a social texture thick enough to make it not only feasible but crucial to organize for a variety of objects. It is true enough that the basis of most such settlements was rural agriculture. But it is undoubtedly true as well that the ease with which the basic agrarian experience flowed into that of commercial small-urban enterprise was much greater and more natural in the Northwest than in the Southwest. The primitive, "agrarian" level of democracy is the one from which we have drawn democracy's folklore, a folklore still appropriate enough for our ceremonial. But it has been chronically difficult for our serious thought to go very far beyond it. The very vision of "grass roots democracy", with its herbivorous overtones, is itself a reproach to an urban culture to which it no longer seems to apply.[40]

Yet we should not feel that there is actually any paradox. Indeed, there are formidable reasons for concluding that the

[40] Thurman Arnold in his *Folklore of Capitalism* (New Haven and London, 1937) makes a parallel point in suggesting that the "traditions" of American business have been derived from a primitive phase in its development; Richard Hofstadter, in a forthcoming work on Populism and Progressivism, notes the same interesting fact with respect to our agriculture. These writers in each case stress the conceptual difficulties which the "myths" of an earlier stage impose upon the realities of a later, much-advanced one. Mr. Hofstadter metaphorically characterizes this polarity as "soft" and "hard". It might be added that a humane view of American culture would recognize a need, on the part of both the business man and the farmer, for "folklore": the need of each for dramatizing to himself his own rôle, for maintaining his self-respect.

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development of American small-town enterprise (and by extension, of urban capitalism) is most centrally—organically—connected with that of American political democracy.[41]

Watching the organization of the Old Northwest, county by county, we are struck by something which is not duplicated on our Southern frontier: the appearance of teeming numbers of *small towns*. By this we mean, not the post-office hamlet with its fifty souls, but rather the market center which had two hundred or more people and was struggling to become bigger. It was a development quite automatic and logical in the Northwest. Cheap land and dear labor set fatal limits on wide-scale land engrossment for purposes other than speculation (and we have already seen the limits set on speculation), so that, for agriculture, subsistence and market farming, rather than extensive raising of staples, would largely be the rule in the '30s and '40s. It was toward the town that an increasingly market-conscious population was orienting itself, not toward the plantation, nor to the cosmopolitan port city, nor yet to the crossroads courthouse. Large amounts of money, if and when made in the Northwest, had to come from commerce, from industrial activity, and from real estate whose value depended greatly on its nearness to or location in a town. It was unquestionably the town from which the tone of life in Ohio, Indiana and Illinois came to be taken, rather than from the agriculture in which an undoubted majority of the population was engaged. It is no exaggeration to say that there were five to six times as many such towns per capita here as in Alabama or Mississippi.[42]

[41] For years the late Professor Schumpeter maintained a theory of this sort. "History", he wrote, "clearly confirms this suggestion: historically, the modern democracy rose along with capitalism, and in actual connection with it. But the same holds true for democratic practice: democracy in the sense of our theory of competitive leadership presided over the process of political and institutional change by which the bourgeoisie reshaped, and from its own point of view rationalized, the social and political structure that preceded its ascendancy: the democratic method was the political tool of that reconstruction." Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York, 1947), pp. 296-97.

[42] The very gaps in available statistics are dramatic. We have no early figures for the Southwest, but by 1853 there were in Alabama only thirty towns with a population of over 200 and only twenty-nine in Mississippi. On the other hand as early as 1833 Indiana, with less than one-half Alabama's 1853 population, had

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The town, becoming the natural focus of exchange for goods and services in the Northwest, must thus inexorably be the focus of politics as well; this fact on the very face of it would mean a faster tempo of political life than on the rural countryside. Things were less simple in the town; the organizational needs were more involved; there were more functions to perform, more offices to fill. But what was it that so energized the Northwest town, what sustained this tempo, what made its democracy *real?* It was the fact that every town was a promotion.

The bright young man of talent and enterprise in the Northwest—unlike his opposite number in Alabama—naturally gravitated to the town; it was there that his future lay; rôles in politics or business were enacted from there rather than from rural strongholds. In the Northwest the typical success story of the young man with wits or money, or both, does not show him accumulating baronial acres for the cultivation of profitable staple crops. Instead, if it shows him buying up choice lands —and oftener than not it does—it is with quite different designs in view, designs centering on the development of town sites. It was estimated that during the boom years 1835, 1836 and 1837 over 500 new towns were laid out in Illinois alone.[43] The energetic Wesley Park, first settler at Auburn, Indiana, besides filling many local offices, besides using his cabin as hotel, jail, church and courthouse, had as a matter of course personally platted the town. He had done so, as had all Northwest town planners, to increase the value of his real estate and future

seventy-seven such towns, and Illinois, with one-fifth the 1853 population of Alabama, had thirty-four. By 1847, when Indiana's population had reached the 1853 level of Alabama, it had 156 towns whose population exceeded 200. If complete figures were available for towns of over 500 population the difference would be even more striking: while towns of this size were quite common in the Northwest, they were, aside from the port cities and state capitals, very rare in Alabama and Mississippi. As early as 1821 Ohio, with a population of 581,434, had sixty-one towns with a population of over 200, twenty-nine of 500 or more, and *twenty-two* of over a thousand. J. D. B. DeBow, *Statistical View of the United States . . . being a Compendium of the Seventh Census . . .* (Washington, 1854); John Scott, *Indiana Gazetteer* (Indianapolis, 1833); J. M. Peck, *A Gazetteer of Illinois* (Jacksonville, 1834); E. Chamberlain, *Indiana Gazetteer* (Indianapolis, 1850); John Kilbourn, *Ohio Gazetteer* (Columbus, 1821).

[43] William V. Pooley, *The Settlement of Illinois from 1830 to 1850* (Madison, 1908), p. 564.

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business prospects.[44] But there was an essential difference in type between this petty-urban speculator and the speculator who engrossed vast cotton lands and held them for a price rise. The distinction was between the monopolist and the promoter.[45]

It was the promotion which gave the tone to the entire life of the town, and most particularly to its politics, which meant that the placation and "cajolery" so displeasing to Baynard Rush Hall in the New Purchase would become, so to speak, universal in the town. Everyone understood that success must depend upon the town's prosperity, that it must be advertised, its virtues broadcast. The town must grow—it was vital to get people there and keep them there. Capital must be attracted—it was of the essence to allure the man with money.

The result was, naturally, a torrent of problems centering in the advancement of business. It was important for the town to obtain for itself the location of the county seat. Here the promoter donated land and made large promises to the county commissioners; in Mississippi the commissioners typically had to *buy* the land for a courthouse site.[46] The population must be

[44] In 1836, lots in Peoria sold as high as $100 per front foot while good neighboring farm land was still to be had at the standard price of $1.25 an acre. R. Carlyle Buley, *The Old Northwest: Pioneer Period* (Indianapolis, 1950), II, 116.

[45] This is very clear from an illuminating survey made by James W. Silver of land operations in Tate and Tippah counties, Mississippi, between 1836 and 1861. Most impressive in his findings are (1) the huge amounts of land in which the successful speculator had to deal, and (2) the lengths of time that these men customarily held their land before selling it. In these two counties alone, 337,000 acres were held by single investors, eight of whom held between 3,000 and 4,000 acres, six holding from 4,000 to 5,000 acres, four from 5,000 to 6,000, and three between 6,000 and 7,000; one owned between 10,000 and 15,000 acres, two between 15,000 and 20,000, and one over 25,000. Averages were struck for thirty-one individual speculators owning a total of 197,376.5 acres at an investment of $267,382.19 with profits of $244,824.24. But the average length of time held was *18.6 years;* the profit must thus be figured in terms not of quick killings but of average annual return. For a majority this came to less than 5 per cent. James W. Silver, "Land Speculation Profits in the Chickasaw Cession", *Jour. of South. Hist.*, X, 84–92 (Feb. 1944). This may be called "speculation", but it was speculation on an order quite different from that typically occurring in the Old Northwest.

[46] Here are two typical cases: Wesley Park, who in 1836 laid out the town of Auburn, Indiana, gave one third of the lots to the county, "receiving no compensation," as he piquantly admits, "but the assurance that it would be permanently the county seat." Widney, *loc. cit.*, p. 128. In that very same year, Bolivar County, one of the rich counties of the Delta, was being organized in Mississippi.

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increased, for this meant automatic benefits, more customers; in the cotton country it might mean greater competition and a drop in cotton prices. Capital must be brought in; expansion of plant was easier and less risky in an Indiana town than it would be on an Alabama cotton plantation. The town must be made attractive; it must be a suitable place to live in; it must have stable government; lapses of law and order would be a reflection upon its peace. Schools and seminaries must be established (no general public school system would exist in Alabama or Mississippi until after the Civil War);[47] roads, bridges, canals and banks were crucial for the nourishment of the town's enterprise. Civic services, churches, facilities of every sort, were urgently demanded. And the keynote, the watchword, the trumpet call, must be Opportunity.

Without a ready-made structure of leadership, how would such a myriad of problems be met and who would meet them? "In no country in the world", wrote Tocqueville, "has the principle of association been more successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objects, than in America." [48] How familiarly do the county chronicles dwell upon mass meetings for worthy objects, upon committees for the advancement of this or that; how appropriate that John Henry and Murray McConnel should trouble themselves for the Jacksonville Lunatic Asylum, for the College, for the Female Academy. Here was a society in

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The proceedings of the Board of Police (a year later) "show the acceptance of the offer of William Vick to sell five acres of land, including the overseer's residence, for the Seat of Justice," at a price of $100 an acre and $300 for the improvements. Florence Warfield Sillers and others, *History of Bolivar County, Mississippi* (Jackson, 1948), p. 12.

[47] A comparison of the two sections in 1840 with respect to primary and common schools is as follows:

	Alabama	*Miss.*	*Ohio*	*Indiana*	*Illinois*
Population	590,756	375,651	1,519,467	685,866	476,183
No. primary & common schools	659	382	5,186	1,521	1,241
Scholars in common schools	16,243	8,236	218,609	48,189	34,876

Abstracted from *Sixth Census*, U. S. Census Office (Washington, 1841).

[48] *Democracy in America*, p. 109.

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which the setting up of institutions was a common experience; indeed, Tocqueville thought that the typical American addressed him "as if he were addressing a meeting," and would infallibly say, "Gentlemen." [49] Everything on the balance line between politics and civic consciousness was directly related to the prosperity of the town's citizens. There was an acute general awareness of this. For instance, the business prospects of a town were much enhanced by its becoming the county seat, and a perennial feature in the history of each Northwest state was the "county seat war" in which entire communities took part. The efforts of towns to make the legislature locate or relocate the seat in their favor typically occasioned great lengths of maneuvering and often actual violence. Scarcely a county in all of Indiana failed to see one or more such "wars".[50]

The very factor of success—an accelerating population—created new enterprises and new opportunities in the Northwest town: an index might be found in the sheer numbers of small business men there in contrast to those in the Southwest.[51] It also created new problems, all of which meant that talent was at the highest premium. Consider the variety of rôles, commercial and political, to be filled. There would be a rôle for the man with money looking for a place to invest it, a rôle for the business man with a heavy stake in the community (the natural

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[50] In Crawford County, when the seat was first relocated, tradition says that the citizens of Fredonia went in a body to Mount Sterling and forcibly removed the records. "If the records were carried away by force," notes a chronicler, "it was only the first time; they have been carried away from each of the later county seats by force." What more excellent instance of democracy could be found than this ardent and universal participation in the concerns of the community? H. H. Pleasant, "Crawford County", *Ind. Mag. of Hist*, XVIII. 146 (June 1922). See also Ernest V. Shockley, "County Seats and County Seat Wars in Indiana", *Ind. Mag. of Hist.*, X, 26 (Mar. 1914).

[51] The story is best told by the Census figures.

	Alabama	*Miss.*	*Ohio*	*Indiana*	*Illinois*
Population	590,756	375,651	1,519,467	685,866	476,183
No. persons in commerce	2,212	1,303	9,201	3,076	2,506
No. persons in mfg. & trade	7,195	4,151	66,265	20,590	13,185

Abstracted from *Sixth Census* (1840).

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organizer, the booster); there would be one for the early settler-business man who knew the scene and who knew everyone (he would be the mediator of interests, the grand master placator). And a rôle would exist for the bright young lawyer who could make connections, who could manipulate the legislature: he he must get a charter for the bank, a charter for the academy; he must press for the county seat, the highway, the canal. Directly to his rear would be the entire town, pressing *him*. This dependence for success upon growth and development, this need for aggressive political representation, forced the community to seize upon whatever talent it could find and watch it closely. Those who rose in politics must continue to placate; the relation between economic welfare and politics was direct and continuing. Such a society would reward its adroitest politicians, not so much with awe and veneration[52] (their activities were too much a matter of general concern), but by reëlecting them to office: they were too badly needed to be dispensed with. Responsibility, here, meant the art of returning home with whatever a politically sensitive electorate might demand.

There is no better illustration of this complexity of political life on the local level, this intimate connection between business and politics, this variety of demand, diffusion of power, and diffusion of pressure than in the promotion of the internal improvement systems of the 1830s. Enthusiasm for improvements found expression all over the country, but the energy of the Northwest states was unmatched for subtle haggling, deep maneuvering, and grandiose objects. The "System" in each of them was like a tract of jungle, lush, overgrown, unplanned, extravagant, magnificent. In Ohio a public works program involving roads and canals at an estimated cost of $8,577,300 was coupled in 1837 with a general law for state aid in credit and subscriptions to private improvement schemes, an act variously known as the "Loan Law", the "General Improvement Law", and the "Plunder Law". The most relentless pres-

[52] Max Weber was much impressed by the later counterpart of the master placator, the American urban political boss. The boss was thoroughly responsible but not quite respectable. See *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1946), pp. 109–110.

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sures from all counties lay behind the fashioning of the bill.[53] The Indiana system, even more spectacular, was in 1836 embodied in a mammoth law of forty-four sections which provided for a network of roads, canals and railroads, omitting virtually no community in the state. It reflected the grand aggregate of many local pressures; the entire movement was of local rather than metropolitan origins,[54] and the interested assemblymen were involved in endless deals and logrollings.[55] The growth of the Illinois Internal Improvement Act of 1837, an imperial scheme of canals and railroads, was the result of a monster bargain. It was kindled by illuminations, bonfires and conventions of the citizenry everywhere, it was energized by the hopes of real estate speculators up and down the state, complicated by the rivalries of Springfield, Alton, Vandalia and Jacksonville over the location of the capital, and compounded by prodigious scheming and haggling in the legislature. Two master Illinois politicians, Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln, were in the very midst of it.[56]

Nothing of any resemblance to this occurred in Alabama or Mississippi, though they too were seized by the internal improvements enthusiasm of the 1830s. Allowing for the probability that the river systems of these states to some extent relieved the need for wide-scale transportation schemes, it is

[53] The Board of Public Works advised in its report "that nothing short of the extension of the canal navigation to every considerable district in the state will satisfy that public will, which justly claims that benefits conferred shall be coextensive with the burthens imposed; and that, in those districts, where canals cannot be made, an approximation to equality should be obtained by aid in constructing roads." The warning, in short, was that there must be something for everyone. Ernest L. Bogart, *Internal Improvements and State Debt in Ohio* (New York, 1924), p. 55.

[54] "The role of local government was typically not the planning of a great system of transportation. It was an attempt to gain a favorable competitive position for the particular community. . . ." Carter Goodrich, "Local Government Planning of Internal Improvements", POLIT. SCI. Q., LXVI, 442 (Sept. 1951).

[55] Esarey, *History of Indiana*, pp. 352–73.

[56] Theodore C. Pease, *The Frontier State, 1818–1848* (Springfield, 1918), pp. 194–219. Interesting unpublished material on the Illinois system exists: Alan Heimert, "The Internal Improvement Act of 1837: An Introduction to the Study of Illinois Politics in the 1830s" (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1950), and John Henry Krenkel, "Internal Improvements in Illinois, 1818–1848" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois, 1937).

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at the same time true that political machinery there was not organized in such a way that local pressures could be anticipated and reacted to with the sensitivity so characteristic in the Northwest. Little or nothing was done there.[57]

Now what was it in the Northwest that made these activities so classically democratic? It was dependence on the favor of large numbers of people in market communities where manipulation was a daily habit, dependence on a favor which must be constantly renewed. This was the process by which the "equal rights" attitude, so symbolic of the Jacksonian period, was developed: room for the aggressive young man on the make. This was the setting in which intolerance of cultural and religious differences could not be permitted to interfere with the promotion: the organizer must be free to boast of schools and churches for all.[58] And this fundamental tolerance,[59] this built-in attitude

[57] The state of Mississippi sought in vain to make a modest loan of $200,000 for internal improvements, backed by its 3 per cent fund, future land grants, and the faith of the state. Dunbar Rowland, *History of Mississippi* (Chicago-Jackson, 1935), I, 553–54. Alabama likewise did next to nothing, and when the Northwest's improvement systems collapsed with the panic of 1837, the governor even congratulated his state for having remained inactive. As late as 1851 Alabama's Committee on Internal Improvements noted bitterly that there had been "not one serious effort on the part of the Legislature to advance the great interests of agriculture, commerce, or manufactures. . . .Other states are rich because they are old, but our destiny seems to be to grow old and poor together." William E. Martin, "Internal Improvements in Alabama", *Johns Hopkins Studies in Hist. and Polit. Sci.*, XX, No. 4 (1902), 40, 73.

[58] Baynard Rush Hall, the first professor at Indiana University, was unpleasantly aware of this. "With our own eyes we saw Cash! handled it with our fingers: heard it jingle with our ears! and all at once 'high larning' became as popular as common schools. . . . Only show that a school, an academy, a college, or, *a church*, will advance the value of town lots—bring in more customers—create a demand for beef, cloth, pepper and salt, powder and shot; then, from vulgar plebeian dealing in shoe leather, up to the American *nobleman* dealing in shops, and who retails butter and eggs, we shall hear one spontaneous voice in favour!" *New Purchase*, p. 400.

[59] This connection between *practical* tolerance and business (ceremonial "tolerance" comes later) can hardly be too much emphasized. In 1849 there was a remarkable act of cultural assimilation in Jacksonville, Illinois. In that year 130 Portuguese exiles from the island of Madeira were brought there, civic committees having undertaken to find accommodations and situations for them, and urged that in coming the exiles "would thus learn our manners, our habits (we hope our good ones only), and our way of doing business of all kinds—and become useful to themselves, and in time amalgamated with us." It was a transaction managed

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of placation, had its other side. The booster would adjust to his neighbors but would adjust to no one who tried to limit *his* activities; he would instruct his representatives but would not tolerate their instructing *him*. The balance was a delicate one and easily upset by the vicissitudes of business.

Under such conditions a prior structure of leadership, a self-perpetuating planter oligarchy, an aristocracy of money and birth, would simply have melted away. A burgeoning capitalism recognizes no prior structures, is impatient of élites, tolerates few restraints. Expressed in classical theory this is *laissez faire;* acted out on the Illinois frontier it meant unfettered opportunity for all, careers open to talent, and a gleeful willingness to manipulate the government, starting at the local level, in any and all ways that might advance business. The principle whereby a small-town culture such as this accomplished its political needs was typically not that of *noblesse oblige*, but of the bargain. The agents were numerous, the demands constant, the haggling intense. The parallel, then, cannot be that of an élite holding sway, but rather of tradesmen maintaining a clientele.[60]

It is possible to compress virtually everything we have said about political democracy in the Old Northwest into the experience of a single county in Ohio. Let Stark County, organized in 1809, furnish that profile. There, the "primitive" level of pioneer democracy, forcing upon the settlers the burden of organizing communities and fashioning institutions, was to be seen in every township. There, the lack of seasoned leadership in Sandy township did not absolve the Hewitts, the Downings, the Van Meters, from serving as constables, sheriffs, justices of

with great efficiency by local groups, including the ladies of Jacksonville, and was highly beneficial to all. George R. Poage, "The Coming of the Portuguese", *Ill. State Hist. Soc. Jour.*, XVIII, 100–135 (Apr. 1925).

[60] Max Weber insisted that this was still true at a much later stage of development. "Industrial monopolies and trusts are institutions of limited duration; the conditions of production undergo changes, and the market does not know any everlasting valuation. Their power also lacks the authoritative character and the political mark of aristocracies. But monopolies of the land always create a political aristocracy." Gerth and Mills, eds., *From Max Weber*, p. 383.

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the peace, or from organizing themselves against the Indians. Nor was it possible to be fastidious in Plain township, where the uncouth Henry Friday, a paroled Hessian soldier, was the only man available for constable. (Once during a plague of locusts he had a locust pie made, "which he ate.") Rudy Bair, whose wife once threw firebrands at the wolves to protect her baby, was the first settler in Paris township; he was the first justice of the peace, a delegate to Ohio's constitutional convention, and a member of the first legislature.[61] The very profusion of public rôles during the first few years should give a key to the energy of the people who would shortly organize Canton, Massillon, Alliance and Louisville. The very first election in Lawrence township involved the naming of two justices of the peace, a clerk, a school examiner, three trustees, two overseers of the poor, two fence viewers, two appraisers of property, three supervisors, two constables, and a lister of taxables. This, multiplied by the number of townships (there were fourteen in Stark County by 1816) and added to the county officers,[62] is in striking contrast to the relatively simple organization of the Mississippi county court.

Stark County did have one landed baron, Bezaleel Wells, who had all the attributes which would seem to make for influence, leadership and power. Wells's career there, however, so similar in some respects to that of John Cleves Symmes, may typify the vulnerability of the great speculator to the aggressions of small operators in the early Northwest. Brought up in surroundings of refinement, Bezaleel Wells had become a staunch Federalist in the 1790s and had excellent political connections which included Arthur St. Clair and George Washington. His own public activity in Ohio included service as judge of probate, prothonotary to the Court of Common Pleas, clerk to the court

[61] Edward Thornton Heald, *The Stark County Story* (Canton, 1949), I, 42–50, 52–55; John Danner, *Old Landmarks of Canton and Stark County* (Logansport, 1904), pp. 43, 470.

[62] Heald, *op. cit.*, p. 66. County organization at that time called for three or more justices of the peace, tax commissioners, a sheriff, a coroner, a recorder, a treasurer, a license commissioner, and justices and clerks of the various courts. Ohio Historical Records Survey Project, Inventory of the County Archives of Ohio, No. 76, *Stark County* (Columbus, 1940), p. 23.

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of general quarter sessions of the peace of Jefferson County, member of the Ohio constitutional convention, and state senator. Having realized substantial profits from purchases of over 15,000 acres in the Steubenville area, he shifted his activities in 1805 to the present Canton township, undoubtedly with foreknowledge of the Indian treaty of Fort Industry. Though the tax laws and the Harrison Land Act had meanwhile made large-scale operations less feasible than they had been at Steubenville, his holdings of 6,500 acres in Osnaburg, Plain and Canton townships still put him in a class by himself.

Since competition had become greatly enlarged, with new towns being platted everywhere, it was clear to Wells that at Canton he must become a promoter. His inducements for attracting settlers were of the most royal sort: wide streets were laid out, whole blocks were donated for schools and churches, and special terms were offered for the purchase of town lots. He even sponsored a horse race at the south end of town to stimulate interest in sales. He made princely offers to the county commissioners to induce them to fix the county seat at Canton; sizable gifts of land and proceeds of sales were to be turned over to the county should Canton be chosen. The seat was, in fact, located there in 1808, but the artful commissioners—themselves small business men and petty speculators—seized upon the vague and contradictory wording of the proposals to exploit Wells in the most callous fashion. They accused him of fraud; by means of court action and merciless pressure they finally made him disgorge 150 unsold lots and a choice courthouse location. Meanwhile Wells, attempting to set up another town in Wayne County, was forced to liquidate the venture when his town failed to be chosen as county seat, and after the disastrous fray with the Stark commissioners his name virtually disappears from Canton history. By 1829 we see Bezaleel Wells—the only man in Stark County's early annals who might possibly have qualified, by virtue of wealth, experience, and extent of land-holdings, for anything like a position of privilege—taking the pauper's oath in a debtor's prison. He had failed as a placator.[63]

[63] Edward T. Heald, *Bezaleel Wells, Founder of Canton and Steubenville, Ohio* (Canton, 1948).

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What of the "secondary" level of democracy in Stark County, that of small-town enterprise? The county's first eleven permanent towns were established between 1805 and 1816—an average of one a year—which was different from the way it was in Alabama: there, even by 1850, only twenty-eight towns of over 200 inhabitants could be found in the whole state.[64] For the success of any of these eleven towns the factor of growth was crucial, and the promoter's art was at a premium. It involved the immediate setting up of services; schoolhouses were built before there were children enough to fill them. It called for toleration, since business always came before religious particularism; it called for placation, and, especially, for the instinct of manipulation; James Leeper's failure to donate lots for churches and schools cost Osnaburg the county seat.[65] The initial problems of settlement were thus carried over into those of promotion, and rôles for the politician and manipulator went hand in hand with rôles for the business man and promoter.

That these rôles, both commercial and political, were not only profuse but interchangeable is seen in the careers of Canton's earliest leading citizens. One result of Bezaleel Wells' disappearance from Canton's town life "was the growth of a democratic, self-reliant, enterprising group of town leaders, who took matters into their own hands." Among the foremost of these, as might be expected, was the chief man on the board of commissioners which had ravished Wells of his holdings, the tavernkeeper Samuel Coulter. Besides entertaining the public, Coulter practiced law, speculated in land, was one of the first trustees of the Farmers' Bank, and served as Judge of the Court of Common Pleas. William Fogle, who kept a general store, was also a county commissioner and later became trustee, director and cashier of the Farmers' Bank, from which he resigned in 1816 to accept the county treasurership. John Shorb, Canton's first storekeeper, became the Bank's first president, was instrumental in founding the first Catholic church, and was highly

[64] "All of them except Tuscaloosa were situated in agricultural communities; and Tuscaloosa was not really an exception, inasmuch as the mineral resources in the vicinity had not then been developed." Thomas H. Owen, *A History of Alabama and Dictionary of Alabama Biography* (Chicago, 1921), II, 265.

[65] Heald, *Stark County Story*, pp. 12, 94-96, 217.

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active in public affairs at large. James Lathrop, a young Connecticut Yankee brimming with talent and ambition, having been admitted to the bar the year of his arrival, plunged instantly into public life, organizing Canton's first library, becoming its librarian, and leading the movement for an Academy. Lathrop was appointed receiver for the Bank when it failed in 1818; he helped get the town incorporated in 1822 and became the first town president; he was elected county auditor the same year and went to the legislature two years later, serving several terms and heading the committee which wrote Ohio's first compulsory school tax law. His name is preserved in Canton legend. The hatter, George Stidger, arriving from Baltimore in 1807, organized and commanded his own company in the War of 1812 and rose to the rank of general. Upon his return, having accumulated considerable real estate before the war, he built a tin and copper shop, set up a tanyard, and ultimately amassed a veritable chain system of such enterprises. He served as Judge of the Court of Common Pleas.[66]

These were the men who headed Canton's "first families". They and their descendants became the only "aristocracy" that Canton could ever have.*

STANLEY ELKINS
ERIC MCKITRICK

NEW YORK CITY

[66] Heald, *Bezaleel Wells*, pp. 113–14, 118–19, 122, 126; Danner, *Old Landmarks*, p. 451; Heald, *Stark County Story*, pp. 6, 94–114, 119–123, 126–33, 135.

* A second article, dealing more directly with the Southwestern and New England frontiers, will appear in the December issue of the QUARTERLY.—ED.

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THE INTEGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

The construction of a united Europe, the remodeling of the Western half of the Continent into an economic-political unity within the framework of the Atlantic community, constitutes one of the major problems of our times. Both America and Russia could pursue their development according to their own intrinsic laws if Western Europe simply did not exist at all. But the fact that Western Europe does exist, and that it has as yet found neither its new form nor its final position in the world political pattern, aggravates the world-wide political tension. Thus the further development of Western Europe is not merely a Western European affair. Both the United States and Russia have long understood this, and both of them endeavor to influence Western Europe's development in accordance with their own interests. They both call for integration, but this word has a different meaning depending on whether it is used by Washington or by Moscow. The Russian method of integration consists in creating a sort of telephone network, which connects every subscriber with the central telephone exchange but makes inadequate provision for direct lines between them. The Americans take a quite different view of the Western European problem: they are pressing for the unification of Western Europe as a region and would consider it as an advantage for the Atlantic community to have a sound and united Western Europe participate in their joint efforts as a partner, along with a rapidly progressing Canada.

Integration thus constitutes a much more complex problem for the Western world than it does for the East, where the solution envisaged would consist in a simple dictatorial move. Integration in the Western sense must primarily be a consciously voluntary act. Walter Lippmann wrote: "It may be that the French could be dragooned into ratifying EDC . . . but it will be a poor kind of diplomatic victory. . . ."[1] And one of the leading advocators of Western European integration, the Dutch

[1] *New York Herald Tribune*, European Ed. Nov. 3, 1953.

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Foreign Minister J. W. Beyen, stated along the same lines: "The vital European question is, whether a supra-national policy will be agreed upon voluntarily and freely, or whether it will be forced upon us in the form of an intervention from outside." [2]

The fact that the United States, as opposed to Soviet Russia, does not exercise any direct pressure on the countries coöperating with her is the reason for the slower rhythm of development. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that a final failure of the European Defense Community would, necessarily, lead to an "agonizing reappraisal" of the entire American defense policy. This statement cannot be interpreted, however, as direct pressure on France and Italy, since Mr. Dulles did not set a term for ratification; nor did he attempt to formulate an alternate form of United States defense policy. The satellite countries of Eastern Europe began their integration process before even beginning to realize what such a process would cost them; and when finally they did realize this, it was too late to retrace their steps or even to stop in their tracks.

We must now touch upon the question as to why the nations of Western Europe—who undoubtedly are endowed with the greatest heritage of general culture—need so much time to discover basic truths which will appear absolutely self-evident in historical retrospect. They cling to the concept of national sovereignty as if it were a gospel derived from the laws of nature, fearing that any deviation from that concept would bring about the death of their nation. As late as 1953 a well-known Sorbonne professor stated: "*La souveraineté nationale est une et indivisible.*" But men had lived for thousands of years before the concept of national sovereignty was even known! National sovereignty is merely the political expression of a technical and cultural *niveau*, some kind of magic formula used in political calculations. Its only objective is to enable the people and the nation to realize their common aspirations to the largest possible extent. These aspirations are subject to change, but they remain much the same during a given era. In our world of today these aims are security and prosperity. From this point of view national

[2] Lecture delivered in Basle, on Sept. 4, 1953.

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sovereignty still offers the best formula as far as the United States and Russia are concerned, but this philosophy becomes obsolete when applied to Western Europe, since such small political units can neither defend themselves nor achieve substantial economic progress on their own. Western Europe therefore must sacrifice parts of its national sovereignties in order to achieve a political way of life leading toward greater security and increased prosperity.[3]

What Is Meant by Integration?

The attempted federation of Western Europe shows only superficial similarities with the development which took place six and a half centuries ago in Switzerland and 150 years ago in North America. In both those cases there was an integration of political structures which had not yet developed any cultural individualities and which, economically, did not differ from each other to any large extent. Paul-Henri Spaak made this clear in Strasbourg in November 1951 at a meeting between members of the United States Congress and various European parliaments. He pointed to three major mental blocks which are dividing the peoples of Western Europe: the multitude of languages, vested interests in each individual national economic structure, and the memory of past foreign occupation. (In this respect England and Sweden constitute exceptions.)

Although well aware of these facts, Paul G. Hoffman, then Administrator of the Economic Co-operation Administration, addressing the Council of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation on October 31, 1949, ventured to put forward the idea of integration. This word sounded so stupendous at the time that serious efforts to give a closer definition of it were not made until some time later. With reference to the economic significance of the term, Mr. Hoffman himself supplied a definition:

> The substance of such integration would be the formation of a single large market within which quantitative restrictions . . . and eventually all tariffs are permanently swept away.

[3] Even as a federation of states, Western Europe could not achieve complete economic and tactical independence; this, however, is due to geographical and economic factors, which fall outside the scope of this essay.

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The formula of the French political writer Raymond Aron reflects the same thought in other terms:

> Two different economic units may be said to be the more highly integrated when transactions between two individuals, one in each of the two units, resemble transactions between two individuals in the same unit.[4]

The creation of the Coal and Steel Community aims at this objective, at least with regard to six countries and within the restricted scope of two basic materials. However, there still exist widely divergent views as to what should be understood by political integration and how such a concept could be translated into reality; and as usual in cases of such divergence, the differences of opinion frustrate any form of positive progress. The drafting of a European constitution, the task assigned to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community under the chairmanship of Heinrich v. Brentano, the German delegate, in the winter of 1952, has so far given rise to more controversy than agreement. For that reason, the so-called "Luxembourg Plan" has recently been advanced, according to which any further work on the European constitution is to be held in abeyance. One special point contained in that Plan should, however, be specifically stressed and be translated into reality as soon as practicable: the election of a European Parliament, through direct, popular vote. (It should be recalled that both the Council of Europe and the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community are composed of delegates of the various national parliaments.) This new European Parliament would have one main task which would consist of adopting the balance of the constituent parts of a European constitution. Thereby, its supporters hope that this constitution would gain respect in the realm of public opinion of the various member countries and its acceptance would be facilitated.

Any form of political union presupposes the subordination of individual and immediate interests to more far-reaching joint objectives. The Dutch politician J. W. Beyen, in the speech referred to above, draws a striking picture of the psychological difficulties inextricably connected with any such attempts

[4] *Lloyds Bank Review*, April 1953.

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> It is far easier to induce people to sacrifice their individual interests under the pressure of an enemy threat, than to unite them in voluntary and peaceful coöperation for their common interest without the existence of any such outside threat.

To the extent that it is conscious of the Russian threat, Western Europe is prepared to engage in joint action, but even that willingness is limited by certain mental reservations. The firm attachment to the unanimity clause as regards any intergovernmental agreements since the end of the war (Brussels Pact, Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Council of Europe) shows that Europeans do not have full confidence in the principle of coöperation and do not want to accept directives even from a qualified majority. Only once so far has integration in its true sense succeeded in Europe, that is, in connection with the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community. This success should probably be credited to two particularly favorable circumstances: the Pool was concerned with two branches of the economic development, traditionally connected in public opinion with the concept of international cartels; and the Russian threat to the free world appeared particularly acute at that time. Had the Coal and Steel Pool agreement been submitted at a later date than it actually was (May 1951), it would never have been signed, and if the ratification process in the six parliaments had been delayed for one reason or another, ratification would probably have become impossible by the spring of 1952.

No other form of coöperation offers Western Europe better prospects for revival than integration. A condition precedent to integration must naturally be an effort to respect national characteristics in so far as they are compatible with common and basic Western European interests. In this connection Western Europe has one point in common with the United States, while fundamentally differing from her on another. The United States and Western Europe both comprise wide areas encompassing completely different economic and living conditions, but, whereas in the United States this factor does not in any important way affect the spiritual unity of the inhabitants, the same factors are being overemphasized in Europe. Therefore, Western

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European integration can succeed only if entered upon with the utmost caution, limiting the competence of the supra-national authority initially to as few sectors of political life as possible, and giving sufficient leeway to individual national feelings.

Nevertheless—in view of the fact that the peoples of Western Europe cling so closely to their spiritual characteristics, and that the politically developed strata so stubbornly adhere to the concept of national sovereignty—it would be doubly desirable to emphasize the supra-national character of this integration from the beginning and to use it as the cornerstone of all the common institutions. Such coöperation can succeed only if rivalries, susceptibilities and national vanity are discarded in favor of a common discipline. And since this aim—with the exception of the Coal and Steel Community—has not as yet been attained in any field of endeavor, the organization of Western European coöperation remains a laboriously slow undertaking. In responsible quarters concerned with these questions, the idea has become firmly established that the OEEC operates satisfactorily even on an inter-governmental level; as regards the Council of Europe, however, these very quarters show only a very slight interest, while public opinion shows even less. Does not this difference in appreciation emanate from the fact that the OEEC was handling the distribution of the dollar aid, whereas a pronouncement on political problems in Strasbourg did not entail any such immediately tangible advantages?

Opposite Political Currents

All the peoples and governments of Western Europe harbor a common desire to strengthen coöperation, but cannot agree among themselves as to its extent and methods. The problem is further complicated by the fact that many countries reflect variations in their domestic policies in their dealings with their European partners.

At the start Great Britain was inclined merely to advocate a friendly, informal understanding based on frequent consultations. Even today, her reaction to the invitations from the Continent remains, psychologically and politically, a firm "No." Originally, France very much favored a closely knit integration,

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to be achieved through the creation of strong supra-national organizations, but she has changed her attitude, beginning in early 1953. In the Benelux countries the trend developed in the opposite direction: originally Belgium was for and Holland rather against close integration. In the meantime, however, both have softened their attitudes. Germany and Italy were firmly in favor of a supra-national organization, in part for variable reasons. These attitudes call for an explanation.

The British fear that a written agreement would bind them, even if at a later date a concrete issue should arise against the background of a different general situation. Furthermore the London government constantly refers to its obligations to the Commonwealth, asserting that these preclude firm political obligations in Western Europe. We must admit that, as far as the psychological argument goes, the continental situation is rather confused. But, on analysis, the political argument sounds rather like a pretext, particularly in view of the fact that conferences of the premiers of the Commonwealth have twice given England the "green light". Despite that go-ahead signal, England subsequently maintained that she still was unable to participate actively in continental integration. This pretext is invoked, presumably, so that England shall not be definitely condemned to play merely the part of *primus inter pares* on the Continent.

The unexpected rise of Germany, with the danger that an integrated Continent would be increasingly exposed to German influence, was the reason for the rather abrupt change in France's European policy. Instead of incorporating this growing source of strength in the integrated whole at the very beginning through a bold political reform and thus making it a useful component of the European "nucleus", many French statesmen seem to be seeking a means of limiting and influencing Germany's use of her forces—an undertaking which has never met with lasting success at any time in the course of history.

In the beginning Italy enthusiastically supported organic Western European integration, on the assumption that this constituted the best means of leveling out differences between former victors and losers. In view of the fact that this cycle

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had already run its full course, however, in the form of Italy's partnership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the integration current emerged considerably weakened from the last Italian elections. For the time being this same leveling argument still applies to Germany; furthermore, all clear-thinking Germans know that they have always been mentally oscillating between humility and excessive pride. At the start, they therefore aspired to ties within the framework of an integrated Western Europe, in order to shed their humility complex; and they maintain this attitude today, in order not to be tempted to aspire beyond their normal rôle within the scope of such a pattern. On the other hand, the Socialists have been against any type of integration with the West from the very beginning, because they deem the reunification of the two parts of Germany more important, and fear that the realization of their main political aim would become more difficult if such an integration were to take place. The Right wing of German political parties opposes integration because it would raise serious obstacles to the free development of excessive national pride, which is one of the basic characteristics of its political thinking.

In spite of continental disagreement, the integration of at least the six countries forming the European "nucleus" would have progressed more rapidly, had not Great Britain initially opposed such a development. That is the reason why the Coal and Steel Community was formed outside the Council of Europe. Not until its breach with Strasbourg had become a reality, and the Coal and Steel Community had been constituted independently, did London realize its mistake; the British government then made its first, but important, step toward integration, declaring on August 2, 1952 that it would no longer oppose regional special agreements within the framework of the Council of Europe. Since then England has entered into close relations with the Coal and Steel Community, an arrangement which seems to work out quite satisfactorily, and on September 23, 1953, Under Secretary of State Anthony Nutting, on behalf of the British government, stated in Strasbourg that it wanted to coöperate more closely with the European Defense Community than its previous attitude might have indicated.

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A new pattern of international relations is thus in the making in Western Europe. To the extent that further agreements concerning a limited coöperation will be concluded, integration will be limited to the continental countries, but existing and future structures will develop their relationships with England and probably also with the three Scandinavian states, on the basis of special agreements. Only the continental alliances will be supra-national; thus the word integration in its true sense will apply only to the Continent. But the less organic and more temporary agreements with England and the Scandinavian group, concluded individually from case to case, may also prove very useful, particularly if, in the course of a few decades, they imperceptibly harden into some sort of Western European political tradition, firmly anchored in the soul of its peoples.

The Council of Europe Has Not Lived up to Expectations

In April 1949, when the Council of Europe was created, it seemed destined to become both a starting and a rallying point for all efforts aimed at European integration. These hopes, however, did not come true. With the exception only of the recent plan to settle the Saar dispute between France and Germany, subsequent initiatives did not come from Strasbourg, nor were they translated into action there. There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon.

The Council of Europe was conceived as a "European" body in the true sense of the word and intended to rally all the free European countries (with the exception of Spain). It did not, however, offer the same advantages as the OEEC, which was charged with allocating credits and with organizing the economic pattern of Europe. Thus the Council of Europe did not have a sufficient reserve of centripetal power. It soon became obvious that the Council's terms of reference were too broad. Too many special interests clashed in Strasbourg and the Consultative Assembly soon split into two groups: one of them comprised countries which were interested only in seeking preliminary contacts—primarily Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries—and the other consisted of countries preparing for true integra-

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tion, that is, the group of six countries which now form the European "nucleus".

This fundamental difference not only obstructed agreement in Strasbourg, but also rendered even more difficult the coöperation between the Consultative Assembly (the Strasbourg parliament) and the Commitee of Ministers (which is all-powerful, within the terms of the statutes of the Council of Europe). Originally, the Committee of Ministers reserved the right to define the scope of the problems which the Assembly would be permitted to discuss, and, as a matter of principle, military problems thus were at the beginning outside the competence of the Assembly. Furthermore, the Committee of Ministers is free to consider or disregard any recommendations made by the Assembly, and in most cases it did the latter. The debates of the Assembly were gradually reduced to the level of academic recommendations and the definition of national approaches to various problems; not until last September, during the debate on Paul-Henri Spaak's report on the common Western European policy toward Russia, did the Assembly act in a "European" spirit, trying to amalgamate the various national attitudes into a supra-national synthesis.

The development up to date is even more disappointing in view of the fact that every meeting of the Strasbourg Assembly brought together the most outstanding representatives of Western European parliamentary life. The psychological inhibitions there may be considerably attributed to the fact that the Strasbourg organization, like the European idea as a whole, does not meet with any real response among the broad masses. Certainly the representatives of the peoples should have the courage to think and act in a European way in their national parliaments and even more so in a European Assembly, but we must remember that many of them harbor doubts, since their electorate has not clearly given them this mandate.

We have touched upon the crux of the question: why is such a beautifully imagined political institution as the Council of Europe at a standstill, and almost unnoticed by the masses? What Western Europe lacks is methodical, lasting information media, operating with the help of modern technique and supplied with sufficient financial support. Now and again, it is true, the

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European Movement tries to fill the gap, but it lacks funds and, apparently, an efficient central organization; furthermore, its information materials reach only those who are already predisposed toward positive European thought. The Western European countries (with the exception of Spain and Portugal) have a democratic structure, and their political life is rooted in their parliaments. Therefore, such an important political development as European integration cannot be realized without positive action on the part of public opinion—and obviously never against it. Again and again ideas have been advanced and projects planned, but in vain. With the single exception of the Coal and Steel Community, no real integration project has been crowned by success, because governments were concerned about the attitudes of their parliaments, and the members of parliament were concerned about the reaction of their electorate. You cannot start building a pyramid from the top, and as long as the base of European integration is not the broad masses, any new project will necessarily meet with indifference, if not outright refusal. Because of this basic shortcoming, limited single projects are more likely to meet with success than concepts of a more general, wider scope. Thus the Council of Europe, for the time being, will continue to be condemned to a rather subordinate part, although its recent achievement in the matter of the Saar is highly creditable and holds out promise of further valuable contributions in connection with problems of limited scope.

The Organization for European Economic Co-operation

The OEEC is the oldest of the joint organizations which were formed in Western Europe after the end of the war. Among the consultative organizations the OEEC has proved to be by far the most effective. Its original task, the allocation of dollar aid and the leadership of European reconstruction, has been completed; in the meantime, however, the Organization has turned, with gratifying success, toward the establishment of an intra-European payments union and the fight for trade liberalization, opposing quota restrictions and discriminatory measures that obstruct trade among the participating countries. Joint action in these two fields was so urgently called for that the early

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opponents of it did not question the objectives of these moves, but rather the working methods involved in them.

This favorable basis for the activities of the OEEC should, however, not lead us to overlook the weakness of the organization. As it does not have any supra-national powers, every decision must be made unanimously by the participating countries. The fact that the OEEC, in spite of such obstacles, has been able to achieve positive results is obviously due to the advantages it had to offer. Frictions, of course, did arise within the European Payments Union, particularly because certain countries had accumulated too-considerable credits and attempted to get a larger percentage of gold in the clearing. They protested, fretted and threatened, but nevertheless remained members of the Organization in order to continue to enjoy the advantages it offered—particularly the prohibition of discriminatory measures in trade relationship between member countries. In one case, when Germany had accumulated too large a debit balance, the Organization acted in an advisory capacity, and the rapid restoration of the German foreign trade balance in 1951 can, to a considerable extent, be chalked up to the credit of the OEEC.

The fact that the OEEC does not have any supra-national authority, however, has prevented it from any effective intervention in French economic and financial policies; and since 1952 France has constituted a stumbling block to further liberalization of intra-European trade. Luckily, a general improvement of the economic situation in all of Western Europe has made it possible for France to settle her financial obligations within the scope of the European Payments Union out of her own means; and the Governor of the Bank of France recently stated that France was in a position to participate in a collective action tending toward the return of free convertibility. As regards her economic obligations, that is, trade liberalization, she is still slow and hesitating in their fulfillment. In any event, it is only indirectly because of the efforts of the OEEC that the liberalization of the trade and payment traffic between its member states has brought about an improvement in the economic situation of each of them.

It would certainly be an advantage to the various participating countries if the OEEC could obtain more powers, in order to

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prevent mistakes in the individual national economic policies and to influence the economic development of the various participating countries according to the aim of the Organization. A reference of the Secretary General of the OEEC, Robert Marjolin, in a speech at the Congress of the Parliamentarians of the European Movement in Paris, in May 1954, shows how very far the Organization still remains from that ultimate aim. In his opinion, unanimous decisions, even though limited in scope in order to reach unanimity, are preferable to majority decisions which would be executed only unwillingly and incompletely by the dissenting countries if they deviated too far from national economic policy and goals.

Thus, the main problem of the OEEC has been and remains the creation of international discipline in currency and economic questions. Its congenital weakness, referred to above, will become increasingly noticeable in the course of the gradual return to the convertibility of Western European currencies. If one single country—or a limited number of countries—should adopt a policy of convertibility, at the expense of free foreign trade, this would only *seem* to be a step forward; intra-European trade constitutes such a considerable part of the total foreign trade of the OEEC countries that convertibility of currencies—however valuable it may be—would become too expensive a victory if it had to be bought at the cost of trade liberalization, or by raising the existing customs barriers.

The work of the OEEC therefore constitutes a kind of "test case" with respect to Western European integration. If the Organization, while working on a consultative basis, can succeed in creating a common discipline and securing observance of that discipline, it will have proved that Western Europe can accomplish constant and guaranteed coöperation according to the pattern recommended by the British, that is, without any supra-national arrangements.

The European Coal and Steel Community—The Showpiece of Integration

As a supra-national organization, the High Authority—the executive body of the Coal and Steel Community—can devote itself exclusively to its great and complex tasks. It has created

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a common market, abolished customs barriers and lifted quota restrictions, but it has not as yet eliminated cartels and is presently tackling other major problems such as cheaper railway rates for "through" transports, facilities for the crossing of international frontiers within the Community and the equal pricing of steel sold by the Community to all consumers.

If the undoubted initial successes of the Community have not been in themselves sufficient to insure the victory of the supra-national idea, at least among the six countries of the European "nucleus", a considerable part of the reason lies in the fact that the positive results of the common market have not yet been understood in all quarters, while, on the other hand, those industrialists who were immediately concerned have already felt the impact of its negative results. Strange though it may sound, the general attitude in political and high economic circles in these six countries today is less favorable to such agreements than it was when their success was more questionable. The European Defense Community and other preliminary projects, therefore, could not in any way benefit from the similarity of their pattern to that of the Coal and Steel Community. Large political and economic groups spare no arguments to engineer the collapse of these projects. They question the viability not only of the proposed organizations but even of the already existing Coal and Steel Community, and they predict its final collapse, while endeavoring, with all the means at their disposal, to precipitate this.

Under prevailing circumstances, therefore, the Coal and Steel Community cannot be used as the example for other integration projects. As regards political problems, it goes too far, uncompromisingly subordinating national interests to supranational objectives; on the other hand, it is dismissed in economic quarters as a prototype, since it covers merely two raw materials, which traditionally have been produced, priced, distributed and exported under conditions largely affected by international considerations. This, however, is a unique state of facts, the exception which cannot be taken as a rule. This, also, is the argument of business circles which would like to keep their current freedom of movement within their own economic branch of the domestic market.

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The European Defense Community— The Do or Die of Integration

In the minds of the six peoples forming the "nucleus" of Europe, the EDC touches what President Lincoln called "the mystic chords of memory". However much these peoples may yearn for an understanding with their neighbors, these aspirations for a better future cannot erase the memories of a thousand years of strife. Their protection against assault, plunder and foreign occupation has been in the hands of their own armies during their entire history. To give up these national armies and entrust their defense policy to a supra-national organization looks to many a Frenchman like an adventure in foreign policy. A poll conducted by the French magazine *Réalités* at the beginning of November 1953 showed that even in France 46 per cent of the replies were for and only 22 per cent against the EDC; 19 per cent had not formed any opinion and 13 per cent did not want to express one. This is not a bad result, but what is distressing is that hardly anybody took notice of this poll. The formation of a group of 200 anti-EDC members of Parliament out of a total of 900 seemed much more newsworthy. This fortuitous juxtaposition of two attitudes reflects in a flash the problem of continental integration. Its progress is being slowed down, though probably not definitively obstructed, because the opposition fights actively while its supporters pursue a policy of watchful waiting.

The EDC also involves difficult psychological problems. The French want to be the leading Power on the Continent, not because they feel strong but because they feel weak. In order not to fall under German leadership they claim the leading part for themselves. The Germans accept EDC today because they have now reached, in their recovery process, a stage of convalescence after an era of humility, and the EDC thus corresponds to an attitude accepted by broad segments of the German nation. The small nations are still turning toward France for leadership, because they have fallen into the habit since the First World War, but they no longer have any real confidence in France's leadership. This may appear completely incomprehensible in the United States, where the exclusive nationalism of the Euro-

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peans is unknown. In America, nationalism is a constructive force, in Western Europe largely a defensive attitude. For this reason the European Army is subject to different appreciations on the two sides of the Atlantic. American officers calculate the fire-power of a division, but in Western Europe the country of origin of the guns is a matter of importance as well. Therefore, nobody in Western Europe, except possibly a segment of the German population, really loves the EDC, not even its most ardent advocators. During his press conference at the last NATO Ministerial Meeting, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. W. Beyen, for instance, asserted that EDC was not an aim in itself but, in the last analysis, only a means, even though one of the most effective means, to further the integration of Western Europe into a political and economic unit. The ex-president of the French Council of Ministers, Robert Schuman, recently expressed the same opinion, thus reëmphasizing that the French ratification of EDC is more and more becoming the central point in the over-all policy of Western European integration.

The European Constitution

For years a theoretical fight has been raging in Western Europe as to whether efforts tending toward integration should be placed on a functional or a federal level. The former alternative means the creation of joint organizations with a limited sphere of activity but with supra-national powers (Coal and Steel Community), while the latter implies the creation of a broad political framework, gradually expanding to comprise organized coöperation to an ever-increasing extent. The project relative to a European constitution falls within the scope of the latter alternative. It must be characterized, however, as a bold political jump into the future, since the peoples of Europe have in no way been sufficiently prepared for such a reform. The gap between its objectives and its practical possibilities became obvious in the course of the work of attempting to draft such a document. The right of objection on the part of the member states against any decisions made by the central authority is to be safeguarded to a much higher extent than in Switzerland or the United States, since each national element fears

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that it might sell its national sovereignty for a dish of federal lentil soup, and that within the scope of the new structure a majority might satisfy its aspirations at the expense of a minority. Therefore the Western European Senate—provided the European constitution were to be drafted under the conditions prevailing today—would play a much more important part in domestic politics in the member states than is the case in America or in Switzerland. What is much more serious, a Council of Ministers representing the national governments would have to be created. A number of specified measures would have to be approved—unanimously or by qualified majority—by this Council. Thus, the principle of federation, should it ever materialize in the shape of the draft constitution, would emerge heavily mauled.

Within every federal nation, the member states are the real sources of sovereignty; the federal organs merely exercise those powers which have been explicitly entrusted to them according to the directives of the member states and under their constitutional control. The European "nucleus" now runs the risk of limiting the part to be played by the projected common authority, as well as its freedom of action, to an excessive extent. The result would be merely to transfer the national rivalries from the national chancelleries to the various offices of a joint authority. The United States went through a similar development more than 150 years ago, and even the first Swiss federal Constitution needed a period of consolidation. It is therefore better to be content with a modest beginning than to try to press for too rapid a development and thus provoke nationalistic protests. Eventually, world political and economic developments will inevitably bring about an expansion of the pattern of coöperation within the European "nucleus".

At first sight the other federalistic projects still appear rather nebulous; this statement applies to the agricultural project ("Green Pool") and the health organization ("White Pool"). On the other hand, the Transport agreement, originally aimed at creating a supra-national organization, has now assumed the form of an inter-governmental arrangement. If the EDC and European constitution come into being, then all these initiatives—

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and many more—will be swept along by the political wave and carried on to conclusion. Then they could become useful contributions to a common structure—whereas today they are only the object of preliminary studies.

Conclusion

Nobody in Western Europe—barring the Communists—contests the fact that a higher degree of coöperation must be attained. Disagreement prevails, however, as to the form and extent of such coöperation, and also with respect to the safety clauses that many countries want to include in these agreements, in order to be able to withdraw if ever such coöperation would impose upon them any substantive deviations from their national policies. Many countries, like Great Britain, and many political parties, like the Gaullists and the German Social Democrats, therefore refuse to accept integration as a form of coöperation. Others accept the basic idea, but dilute it with too many reserves and "escape clauses"; this applies particularly to certain Belgian circles. However, the difficulty which all encounter is that no nation can give up even part of its sovereignty without being sure that the organization for which it divests itself of its sovereignty is in position to assume the tasks entrusted to it. In America and in Switzerland the experiment succeeded—but how different are the conditions in Western Europe. This may explain, and to a certain extent even excuse, the resistance and hesitation shown by many politicians.

Nevertheless, the integration of the European "nucleus" and the expansion of Western European coöperation inch forward. The exercise amounts merely to building single parts of an overall construction project, and in this connection the question might well be raised whether this is the right method of proceeding—to lay a brick here one day, to pierce a door there another day, being fully familiar with all the master plans, but not really sticking too closely to any one of them. The only reply to this is that it is far better to seize every opportunity to advance the common undertaking, than to stop work altogether. Undoubtedly it will be possible to use each partially finished structure at a later date, the day when final integration becomes a

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reality. The Coal and Steel Community is guaranteed for fifty years to come, and the other inter-governmental organizations will certainly continue to exist. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation may have terminated its original tasks, but it, as well as the Council of Europe, is carrying on such useful studies and preliminary work that nobody would wish to eliminate either of them. As to the European Payments Union, a gratifying consolidation took place during the last months of 1953, but this organization, although extended for only one more year, cannot be dissolved until free convertibility has become a fact for all its members. Similarly, the European "nucleus" will not be able to attain a degree of real integration unless and until it adopts a common constitution and transfers to a joint organization that part of each government's tasks which none of the countries themselves are able to perform efficiently, even under optimum conditions. This experiment was undertaken in 1952, and negotiations will continue. But the main part of the work still remains to be done. If the effort to establish the European Defense Community fails, which at this writing is one of the closest questions on record, the activities of the Coal and Steel Community and the rest of the joint organizations will not be able to overcome the deadlock which the integration efforts would then have reached. The elements existing today only constitute single steps, which do not reach the top floor. To get up there the whole staircase is needed.

Disagreement prevails in Western Europe as to whether integration should be approached from the political angle, a theory advanced by the advocators of a joint constitution—primarily P. H. Teitgen of France and Heinrich v. Brentano of Germany—or from the economic angle, as recommended originally by Jean Monnet and now mainly by the Dutch Foreign Minister J. W. Beyen. Economic agreements have a more immediate impact than political approaches. Furthermore, on a political terrain considerable resistance among the broad masses might be encountered, whereas the same masses generally do not violently react to economic questions. On the other hand, violent resistance to economic reforms is generally encountered

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in the economic circles which are most immediately affected. One school of thought believes that, for a long time to come, Europeans will probably be compelled to stay within the limits of the possible rather than to undertake what they consider desirable; the best solution will therefore be to press the reforms which seem to have the greatest chances for success in each field. The opposite school of thought—among whose supporters are Jean Monnet, P. H. Teitgen and apparently also Paul-Henri Spaak—is of the opinion that the creation of a European constitution would free the way for all the other reforms which are considered desirable. An academic discussion as to whether political or economic questions should be given priority will not shed any light on the situation, and can hardly be expected to lead to positive results.

The common denominator of all these difficulties is the inveterate nationalism of the Western Europeans, which is far less constructive than the corresponding feeling on the part of Americans. Western European nationalism has become ever more denatured and subconsciously connected with material interests: people adopt a nationalistic attitude because the stronger their state, the more advantages it will be able to offer them. Only a long process of reëducation can solve this problem. The generations which were brought up in a thousand-year tradition of European jealousies and mutual distrust will hardly be open to the argument raised in favor of integration as the sole solution for the problems of our time.

Thus the integration of the European "nucleus" and the broadening of organized coöperation in Western Europe still call for much time, and above all for patient educational work. The fact that this educational work has hardly begun, and that it has hitherto not been given the attention it deserves in any quarter, is hardly promising for the future. This is the crux of the problem: the peoples of Western Europe must learn to think "European" before their countries will be able to form a United Europe.

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THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY

THE Enlightenment—the age that extends from Locke to Condorcet—was one of the most creative ages in the history of political theory. Its leading writers brought the conception of natural law to its culmination, created the foundations of modern sociology, developed utilitarianism, anticipated socialism, and gave democratic theory the most profound formulation it has ever received. Yet the majority of Enlightenment writers, who accumulated much of the intellectual capital off which we still live, have been condemned to obscurity, the victims of Whitehead's remark that "*Les philosophes* were not philosophers."[1] German and French writers have been restudying the Enlightenment for at least half a century,[2] but there are few studies in English of the political thought of Voltaire, d'Alembert, Diderot, Helvétius, Frederick the Great, Hume, and others. At the same time, some of the current interpretations of Locke and Rousseau recall Gibbon's observation on the state of criticism in the age of the Antonines: "A crowd of critics, of compilers, of commentators, darkened the face of learning."[3]

[1] *Science and the Modern World* (New York, 1925), p. 86. This comment is usually quoted out of context. Whitehead criticized the *philosophes*, but his general estimate of them was favorable.

[2] Of the many excellent studies, I mention only three examples: Gustave Lanson, *Voltaire* (Paris, n.d.); Robert Derathé, *J.-J. Rousseau et la science politique de son temps* (Paris, 1950); Friedrich Meinecke, *Die Idee der Staatsraison* (Munich, 1924).

[3] *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. by J. B. Bury (London, n.d.), I, 58.

To be sure, several penetrating volumes on the Enlightenment have become available to us in recent years: Ernst Cassirer's *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1951), first published in German in 1932; Basil Willey's *The Eighteenth Century Background* (London, 1940); Arthur O. Lovejoy's *Essays in the History of Ideas* (Baltimore, 1948), a collection of articles and addresses. None of these books is by a political theorist, and all of them are concerned with political theory only in passing. These books point up just how small a contribution political theorists have made to the study of the Age of Reason.

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Once we survey the literature on Enlightenment political thought, scant as it is, we find neglect compounded by misconceptions. These misconceptions stem, in part, from German Romantics like Adam Mueller or nineteenth-century critics of the Age of Reason like Taine, whose estimates have been uncritically adopted by many of our contemporaries. Some radicals like Laski[4] or populists like Parrington[5] have been so concerned with debunking Enlightenment thinkers as bourgeois ideologists that they have unduly minimized their permanent contributions. But the authors most responsible for perpetuating clichés about the Enlightenment are the so-called "New Conservatives" like John H. Hallowell and Russell Kirk, who are now attempting to construct a conservative world view by attacking the ideas which they attribute to Enlightenment political theorists. Thus the student of Enlightenment political thought should take as his motto part of the sentence which Bentham put on the title page of his *Fragment on Government:* "*. . . avant d'instruire, il faut commençer par détromper.*"[6]

I. *Reason*

The charge that Enlightenment thinkers had a childlike faith in reason is at once the most prevalent and most inaccurate criticism of the philosophers of the period. During the first half of the eighteenth century, writes one recent historian of political thought, "reason . . . [was] regarded as a panacea for all human ills."[7] Another writes: "It was not that the eighteenth century substituted reason for faith, as some suppose, but that it exchanged one kind of faith for another, a faith in the methods of scientific empiricism for those of theology."[8] It is not difficult to read in these estimates Carl Becker's thesis of *The*

[4] See Harold Laski, *The Rise of European Liberalism* (London, 1936), ch. iii.

[5] See Vernon L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, 1927), esp. volume I. Parrington does not seem to have been too closely acquainted with Enlightenment political thought. He could write, for example: "The solution of the vexing social problem, Rousseau concluded, lay in a return to a state of nature." *Ibid.*, I, 272.

[6] From Montesquieu, *Esprit des lois*, livre XXX, ch. xv.

[7] Lawrence C. Wanlass, *Gettell's History of Political Thought* (New York, 1953), p. 237.

[8] John H. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought* (New York, 1950), p. 119.

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Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers.[9] But this witty and perverse little book, which has probably prevented more students from thinking about the Enlightenment than any other, does not—despite Becker's great authority—alter the fact that these estimates are half-truths.

The fact is that Enlightenment thinkers were, generally, far from naïve about reason. What is more, the variety of their ideas about reason cannot be reduced to a simple formula without doing violence to the convictions of most of the men who are customarily thought to belong to the Age of Reason. Kant spent most of his life in profound and subtle efforts to determine the limits of reason; Hume developed a thoroughgoing theory of social habit in which reason played a relatively small part; Voltaire, Diderot and d'Alembert dealt with reason realistically and skeptically; and Helvétius' rather simple belief in the infinite educability of man was severely criticized by the very men who are now charged with naïveté.[10] The damage which the formula "faith in reason" has done can be measured by a recent estimate of Diderot in a history of political theory: "To Diderot reason was everything."[11] The truth is that Diderot consistently stressed the power of the passions,[12] and that the key to his

[9] New Haven, 1932. Indeed, Hallowell relies heavily on Becker and cites him repeatedly. Hallowell, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

[10] Voltaire, who was fond of Helvétius, thought little of his work, and was particularly critical of his assertion that all men are equally gifted—an assertion which was fundamental to Helvétius' theory of the power of environment and the unlimited possibilities of education. Voltaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. by Louis Moland (Paris, 1883), XIX, 23; XLVIII, 247, and elsewhere. Diderot, who on occasion collaborated with Helvétius, also disagreed with him and attempted to refute his environmentalism in detail. See *Réflexions sur le livre de l'Esprit par M. Helvétius* and *Réfutation suivie de l'ouvrage d'Helvétius intitulé de l'Homme* in Diderot, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. by J. Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris, 1875–77), II, 267–456.

[11] Wanlass, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

[12] Diderot's *Pensées philosophiques*, one of his first works, begins: "I. On déclame sans fin contre les passions; on leur impute toutes les peines de l'homme, et l'on oublie qu'elles sont aussi la source de tous ses plaisirs. C'est dans sa constitution un élément dont on ne peut dire ni trop de bien ni trop de mal. Mais ce qui me donne de l'humeur, c'est qu'on ne les regarde jamais que du mauvais côté. On croirait faire injure à la raison, si l'on disait un mot en faveur de ses rivales; cependant il n'y a que les passions, et les grandes passions, qui puissent élever l'âme aux grandes choses. Sans elles, plus de sublime, soit dans les moeurs, soit dans les ouvrages; les beaux-arts retournent en enfance, et la vertu devient minutieuse." *Oeuvres complètes*, I, 127. See also such later works as *Le neveu de Rameau*.

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work can be found not in rationalism but in his intense concern with morality.

It is this distortion of the rôle of reason that has led many commentators to exaggerate the gulf that separates Diderot and his circle from Rousseau. Thus Professor Ebenstein holds that in the *Discours sur l'inégalité* Rousseau "announces the idea—so contrary to the commonplaces of his time—that human understanding is not the sole domain of reason but is 'greatly indebted to passions.' " [13] But this idea of Rousseau's, far from being "contrary to the commonplaces of his time", expresses a tenet central to Enlightenment philosophy. The line that divides Rousseau from Diderot and Voltaire must be sought elsewhere. Professor Kirk puts it more strongly: "Even Rousseau cries out against such overweening confidence in a human rationality which, although insolently disavowing supernatural direction, asserts its own infallibility." [14] In this fanciful estimate Rousseau's doctrine is seen as a sentimental revolt against cold reason rather than as the attempt to reconcile the claims of reason with those of conscience and sentiment.[15]

Of course, Enlightenment thinkers can be called "rationalist", but not in the simple-minded sense. In general, Enlightenment philosophers held that knowledge is better than ignorance—that if social problems are to be solved they can be solved only through action based on research and analysis rather than through prayer, renunciation, or the patient waiting for God—that reason is better than fanaticism—that reason must come to terms with sentiment and act in accord with it—that barriers to inquiry, whether barriers of religion, tradition, or philosophic dogma, are always pernicious since only rational inquiry can understand reality. "*La raison*", wrote Voltaire, "*consiste à voir toujours les choses comme elles sont.*" [16]

[13] William Ebenstein, *Great Political Thinkers* (New York, 1951), p. 413.

[14] Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago, 1953), p. 27.

[15] Rousseau's rationalism has been emphasized by several commentators, especially Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans. by Peter Gay (New York, 1954), and Robert Derathé, *Le rationalisme de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Paris, 1948).

[16] *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, article "Enthousiasme", *Oeuvres complètes*, XVIII, 554.

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It cannot be repeated too often that the "cold" rationalists—like Helvétius or Holbach—who were criticized by Goethe, were neither as typical of the Enlightenment nor as rationalist as their critics would like us to believe. Nor do these critics who frequently quote Goethe's well-known lines from *Dichtung und Wahrheit*[17] seem to remember that Goethe was fond enough of the Enlightenment philosophers to translate Diderot's *Le neveu de Rameau* and Voltaire's *Mahomet* into German.[18] The cold rationalism of Enlightenment thinkers cannot be proved by the fact that some of them, like Hume, deplored "enthusiasm". Hume was not a rationalist (although he was neither as skeptical nor as destructive as he has often been painted), and his attitude was characteristic of many educated and polite men in the eighteenth century as well as of many men of sober religion.

If the findings of modern psychology have invalidated some of the assumptions and some of the conclusions of Enlightenment philosophers concerning the nature of reason, we should remember that these findings do not sustain the pious despair of nineteenth- and twentieth-century irrationalists. What is more, a number of Enlightenment writers anticipated recent psychology. I mention only Diderot's psychological determinism and his brilliant formulation of the Oedipus complex,[19] Hume's

[17] "I mention as an instance, to serve for all . . . [prohibited books that had no effect on Goethe and his friends] the *Système de la Nature*, which we took in hand out of curiosity. We did not understand how such a book could be dangerous. It appeared to us so dark, so Cimmerian, so death-like, that we found it a trouble to endure its presence, and shuddered at it as a spectre." Book XI, Oxenford Translation. Quoted from J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), p. 397. However, Goethe evidently believed that Holbach's book was *not* what Mr. Randall calls it—"that consummate expression of the Age of the Enlightenment." *Ibid.*

[18] In 1830 Goethe said to F. von Mueller: "Ueberhaupt haetten die Franzosen seit Voltaire, Buffon und Diderot doch eigentlich keine Schriftsteller erster Groesse gehabt, keinen, bei dem die geniale Kraft, die Loewentatze so recht entschieden hervorgetreten." Quoted in H. A. Korff, *Voltaire im literarischen Deutschland des XVIII. Jahrhunderts* (Heidelberg, 1917), p. 767.

[19] "Si le petit sauvage était abandonné à lui-même, qu'il conserva toute son imbecillité et qu'il réunit au peu de raison de l'enfant au berceau la violence des passions de l'homme de trente ans, il tordrait le cou à son père et coucherait avec sa mère." *Le neveu de Rameau*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, V, 474. Quoted, with evident relish, by Sigmund Freud, *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1949), p. 296.

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analysis of habit which was modern enough to serve John Dewey as the starting point for his social psychology,[20] Montesquieu's understanding of the terroristic basis of despotism,[21] Gibbon's grasp of the nature of ideologies and the manipulation of the masses.[22] Finally, it is well to remember that Sigmund Freud, the man who above all others is supposed to have destroyed the justification of Enlightenment rationalism, was the greatest child of the Enlightenment which our century has known—with his fundamental assumption that the search for truth must never stop, that only knowledge allows reason to function, and that only reason can make us free.[23]

A careful analysis of the conception of reason in the Enlightenment, liberated from the clichés that seem to be handed down from generation to generation, could address itself to the real problems. I suggest that it would reveal: (1) the wealth of meaning collected under the single word "reason"; (2) the close relation of reason to sentiment and morality; (3) the careful qualifications with which the Enlightenment thinkers surrounded their conviction that reason can bring freedom and happiness; (4) the predominantly critical function of the ideas of reason and rationality; (5) the close relation of reason to the concepts of autonomy and adult self-determination. Bentham spoke for the whole Enlightenment when he said: "He who is not a judge of what is agreeable to him, is less than a child; he is an idiot."[24]

II. *Progress*

Closely allied to the superstition about reason, and almost equally mistaken, is the widespread notion that Enlightenment philosophers believed in the inevitability of progress. One

[20] *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1922). For Dewey's acknowledgment to Hume, see his "Foreword to the Modern Library Edition" (1930), pp. v–vi.

[21] See esp. *Esprit des lois*, livre III, chs. 8–10; livre V, chs. 12–18.

[22] See esp. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chs. i–iii.

[23] The relation of Freud's ideas to the Enlightenment deserves far lengthier treatment than could be given here. I shall quote only one passage: ". . . after all, analysis does not set out to abolish the possibility of morbid reactions, but to give the patient's ego *freedom* to choose one way or the other." *The Ego and the Id* (London, 1927), p. 72n.

[24] *Theory of Legislation*, ed. by C. K. Ogden (London, 1931), p. 18.

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critic writes: "This idea . . . was one of the dominant ideas of the Age of Enlightenment."[25]

Despite the fact that this view is rather generally accepted, it is a myth. Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Diderot, had no theory of progress; Rousseau's political theory stressed retrogression;[26] Voltaire's and Gibbon's belief in progress was closely hedged; only Turgot with his three stages, and Condorcet with his ten epochs, may be said to have had a fully articulated theory of progress.[27]

The myth overlooks one important distinction: when we speak of "progress" we can mean either that progress is possible if we act in certain specified ways (if, for example, we bring our reason and our experience to bear on a social problem), or that progress is inevitable, inherent in history. Only the latter can properly be called a theory of progress—the former is the mood that lies at the bottom of reformism.[28] But it was precisely the reformist, not the metaphysical, conception of progress that dominated Enlightenment thought.

Indeed, familiarity with the writings of the Enlightenment—for it would seem that here only unfamiliarity breeds contempt—will reveal the many dark shadows which the Enlightenment thinkers placed in their picture of human nature. Voltaire's poem on *The Lisbon Earthquake*, Montesquieu's bitter portrayal of man and of the futility of all love save incest between brother and sister,[29] Diderot's savage criticisms of man-made political institutions, Gibbon's cynicism, and Hume's skepticism—these views of man cannot properly be equated with fatuous optimism.

[25] Hallowell, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[26] By Rousseau's belief in retrogression I do not mean the untenable thesis that Rousseau was a primitivist. A careful reading of his *Discours sur l'inégalité* will dispel that notion. I mean his Platonic belief in the inevitable degeneration of governments, even of good governments. See *Contrat social*, livre III, chs. 10, 11.

[27] I do not intend to deny, of course, that the theory had predecessors like Fontenelle, or that radicals like Helvétius or Godwin believed in perfectibility. The point is that a genuine theory of progress was not central to Enlightenment speculation.

[28] Hallowell, a sharp critic of the Enlightenment, admits that by the "idea of progress" he means the idea that "in time man must *inevitably* become more reasonable, freer, happier, and better." *Op. cit.*, p. 135.

[29] *Lettres persanes*, No. 67, "Histoire d'Aphéridon et Astarté". See Franz Neumann, "Introduction" to *Spirit of the Laws* (New York, 1949), p. xviii.

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Even Condorcet, in the greatest paean to progress ever written, did not overlook the cruelty, the fanaticism, the stupidity of men, even in the Ninth Epoch, the most enlightened stage of development yet achieved:

> But if, as everything assures us, the human species will not relapse into its former barbarism; if everything should insure us against that pusillanimous and corrupt system which condemns mankind to eternal oscillations between truth and error, liberty and servitude, we see at the same time that civilization [*lumières*] occupies only a small part of the globe, and that the number of those who are really civilized disappears before the mass of men delivered over to prejudices and ignorance. We see vast countries groaning in slavery; in one place we see nations degraded by the vices of a civilization whose corruption slows up progress; in another place, nations still vegetating in the infancy of its first epochs. We see that the labors of these last ages have done much for the human spirit, but little for the perfection of the human species; much for the glory of man, something for his liberty, but as yet almost nothing for his happiness. In several places our eyes are struck by a dazzling light; but dark shadows still cover an immense horizon. The mind of the philosopher rests with satisfaction on a small number of objects; but the spectacle of stupidity, slavery, extravagance, barbarity, afflicts him still more often; and the friend of humanity cannot enjoy unmixed pleasure but by surrendering to the sweet hopes of the future.[30]

When Voltaire's *Candide* and Samuel Johnson's *Rasselas* were published almost simultaneously in 1759, Johnson himself remarked on the close resemblance of the two books. Voltaire had concluded that we must cultivate our garden; Johnson, that "human life is everywhere a state, in which much is to be endured, and little to be enjoyed." Boswell quotes Johnson as having said that "if they had not been published so closely one after the other that there was not time for imitation, it would have been in vain to deny that the scheme of that which came latest was taken from the other." [31]

[30] *Esquisse d'un Tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, in *Oeuvres complètes* (Brunswick and Paris, 1804), VIII, 312–13. It is worth noting that this book was written and published in the 1790s, when the Enlightenment was almost over.

[31] Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, quoted in Joseph Wood Krutch, *Samuel Johnson* (New York, 1944), p. 181.

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It seems difficult to overestimate the significance of this episode. To be sure, the philosophies of Johnson and Voltaire were not alike. Indeed, Voltaire had employed his keenest intellectual resources in his attempt to refute Pascal's tragic view of man.[32] But the fact that the embodiment of the Enlightenment and the embodiment of eighteenth-century Christian pessimism could arrive at almost identical positions suggests that Enlightenment thinkers were far more aware of tragedy than they have usually been given credit for.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Turgot and Condorcet are usually the only writers quoted in support of a belief which a whole movement is supposed to have shared.[33] I do not intend to deny, of course, that there was a vital strain of self-confidence in Enlightenment political speculation. But it was, on the whole, the mature confidence of men at home in their world, aware of their growing control over nature, and realistically hopeful of the future.[34] Today we dwell too much on the mistaken predictions of some of their number and exaggerate their optimism[35] while we tend to overlook their hardheaded, sensible and successful efforts at piecemeal reform, such as the work of Voltaire, Beccaria and Bentham in humanizing the penal code.

III. *History*

It might be supposed that the notion that the Enlightenment had no sense of history would be completely overcome by now. In the nineteenth century, it was widely believed that the eight-

[32] He returned to this task again and again. *Remarques sur les Pensées de M. Pascal* in *Oeuvres complètes*, XXII, 27 *et seq.*, and *Dernières Remarques sur les Pensées de M. Pascal* in *ibid.*, XXXI, 1 *et seq.*

[33] I shall give only one example: "Many writers contributed to the fashioning of the idea of progress but none were more successful than the Frenchman Condorcet." Hallowell, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

[34] On the nature of this confidence, see Bernard Groethuysen, *Die Entstehung der buergerlichen Welt- und Lebensanschauung in Frankreich* (Halle, 1927). Some Enlightenment writers, notably Diderot and Rousseau, held the theory of the original goodness of man, but they drew from it, not a theory of infinite perfectibility, but a theory of the possibility of reform in a society which their reason and their experience told them was imperfect.

[35] Thus, Professor Ebenstein talks of "the optimistic faith of the Age of Reason in the possibility of wholesale social change through proper legislation." *Op. cit.*, p. 397.

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eenth century had lacked an appreciation of history. "The historical sense", wrote Gustave Flaubert to the Goncourts in 1860, "dates from only yesterday, and it may well be the best thing the nineteenth century has to offer."[36] But today, after Dilthey's epoch-making article of 1901, and the popularization of his thesis by Friedrich Meinecke and Ernst Cassirer,[37] we have little reason to hold on to an opinion which Cassirer has called "a battle cry coined by the Romantic Movement when it entered the field against the philosophy of the Enlightenment." [38] But a history of political theory published in 1953 repeats the old charge that the eighteenth century—the century of Gibbon, Voltaire, Hume, Vico, Robertson, Montesquieu—"was a time when the historical spirit was lacking and when men had little reverence for the past." [39]

To be sure, Hume's history had not yet completely broken with the theory of the uniformity of human nature and was thus handicapped by an inadequate conception of historical change.[40] Voltaire, in his anxiety to teach the lesson that superstition is the greatest evil mankind has ever known, greatly overemphasizes the merits of the age of Louis XIV at the expense of the Middle Ages. Indeed, Voltaire's historical works bear evidence that his urge to prove a moral point or scourge an abuse often got the better of his objectivity and turned his history into propaganda. But, as Professor Dorn puts it, "the defects of Voltaire's

[36] *The Selected Letters of Gustave Flaubert*, trans. by Francis Steegmuller (New York, 1953), p. 203.

[37] Wilhelm Dilthey, "Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert und die geschichtliche Welt", in *Gesammelte Schriften* (Leipzig, 1927), III, 209–68; Friedrich Meinecke, *Die Entstehung des Historismus* (Munich, 1936); Cassirer, *Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, ch. v, "The Conquest of the Historical World".

[38] Cassirer, *Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, p. 197. But for an opposing view, see Benedetto Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty* (London, 1941), pp. 65–77.

[39] Wanlass, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[40] This may sound like a rather weak indictment in view of Hume's frequently quoted pronouncement: "Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature." *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Sec. VIII, Part I, in *The Philosophical Works of David Hume*, edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London, 1882), IV, 68. But Hume does not do justice to his own historical writings with this remark. His *History of England* goes far beyond it. On this point, see Meinecke, *Die Entstehung des Historismus*, I, 198–233.

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history are less those of his system than of his fiery temperament, and it is absurd to accuse him and the entire Enlightenment of wanting in the historic sense because of these shortcomings." [41]

While the charges against Enlightenment historians have some truth in them, it is important for us to realize that the historians did have a sense of development, a sense of change, a sense of the past, a sense of causation. Such historians as Voltaire developed the revolutionary concepts of "culture" and "universal history". If the great Romantic historians later surpassed them, they could do so only because they were standing on the shoulders of their predecessors.

One other point must be made: the very defects of Enlightenment history are instructive, particularly since they help us to understand the position of intellectuals under absolutism. If the French Enlightenment historians used history as propaganda, this was part of their unrelenting struggle against the authorities. Since direct social criticism was dangerous, French reformers turned to what Lenin was later to call "Aesopian language". They published books anonymously, they attributed their works to fictitious authors or to writers long since dead, they criticized their institutions by inventing Persian travelers who commented bitingly on France, or by praising Tahiti. In this war against censorship, history had a rôle to play, and any assessment of the Enlightenment sense of history must take this fact into account.[42]

IV. *Enlightened Despotism*

The problem of forms of government and the good state was debated by the Enlightenment thinkers with vigor if not always with precision. The understanding of despotism was substantially advanced by the writings of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Condorcet, and others. The rôle of the state in the economy

[41] Walter L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire, 1740–1763* (New York, 1940), p. 219.

[42] Some of the "unhistorical" tone of Enlightenment writings stems from a widely held suspicion that historical arguments could be used for reactionary purposes—to prop up institutions that deserved to be destroyed. Those Enlightenment thinkers who were strongly interested in social change (such as Jeremy Bentham) shared Locke's conviction that "at best an argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no great force." *Second Treatise*, Par. 103.

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was an important theme in the writings of Hume, Adam Smith, the Physiocrats, Bentham. Yet present-day discussion of forms of government has not done justice to the wide variety of views held by eighteenth-century philosophers. It is commonly asserted that most of them believed in the "enlightened despot". Now this statement can unequivocally be made of some Enlightenment thinkers like the elder Mirabeau—we have a letter from Rousseau to Mirabeau on just this subject[43]—but it is far from being an adequate description of the ideas of such thinkers as Voltaire and Diderot. How little certainty exists on this issue can be seen from a few quotations from recent textbooks. Voltaire "preferred a benevolent and enlightened monarchy; but since kings could not be trusted to govern well, he considered the republican form of government the most tolerable . . . he expected reforms to be carried out by the rulers themselves."[44] A few pages later, the same author writes that "Voltaire, the Encyclopedists, and the Physiocrats . . . favored an enlightened monarchy."[45] Still later he writes:

> The liberal school of the first half of the century, represented by Montesquieu, D'Argenson, and Voltaire, was historical in method, looked to the English government as a model, and was moderate in its aims. The second school, of which Rousseau, Diderot, Helvétius, and Holbach were the chief exponents, was doctrinaire and intolerant of existing institutions. It applied *a priori* methods and relied upon pure reason to construct a perfect state.[46]

In these citations we see Voltaire a monarchist by taste and a republican by expediency, but at the same time the advocate of "enlightened monarchy" (which, as the reference to the Physiocrats shows, can only mean "enlightened despotism") and the advocate of British constitutionalism. Diderot (the chief Encyclopedist) is ranged with the Physiocrats, who wanted enlightened despotism, and with Rousseau, who was a democrat.

These quotations, which could be multiplied from other sources, show the existence of a problem that calls for further

[43] July 26, 1767. In *Correspondance Générale de J.-J. Rousseau*, ed. by Th. Dufour and P.-P. Plan (Paris, 1924–34), XVII, 155–59.

[44] Wanlass, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–48.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 253.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 281–82.

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research. In my view, it is certain that Diderot was not a supporter of enlightened despotism,[47] and that while there is a "Voltaire-Problem", all indications point to the fact that he, too, transcended that doctrine.[48]

One of the greatest difficulties—and one of the greatest virtues—of Enlightenment political thought is that it is embedded in social thought. With few exceptions, Enlightenment thinkers did not compartmentalize their ideas—they were concerned with the development of man as a whole, with the growth of his reason and freedom, and they attempted in their writings to encompass all of life. Easy generalizations about the political ideas of these men therefore turn out to be almost always wrong.

V. *Locke and Rousseau*

This brief survey has indicated that generally accepted interpretations of Enlightenment political thought are clichés that badly distort the truth if they do not negate it. There are others: for example, the supposed antithesis between En-

[47] Diderot repeatedly stated his conviction that all arbitrary government is bad. "Le gouvernement arbitraire d'un prince juste et éclairé est toujours mauvais. . . . Un des plus grands malheurs qui pût arriver à une nation, ce seraient deux ou trois règnes d'une puissance juste, douce, éclairée, mais arbitraire: les peuples seraient conduits par le bonheur à l'oubli complet de leur privilèges, au plus parfait esclavage." *Réfutation de l'ouvrage d'Helvétius intitulé L'Homme*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, III, 381, and elsewhere.

[48] However, for a contrary point of view, see Professor Ebenstein: "Voltaire was little interested in forms of government; a benevolent despot, enlightened enough to protect intellectual liberty and personal property, would have suited his taste best, as he was more interested in the monarch's enlightenment than in his autocratic government" (*op. cit.*, p. 410); see also Professor Dorn who said, "With few exceptions, they [the philosophers of the first generation] were, like Voltaire, defenders of an enlightened despotism" (*op. cit.*, p. 222). I am in full agreement with J. B. Black who wrote: "His intellectual sympathy was with republicanism and democracy, as the most natural, free, humane, and peaceful type of political association. But considerations of security led him to recognise the monarchical *régime*, provided it was tempered by justice and subject to the law, as the most practicable in the Europe of his day." "Voltaire", in *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great French Thinkers of the Age of Reason*, ed. by F. J. C. Hearnshaw (London, 1930), pp. 145–46. See also Gustave Lanson, *Voltaire*, pp. 180–91. For Voltaire's political ideas, see esp. *L'A.B.C.*, in *Oeuvres*, XXVII, 311–400; *Idées républicaines*, *ibid.*, XXIV, 413–32; *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, article "Démocratie", in *Oeuvres*, XVIII, 331–35; *Lettres sur les Anglais*, *ibid.*, XXII, 82–189.

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lightenment and Romanticism. Some critics speak of a "Romantic reaction", a supposedly monolithic conservatism that contradicts and combats the radicalism of the Enlightenment.[49] But this antithesis neglects both the intimate ties that bound many Romantics to the Age of Reason—I recall Byron's admiration of Voltaire—and the immense range of political ideas in what Lovejoy has properly called "Romanticisms", from the reactionary ideas of Novalis to the radicalism of Shelley.

When we turn our attention to the leading thinkers of the period, the situation improves but little. Some rather strange traditions have grown up concerning them.[50] Take the supposed contradiction between Locke's empiricist epistemology and rationalist political theory, a "contradiction" that seems to have achieved the status of doctrine among political theorists.[51]

[49] Thus we can read Professor Hallowell's chapter on "The Romantic and Conservative Reaction" (*op. cit.*, pp. 159–97) without getting the slightest idea that some of the leading romantics (Byron, Shelley, Keats and others) were radicals and revolutionaries.

[50] It would, of course, be absurd to say that no exemplary studies exist. I mention only Franz Neumann's "Introduction" to Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws;* John Plamenatz, *The English Utilitarians* (Oxford, 1949); Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the Modern State* (London, 1934); Annie M. Osborn, *Rousseau and Burke* (London, 1940). The list could be enlarged. See also Kingsley Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. by J. P. Mayer (London, 1954).

[51] This idea appears to have had its origin in a few excellent and highly respected textbooks and to have been taken over uncritically by others. C. E. Vaughan writes: "The *Essay concerning Human Understanding* opens with a vigorous assault upon the doctrine of innate principles and ideas. . . . Now, if there ever was an innate idea, it is the law of nature, as expounded in the *Civil Government* of Locke. It springs fully armed from the brain of man, at the very dawn of his history. It owes nothing to experience. It is the gift of intuition, pure and simple. . . . Yet the whole argument of . . . [*Civil Government*] may be said to rest upon the acceptance of those innate ideas which are vehemently repudiated in the . . . [*Essay*]." *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau* (Manchester, 1925), I, 163. George H. Sabine is somewhat more cautious: "It is exceedingly difficult to understand exactly what Locke believed to be the philosophical justification for his theory of natural rights, or in other words to see how he meant to unite his political theory with his general philosophical position. . . . Locke's philosophy as a whole presented the anomaly of a theory of the mind and a procedure in describing it which was generally empirical, joined to a theory of the sciences and a procedure in political science which was rationalist." *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 1950), pp. 529–30. C. C. Maxey writes: "That Locke, the denier of innate ideas, should be the doughty champion of inherent rights, is one of those curious paradoxes which attest the human quality of even the greatest intellects." *Political Philosophies* (New York,

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Rousseau, as I have shown elsewhere,[52] has suffered from interpreters more severely than any other political theorist. Disagreements concerning his political theory are, of course, legitimate—Rousseau's thought is complex and filled with difficulties. But a careful reading of his work should make impossible any judgments such as these: "The 'noble savage' was Rousseau's ideal . . . . [He believed in] the desirability of a return to nature." [53] Or: "All restraint upon man's natural impulses Rousseau believes is bad—goodness consists in being liberated from law, from discipline, from authority, from the obligations imposed by God and our fellowmen." [54] Or: "The surrender of Rousseau to desire . . . end[s] in the dehumanization of our race . . . ." "[He popularized] . . . the idyllic fantasy of a free, happy, lawless, and propertyless state of nature." [55] The second and third passages, indebted as they are to Irving Babbitt, should make us humble about the power of rational persuasion, for they show that repeated, reasoned and documented refutation will not exorcise misinterpretations.

VI. *The Enlightenment and Contemporary Politics*

Scholarship is a self-correcting enterprise, and its vocation is not the justification of political positions but a continuous

1948), p. 254. These views are reproduced in the latest textbook we have: "The following discussion is primarily concerned with Locke's political ideas. In the realm of philosophy Locke was instrumental in establishing the divergent philosophy of empiricism. The logical difficulties of these two positions seem not to have bothered Locke. He never faced the difficulty of proclaiming the existence of certain innate concepts, such as natural rights, on the one hand, while demonstrating on the other hand that no idea is innate because all ideas have an empirical origin." Wanlass, *op. cit.*, pp. 223–24n.

This is not the place to deal with this issue in detail. Suffice it to say that the supposed contradiction rests on a confusion of self-evident innate ideas, which Locke rejected, with moral norms found by reason, which Locke accepted. Far from "never facing the difficulty", Locke was fully aware of it. "I would not here be mistaken," he wrote in the *Essay*, "as if, because I deny an innate law, I thought there were none but positive laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate law, and a law of nature; between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of by the use and due application of our natural faculties." I, iii, 13.

[52] See my "Introduction" to Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*.

[53] Wanlass, *op. cit.*, pp. 254, 256.

[54] Hallowell, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

[55] Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 369, 44.

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effort to approximate the truth. This article is not a plea for the views held by Enlightenment political theorists, but for more searching and accurate interpretations of their ideas. But, as I indicated at the beginning, it would be unrealistic to assume that all of the interpretations which I have criticized are wholly objective or wholly nonpolitical. Enlightenment philosophers had a set of ideals which are unpalatable to some of its critics: they championed free inquiry, they upheld the right to free thought and expression, they believed in diversity, they were secular, they despised superstition and fanaticism, they believed in the possibilities of reform, and they were passionately humane. Indeed, if Enlightenment thinkers could be summed up in one phrase, I would call them "the party of humanity". Whatever their disagreements, on this they agreed—from Montesquieu's denunciation of torture to Voltaire's concern over the Calas case, from Locke's opposition to arbitrary government to Bentham's championship of legal reform, from Helvétius' belief in education to Kant's cosmopolitanism.

The vindication of these ideals deserves separate and more exhaustive treatment than can be given here. But the point is that this vindication can properly begin only after we have discarded the catchwords which are now so often substituted for considered judgments. To be sure, the ideas of the Enlightenment need criticism, but such criticism must be at once informed and disinterested if it is to be anything but the knocking down of straw men. Once we apply such high standards to the criticism of these ideas, their permanent value and validity will become more apparent than ever. In the restrained words of Montesquieu's Preface to his *Esprit des lois:* "It is not a matter of indifference that the minds of the people be enlightened."

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THE REDUCTION OF COMMUNIST POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNIONS

A Case Study

IN the last three years, the Australian Communist party has seen much of the power it had accumulated since 1934 wiped out. Neutralization or defeats of Communist officers in major trade unions have broken the party's grip on Australia's heavy industry and removed it as a directing force in the Australian trade-union movement.

The Communist party had acquired this impressive strength through skillful tactics and organization, fortuitous circumstances, and, notwithstanding a few exceptions, a general inattentiveness on the part of non-Communists. This permitted Communists to win the management of key trade unions in land transport, shipping, iron and steel, coal, and the building trades, to name the most prominent ones. These successes compensated the Communist party many times over for its failure to win more than a miniscule ideological following in the trade-union movement or in the country at large. In turn, the Communists were defeated by the superior organization and tactics of vigorous anti-Communists; by the political compulsions on Communists to support a foreign Power putting them in fundamental conflict with the aims of the general trade-union membership, the federal government and the Federal Arbitration Court; and by the fraud and the corruption Communists consequently found it necessary to employ to maintain their positions in the trade unions.

The course of the conflict between the Australian Communist party and the rest of the community cut across trade-union traditions. It led to important revisions of industrial legislation designed to assure democratic trade-union elections and to government action designed to eliminate the use of trade unions for subversive purposes while not infringing on legitimate

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industrial activity. Out of the conflict emerged a vigorous, cohesive anti-Communist trade-union force pledged to remove the strength the Communists still have in key sectors of the economy, for example, shipping and coal, from which the party could rebuild its fortunes, carry out significant sabotage, and divert the trade unions from day-to-day practical problems.

I

The influence of the Australian Communist party rose steadily for thirty years, in an environment free of deep-rooted economic, political and social problems. Australia has been characterized by a tradition of social advance and egalitarianism. Workers have high wage and living standards, a high degree of trade-union organization (65 per cent of the wage and salary earners are union members), and comprehensive social services. Australia is a stable, successful political democracy in which the Labor party—the trade-union political voice—is the oldest and largest continuous party. It has a growing economy with opening opportunities. What is more, the fortunes of the Communist party did not vary with the phases of the business cycle. It gained and lost ground in terms of its success in devising tactics suitable to local conditions during either prosperity or depression as governed by the needs of the local party and international Communist objectives. The connecting policy of the Communists in Australia was one which combined political activism with a pragmatism aimed at constantly adding to the power already there—ever mindful of the Soviet Union as the model of successful seizure of government and center of international Communist strength.

Allowing for the local environment, the broad history and tactics of the Australian Communists paralleled those in other countries. From 1920 to 1922 the party was preoccupied with sorting out its organizational differences to qualify for affiliation with the Communist International. Once a united party was formed, it adopted the slogan of the 1921 Third World Congress of the Comintern, "To the Masses". It put into operation the tactics of a "united front" suitable for what the Communists regarded as a period of "temporary capitalist economic stabiliza-

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tion". However, the Australian Communist party was torn by controversy over abstract ideology and conflicts reflecting in part the developments in Russia. The party never numbered more than a few hundred. In 1923, a few months after wangling membership, it was expelled from the new South Wales branch of the Labor party. The posts it acquired by "boring from within" the trade unions, though important, were few and of no national effect.

In 1930, following two years of divided policy and party conflict which was settled by the removal of the leaders, on Comintern instructions,[1] in favor of some of those still in control, the Australian Communist party adopted the tactic of open class war in accordance with resolutions of the Sixth Comintern Congress (1928). Believing that the "capitalist stabilization" of the 1920's was crumbling, the Communists replaced their modified support of the Labor party with a relentless attack upon "reformists" and "social-fascists". They promoted unrestrained industrial turmoil at every opportunity in order to deepen the economic crisis. (For example, they concentrated great energy in adding to the bitterness of the fifteen-month coal strike of 1929–30.) The party organized the unemployed and, where possible, led them into street violence. The party benefited from the desperation of the economic depression, the unpopularity of the state and federal Labor governments of the day trying to cope with the economic crisis, the cleavages within the Labor party and the disillusionment of many of its supporters. Though the Communist party underwent its most rapid growth at this time, probably reaching 5,000 members, this was still minute when compared with the number of unemployed which reached a peak of almost 600,000 in June 1932 (30 per cent) and by July 1939 still totaled almost 300,000 (12.5 per cent).[2]

Apart from being alien to the Australian outlook, the strategy of revolutionary extremism frightened craftsmen or job-conscious

[1] This was done through an open letter from the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the Australian party membership published in *Workers Weekly*, December 6, 1929.

[2] Estimates based on statistics in *Commonwealth Labor Report* (No. 37) for 1948.

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workers. Separatist trade-union activity remained essentially a weak minority movement and the operation of the state and federal arbitration systems practically ruled out the establishment of new red unions.[3]

The upward swing of the business cycle in Australia in 1933, which confronted the party with demoralization as some of its more effective adherents drifted back to work or lost interest, coincided with the revised international Communist policy line which sought to win support in non-Communist countries for the U.S.S.R. against Germany and Japan. Following earlier instructions from the Red International of Labor Unions, the revival of the "united front" in Australia was formalized by the decision of the Seventh Comintern Congress of 1935. Under the slogan of "Unity Against War and Fascism", as elsewhere, the Australian Communists demanded collective security (that is, an alliance with the Soviet Union), boycotts against Japanese goods, as well as strikes to block the shipment of war materials to Japan. At home they called for a popular front. Daily revolutionary struggle ceased. The Communists sought (but failed to get) affiliation with the Australian Labor party [ALP]. Nevertheless, they directed their members to work side by side with "the reformists" in the trade unions and to join them in pressing for concrete economic demands and social reforms, for example, the 40-hour week, an increased basic wage, extension of social services and other objectives that seemed reasonably capable of achievement.

As one leading Communist put it, "It was in the trade unions that the first fruits of the united front tactic were gathered." [4] Cadres that had been recruited into the unemployment movement formed fractions within designated trade unions. Trained, well disciplined and young, they took over many of Australia's

[3] One of the better-known Communist experiments in dual unionism, the Pastoral Workers Industrial Union, formed to compete with the powerful anti-Communist independent Australian Workers' Union—a general workers union based on the pastoral industries—won only a few hundred members, never obtained registration in any arbitration court or bargaining rights, and disappeared in the mid-thirties after a few years of precarious existence.

[4] E. W. Campbell, Director of Marx School (Sydney), in *A History of the Australian Labor Movement—A Marxist Interpretation* (1945).

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major unions by default. They were able to exploit the weakness and fissures that were characteristic of the political and industrial labor movements during the depression. Key union officers were discouraged, aged or incompetent. The general membership was apathetic or hungering for efficient and energetic leadership. Trade-union office was, with few exceptions, unattractive and unrewarding. Few people had any knowledge or understanding of the methods and objectives of the professional agitators who assumed the posture of trade unionists. Where other methods failed, the Communists made unscrupulous use of loosely drawn union rules, for example, by "packing" small union meetings which could elect or remove officers. Communists also engaged in rigging ballots, outright intimidation and character assassination to drive non-Communists from office where resistance was stiffer or more sophisticated.

The first big victory came in 1934 when Communists gained the offices of general president and general secretary of the Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation (Miners' Federation) in which the bitter antagonism of the industry had created a certain ideological susceptibility to Communist or to radical appeals. By the time the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in 1939, Communists had acquired positions of decisive influence in the Australian Railways Union, the Federated Ironworkers' Association, the Waterside Workers' Federation, the Australian Seamen's Union, the Sheet Metal Workers' Federation, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the building unions (which later amalgamated into the Building Workers' Industrial Union), the Federated Clerks' Union, and the New South Wales Teachers' Federation, as well as some smaller unions less well known. They had also made considerable headway in the unions of the electrical trades, local transport and public utilities. But they were never able to gain a firm footing in the Australian Workers' Union, whose early political experiences had immunized it to Communist technique and whose officers were tough and well paid.

With the outbreak of the European war, after an initial misreading of Soviet policy for six weeks, during which the Communists demanded full-scale support for the war, they called

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for a "people's peace", abandoned the "united front" and attacked the Labor party. They went underground and appeared in public in various disguises after they were declared illegal in June 1940. Communist trade-union officials, while technically disclaiming membership in an illegal party, nevertheless, for the duration of the Russian-German Pact of 1939–41, fully participated in the international Communist campaign to sabotage the allied war effort. Though the party lost some important adherents including some trade-union leaders, the Communists, because of the remoteness of the battleground from Australia, were spared many difficulties with the general trade-union membership that faced their counterparts in other countries. Moreover, there was only a brief period between the effective mobilization of the Australian war potential and the German invasion of Russia.

The June 1941 change in party policy, following the invasion of the U.S.S.R., gave Communist trade-union leaders new and far more favorable conditions to increase their powers in the Australian industrial structure. The "united front" was revived. Communists sought to ingratiate themselves with the Labor party, though the 1943 conference of the Labor party reaffirmed earlier condemnations of the Communist party as an "anti-Labor political organization", rejected offers of affiliation, and excluded members of any other political (meaning, the Communist) party from membership in the Labor party. Communist trade-union leaders effected semi-legality of the party by their active support of the war following the invasion of the U.S.S.R. and in 1942 the party was legalized. Communist trade-union officers, by virtue of their positions in trade unions, became active participants in government-sponsored programs. They vigorously pressed on their membership the importance of industrial peace and maximum productive effort. They advocated ruthless suppression of strikes and absenteeism, support for industrial conscription, dilution of skilled labor in industry, wage pegging, and extension of compulsory military service. The change in Communist policy was described in 1942 by Ernest Thornton, who was at that time Federal Secretary of the Federated Ironworkers' Association and a member of

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the Political Committee of the Australian Communist party. In a speech to the Federal Council of the union, urging support for the war, Thorton reminded the delegates: "Our union was involved in more strikes than any other union. These strikes were not sporadic strikes like those that occur in the coal fields from time to time, but planned and deliberate strikes, because we made strikes our business." [5]

The membership and power of the unions in which the Communists had entrenched themselves pyramided as the natural result of the rapid industrialization and centralization of the economy. The Communists centralized control of federal unions to reduce recalcitrant branches and absorbed specialized smaller non-Communist unions where they shared jurisdiction. For example, in 1942 the Ironworkers swallowed the Munitions Workers' Union. The standing of Communist trade-union officials grew with the public and employers as a result of the general admiration for the Russian war effort, and the highly favorable publicity accompanying their coöperation in the defense program. Communist union officers took credit for the large gains Australian workers derived from the war prosperity and granted by the Labor government and various arbitration bodies. Communist party membership increased to more than 20,000 by the end of 1943 and "front" organizations flourished. The Communist party, through its trade-union power, emerged from the war as a force in economic and political thinking in Australia unknown in any other country of the English-speaking world.[6]

In 1945, the Communist party controlled the policies of trade unions in every basic industry, with the exception of agriculture. The unions controlled by the Communists had a membership of about 275,000 (out of 1,200,000 unionists). Through these unions the party could exert pressure on the entire political and industrial labor movement. In 1945 and again in 1947,

[5] "Trade Unions and the War", pamphlet of Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia [FIA], 1942. Extract from speech by E. Thornton to the Federal Conference of the FIA.

[6] The first and only candidate ever elected on the Communist ticket to a state or federal legislature was a Rhodes scholar and lawyer with a personal following who lasted one term in the Queensland Legislative Assembly, being defeated in 1950 for reëlection.

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in the absence of the regular delegate, Ernest Thornton was designated the delegate of the Australian Council of Trade Unions [ACTU] to the World Federation of Trade Unions [WFTU]. The Communists had at their disposal treasuries, and administrative and press facilities comparable to, if not greater than, any major political grouping in the country. They had international working relationships with Communist political and trade-union organizations in Europe and Asia which none could match. They formed a network which they could use to allocate, train or give a sort of job security to supporters by transferring personnel from one union to another, or provide touring facilities for party propagandists. They controlled the Queensland branch of the ACTU and at least three important provincial labor councils, including Newcastle (New South Wales), the heart of heavy industry. They had nearly half the delegates at the 1947 ACTU Congress, could generally get majority support for their proposals, and were only narrowly defeated in their bid to gain a self-perpetuating grip over the ACTU Interstate Executive. About one third of the Central Committee of the Communist party was made up of the more prominent Communist trade-union leaders in key industries.[7]

However, the initiation and coördination of trade-union activity remained in the hands of the party's Industrial Committee, whose chief officer, the secretary, was a political rather than union leader. The directing force of the party was the Political Committee, of which the President, General Secretary and Organizing Secretary of the Communist party formed the nucleus or National Secretariat.

In May 1948, Ernest Thornton, then probably the most powerful single Communist trade-union official, summarized party-union relationships to the 15th National Congress of the Australian Communist Party:

[7] Among those who at one time or another were members of the Central Committee were Thornton and L. J. McPhillips of the Ironworkers' Union, Tom Wright of the Sheet Metal Workers' Union, J. J. Brown of the Australian Railways Union, J. Healy of the Waterside Workers' Federation, E. J. Rowe and Alan Wilson of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, D. Thompson of the Building Workers' Industrial Union, Idris Williams and Edgar Ross of the Miners' Federation, E. V. Elliott of the Australian Seamen's Union, J. R. Hughes of the Clerks' Union, and C. M. O'Shea of the Tramwaymen.

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> And the general policy of the union. Is that decided in consultation with the leaders of the Labour Party? No! The policy of the Ironworkers' Union is decided in consultation with the leaders of the Communist Party. The great achievements of our Union in the past few years should be credited to the Communist Party. But they are not so credited. Because the Party does not appear as the Communist Party to the members of the union. The achievements of our leadership are credited to individuals and not to the party.
>
> The same thing in many ways applied to the Waterside Workers' Federation, the Miners' Federation and the Seamen's Union, and soon will apply to many other unions such as the A.E.U., A.R.U. and so on.

In November 1944, the Central Committee of the Australian Communist party indicated its next switch in policy when it contradicted Ernest Thornton who, on returning from abroad, advocated the continuation of "class peace" into the post-war period, that is, coöperation to increase production and minimize industrial friction. The party indicated that this was not appropriate for the Communist objective in the British Commonwealth.

With the end of the war, once the Soviet Union was safe, the Communists unfolded a pattern of general economic disruption combined with industrial warfare of a para-military nature designed to fit into the Soviet strategy of dividing Britain and the United States and intensifying the balance-of-payments difficulties of the British Commonwealth. Anti-American propaganda became intense. A favorite Communist theme was to raise false issues about Australians being faced with a choice of loyalty to Britain or to the United States. The Communists sought to promote political instability by fragmentation of the Australian Labor party through cutting away its trade-union support.[8] They put into effect a "united front from below" strategy which distinguished the rank and file from

[8] Thornton, at the 15th National Congress of the Australian Communist Party (1948) announced, "It is important that we should take steps to break with the old tradition that the Labor Party is the only party of the working class . . . therefore, we are proposing in the Ironworkers' Union that political affiliation in the future should be on a voluntary and not an automatic basis."

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trade-union officials who were Labor party supporters and through agitation by sympathizers in local Labor parties campaigned against the "right wing leadership". Economically, the Communists acted to aggravate the Australian wage-price inflation, to keep the business community in a state of unrelieved tension and uncertainty by disrupting the flow of industry, and to undermine the arbitration and conciliation system which is the cornerstone of Australian industrial relations.[9] They campaigned against the government's immigration program and sought to discourage foreign, especially American, investment in the country.

Beginning in 1945, Communist trade-union leaders fully exploited the general post-war relaxation of discipline and industrial unrest, helping to push strike figures to an all-time high—two and a half times what they had been in 1944. In 1945 and 1946, large-scale strikes led by Communists hit key industries—electric power, steel, coal, shipping, metal trades and land transport. They were characterized by defiance of ALP or ACTU policy, disregard of appeals by state and federal Labor governments, and avoidance of arbitration or conciliation until it had become clear the strike had run its course and a face-saving formula was needed. However, following these early outbursts, the Communists relied principally on methods more suitable to an economy of shortages, mainly of labor and basic materials, such as coal. For this they developed a system of bottleneck strikes involving a few workers. This capitalized on the weak discipline of the acute labor market, spared individuals and union treasuries large financial sacrifice

[9] Apart from general doctrinal objections, the Australian arbitration system has been a special target and subject of discussion at international Communist conferences. The 1929 meeting of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat in Vladivostok declared in part: "The Pan-Pacific trade secretariat considers as one of the most important tasks of all its affiliated organizations an energetic and systematic struggle against compulsory arbitration . . . the essence of which is the voluntary renunciation of the class struggle. . . . Negotiations are possible and even necessary in the course of the class struggle for the purpose of concluding a definite and temporary agreement for a short period. But negotiations between two constantly fighting armies (a sort of temporary armistice in the form of a collective agreement which enables us to collect our forces) are not to be confused with complete disarmament."

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and yet had widespread effect in setting the course and pace of industry. The chief techniques were "snap" stoppages, slowdowns, regulation strikes, piecework restrictions, and overtime bans and calculated crew shortages among dockers and seamen over real or imaginary grievances. Periodically, these outwardly unrelated disputes were consolidated to give the effects of a general partial strike throughout the economy, usually involving most of Australian heavy industry, power and transport. On other occasions, these disputes were scheduled in turn to give the effects of a "rolling" strike within an industry, from city to city, or from industry to industry. Wherever possible, political issues were introduced into disputes in the effort to develop among workers the habit of using industrial strength to gain political ends. Following the 1945 peak, man-days lost in strikes between 1946 and 1950 leveled off at about double what they had been from 1941 to 1944. The Communist party also interfered directly in foreign affairs through control of key unions. Using principally the Waterside Workers' Federation and the Australian Seamen's Union, between 1945 and 1949, the party played on sympathy for the Indonesians and engineered support from other unions as well as from the ACTU to impose, lift and reimpose embargoes on the flow of materials to Dutch forces during the Indonesian hostilities in an attempt to influence the political course of the revolt.

Though many factors contributed to industrial disputes in the post-war period, a general idea of the striking power the Communists had gathered in the trade unions can be obtained. According to one study, primary issues as causes of disputes such as wages and hours, employment and trade-union rights dropped sharply, while strikes with political overtones, sympathy stoppages and those involving vague grievances over working conditions (which the Communist party leaned on heavily) increased sharply. By 1948, according to one study, 30 per cent of all strike time could be attributed directly to these causes, not counting disputes where political inspiration was not declared or open.[10] Another attempt to factor out the degree of Communist inspiration in post-war industrial disputes

[10] *Pattern of Industrial Disputes*, Research Service Associates (Sydney, 1950).

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estimated that, in the major industrial state of New South Wales between September 1945 and December 1949, eleven Communist-controlled unions (excluding mining) having about one fourth of the membership of non-Communist unions accounted for more than three fourths (77.5 per cent) of the total man-days lost in disputes.[11]

If mining is included, Communist-run unions having 28 per cent of the membership of non-Communist unions accounted for 88 per cent of the man-days lost in disputes. The study estimated conservatively that, from 1945 to 1948, Communist-run trade unions (including mining) in all six Australian states were responsible for 75 per cent of all man-days lost in disputes. Between 1945 and 1949, man-days lost annually per union member in Communist-run unions in New South Wales were 31.5 compared with .9 for members of non-Communist unions. For Australia between 1945 and 1948 the comparable figure was 17.5 man-days in Communist-led unions compared with 1.7 days in other unions.

II

Early post-war opposition to the Communists was largely sporadic, unconnected and passive. The Australian Labor party regularly reaffirmed its condemnation of the Communist party as a conspiracy against the working class. The Industrial Groups which the Australian Labor party began to authorize in the various unions in 1945, in an effort aimed mainly at countering Communist efforts to draw away the trade-union support of the ALP, were weak and controversial. From time to time, there were open rebellions such as those of the Balmain branch of the Ironworkers' Union which refused to accept dictation from the Communist-run national office of the union. But for the most part union members expressed their dissatisfaction with Communist leaders by a drift from Communist to non-Communist unions where they shared jurisdictions, strike resistance, nonparticipation in union affairs, delinquency in union dues, and disregard of appeals from Communist officers for support for a variety of "front" projects.

[11] *Communist Initiated Disputes in the Post-war Period,* Research Service Associates (Sydney, 1950).

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To retain their hold in the trade unions, the Communists had important advantages. As incumbents, they had at their disposal the union press, the organizing network, and complete control over the election machinery. They had union treasuries which enabled them to entangle and exhaust opponents by endless legal stratagems. The state and federal arbitration systems, which had blocked the Communists from forming dual unions during their revolutionary extremist period, now operated as similar barriers to the formation of rival anti-Communist unions. The Communists had the advantage of experienced and yet comparatively youthful and well-trained personnel. At an ACTU Congress, they operated as a bloc unencumbered by differences of policy that normally arose among the non-Communist unions concerned with the problems of their different industries. In contrast to the basically isolationist nature of the Australian trade unions, few of whose leaders had ever traveled abroad, Communist trade-union leaders made frequent trips which brought them into contact with Communists in Asia, Western Europe and the "Curtain" countries for training as well as for the exchange of experiences. In addition, for propaganda purposes, they had at their disposal material and advice supplied through their international affiliations.

But probably most significant was the Communists' psychological warfare which successfully fostered defeatism among non-Communists. Thus, the Communists created the stereotype of the selfless, efficient Communist trade-union fanatic who was devoted to the union and whose militancy had brought large gains to the workers since the beginning of the war. On top of this, Communist officers maintained a fiction of working for low salaries while they enjoyed many personal conveniences at union expense. On the other hand, they caricatured non-Communist union leaders as corrupt union bosses, or as ineffective beer drinkers, subservient to the government, the arbitration courts, and employers who periodically gave them hand-outs. The Communists claimed to be a legitimate but more militant part of the union movement. They exploited the tolerance of those who, judging by the standards of democratic experience, could not bring themselves to believe that such a rapid change

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in Communist policy from the wartime alliance was possible. They underplayed their party affiliations and encouraged those who, preferring to regard them as impatient radicals, assumed the rôle of neutral mediators between the "Right" and "Left" in the labor movement.

However, a series of events in 1948 and 1949 drained away most of the advantages the Communists had and hardened opinion against them. A sensational exposure by a member of the Victorian branch executive of the Communist party told of widespread election frauds, and misuse of office and funds in Communist-run trade unions.[12] An inquiry by a Royal Commission in Victoria led to further revelations of Communist party-trade union relations, fraud and corruption. The General Secretary of the Communist party was convicted for sedition when he echoed the statements of Communist leaders in other countries that he would not oppose a Soviet army landing in Australia.

Equally dramatic were the rank-and-file revolts that flared at meetings when in April 1949 Communist officials tried to organize walkouts to protest the jailing of the Assistant National Secretary of the Ironworkers, L. J. McPhillips, for contempt of the Federal Arbitration Court during hearings for an increase in the basic wage. Sabotage of the operations of the Stevedoring Industry Commission (which stabilizes the waterfront industry as part of the dock decasualization scheme) by the Communist members from the Waterside Workers' Federation forced its reorganization by the Chifley Labor government without trade-union representation.

The conflict between the Communists and the community came to a head during the seven-week general coal strike from June 27 to August 15, 1949, which it took the full force of the federal government, the federal arbitration system, the Labor party, and non-Communist trade-union movement, to break. The strike of 18,000 miners, by cutting off sources of power, shut down most heavy industry and threw 500,000 or 20 per cent of all wage and salary earners out of work. It resulted in

[12] "I Was a Communist Leader" by Cecil Sharpley, *The Herald*, Melbourne, 1949.

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emergency legislation passed by the federal and state (New South Wales) Labor governments which permitted the freezing of union funds to prevent their use to support the strike, the jailing of several of the most prominent Communist trade-union figures in the country for violations,[13] and raids on Communist party offices. The strike was denounced by Prime Minister J. B. Chifley "as a Communist conspiracy". Labor party leaders and trade unionists urged miners (unsuccessfully) to return to work. However, other unions carried and used coal mined by troops while miners passively looked on.

The events of 1949 accelerated the controversy over a long-range government program to deal with Communist subversion without encroaching on civil liberties and trade-union rights. Communism was a central issue in two general elections in 1949 and 1951. It caused considerable differences, especially in the Labor party and trade unions. Legislation by the Liberal-Country party government, under which the government proposed to outlaw the Communist party, expropriate its assets and remove Communists from trade-union positions in defense industries, was declared unconstitutional by the High Court.[14] The intense national discussion which cut across all party lines reached a climax in September 1951, when the electorate rejected a constitutional amendment to permit the government to legislate on Communists in any way necessary for national defense and specifically to grant it power to pass the invalidated law.

Nevertheless, a continuous nonpartisan policy toward Communists began to take shape. In July 1949, the federal Labor government, with the endorsement of non-Communist trade unionists, passed permanent legislation amending the Federal Arbitration Act to provide for inquiry where there appeared to be a reasonable question of irregularity in union elections, for payment of legal expenses of the plaintiff and to permit the Federal Arbitration Court to conduct new ballots where the

[13] Among them were Williams of the Miners, McPhillips of the Ironworkers, Healy of the Waterside Workers' Federation (all Central Committee members).

[14] Communist Party Dissolution Act passed October 20, 1950, invalidated March 9, 1951 by High Court of Australia in *Australian Communist Party and Others* versus *The Commonwealth of Australia and Others.*

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result had been affected by irregularity. Although a Liberal-Country party coalition won the December 1949 general election, union members showed no inclination to renew solidarity with Communist trade-union leaders. Communist efforts to play on trade-union loyalty to the Labor party and to involve trade unionists in an industrial war to drive the Liberal-Country party government from office failed. Communist propaganda that government action against the Communist party and Communist officers in trade unions was an attack on labor generally won negligible sympathy. Thus, with no protest from the rank and file, a non-Labor government periodically broke politically-inspired strikes by invoking the industrial sections of the Crimes Act (a traditional anti-Labor symbol), and threatening de-registration proceedings against unions refusing arbitration. From time to time it won support of the ACTU in putting down Communist-inspired strikes. The government strengthened the enforcement powers of the Federal Arbitration Court, enlarged it to speed settlement of disputes, and added to earlier ballot legislation by providing that under certain conditions (to eliminate nuisances) trade unions or a substantial section of their membership could petition the Federal Arbitration Court to conduct elections for union officers[15]—to ensure against irregularities—a practice gaining in popularity despite Communist campaigning against "government interference" in union affairs. This nullified the Communist tactic of forcing non-Communists into lengthy court proceedings to seek redress for fraud.

Similarly, the Federal Arbitration Court became an important medium to restore industrial stability and democracy in the trade unions. With no protest from rank-and-file members, the arbitration court fined, imposed occasional jail sentences, and de-registered unions for contempt of court or illegal strikes, when it became clear that Communist leaders were abusing the tolerance of the Court and had no genuine interest in settling a dispute. The Court streamlined and gave priority to hearings involving fraud in union elections to thwart the Communist

[15] The 1949 and 1951 legislation enlarged Section 96 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1904–1951) which covers "Disputed Elections in Organizations".

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technique of developing marathon court cases. It reinstated anti-Communist opposition leaders expelled by Communist union officers on trumped-up charges. It acted promptly on protests of rank-and-file workers against the practice of Communist unions donating funds to "front" organizations. Decisions of the Court, such as the one by the specialized Coal Industry Tribunal in 1951 which provided bonuses for continuous work in the mines and was fought bitterly by the Communist leaders, struck at the heart of the Communist rolling-strike technique. Another significant decision which indicated the attitude of the Federal Arbitration Court toward Communists was made by Mr. Justice Dumphy, when in June 1952, for the fifth time, he rejected the application of the Communist-controlled Building Workers' Industrial Union to regain registration. Justice Dumphy observed that the Victorian Royal Commission on Communism had listed the use of political strikes in defiance of arbitration as one of the Communist party means toward achieving its objectives. He questioned whether the word of a member of the Communist party to obey the Federal Arbitration Court could be trusted and declared, "An industrial leopard can not obliterate its spots by the mere application of a coat of whitewash."

The swing against Communists in the trade unions gathered pace in 1949. The ACTU Congress of September 1949 saw a drop in the Communist bloc to about one third of the delegates. Though the Communists managed to retain control of the Miners' Federation, they lost control of its biggest branch. In the Ironworkers, the Newcastle branch having 25 per cent of the membership, which suffered badly during the coal strike, ignored personal appeals from National Secretary Ernest Thornton, and elected a completely anti-Communist group of leaders, making the branch the base of revolt in the union. In March 1950, the Victorian branch of the Clerks' Union successfully revolted after a bitter legal battle, at one point during which defeated Communist officials barricaded themselves in the union offices. In all this warfare, the ALP Industrial Groups became the spearhead, gaining strength through experience which tightened their organization, trained leaders and built confidence. How-

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ever, the first of the victories of national scope came in the Ironworkers' Union in November 1951, as the climax to one of the bitterest and most sensational campaigns in Australian trade-union history. Beginning in 1945 with the revolt of the Balmain branch of the union, "Groupers" endured Communist intimidation and fraud, as well as discouragement from "neutrals". Finally, after sixteen months of hearings involving fifteen major court actions, including constitutional tests of all the "clean ballot" legislation and the powers of the Federal Arbitration Court in general, the Ironworkers' Union, the citadel of the Communist party in the trade-union movement, was won by the ALP Industrial Group. The Federal Arbitration Court removed L. J. McPhillips, who had taken over from Thornton as national secretary of the union, when the latter left Australia to join the WFTU Asian Liaison Bureau in Peking. Justice Dumphy declared that Laurence Short had really won the 1949 election for national secretary, but had been deprived of office by "forgery, fraud and irregularity on a grand scale" at the ballot box.

The Ironworkers' victory came in the midst of the first general recession and appearance of significant unemployment in Australia since the war. Throughout the recession and the upswing that followed in 1953, anti-Communist victories continued. The ALP Groups completely destroyed the hold of the Communist party on the Federated Clerks' Union, the Australian Railways Union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union (the second largest union in the country), as well as on smaller organizations. These three unions plus the Ironworkers had about 200,000 of the 300,000 members over whose industrial action the party had had decisive influence. Nonpartisan anti-Communists captured the New South Wales Teachers' Union. The Communist-controlled Building Workers' Industrial Union, which could not be captured from within since as a de-registered union it was not subject to the Federal Arbitration Court, began to lose members rapidly to the newly formed Australian Society of Carpenters and Joiners. The latter won recognition and bargaining rights through registration in the Federal Arbitration Court. The Communist party lost its unchallenged control of the Miners' Federation as prominent anti-Communist trade

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unionists won important positions on its Central Executive and Central Council. In the Waterside Workers' Federation, active anti-Communist opposition made Communist leaders cautious about putting party policy into operation.

However, the party has maintained its grip on the Australian Seamen's Union as well as a machine-like grip on the Newcastle Trades Hall Council, smaller provincial councils, and the Queensland Trades and Labor Council. Though heavily outnumbered, the Communists, nevertheless, still have exaggerated representation at ACTU Congresses and form a substantial minority bloc which they can use to exploit differences among non-Communists. The Queensland Trades and Labor Council, though of highly doubtful representativeness of Queensland labor, retains its position as a state branch of the ACTU and designates two members of the ACTU Interstate Executive. The Communists also retain influence in the Sheet Metal Workers' Federation as well as in sections of the smaller metal trades, and ship repair, scientific workers and public utilities unions.

In winning control away from the Communist party, the ALP Industrial Groups replaced optimistic guesses with long-term strategy. They provided imaginative leaders, some of them former Communists, and established their own publicity media to break the monopoly of the Communists on the trade-union press in many industries. They constantly harassed and exposed Communist officials in trade unions, keeping them off balance. They won wide public support in their crusade for union democracy and reclaimed the symbols and traditions of Australian trade unionism. By constantly forcing clear-cut issues, for example, at ACTU Congresses, they made sympathizers take sides and fragmented the façade of the Communist-inspired "united front". The stereotype the Communists had so carefully created about their own invincibility disintegrated. The "Groupers" made use of the arbitration court "clean ballot" legislation to get an honest count and roused the trade-union membership to a pitch which resulted in some of the largest total ballots recorded in the history of these unions. They made it clear in elections that the choice before the membership was between the Communist party bureaucracy whose

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primary allegiance was to a foreign Power and rank-and-file control which could exercise an effective political voice through the largest indigenous party in the country, the Labor party. The sweeping nature of the anti-Communist victories in court-conducted ballots and the Communist party's declared determination to destroy the system cast suspicion on all Communists who had gained office by other procedures. In office the anti-Communists learned rapidly to become able, efficient administrators, reformed union finances, expanded services to members, and proved able negotiators. In succeeding elections, they repeated their victories by majorities of up to 10 to 1 over "Unity" (Communist) candidates.

Richard Dixon, President of the Communist party, in his New Year's message for 1952 declared:

> Industrial Groups may be small in number but in all recent elections the Industrial Group candidates have commanded big support among workers . . . because the Industrial Groups are organizations of the Labor Party in the factories and the unions. Hence, when the issue appears as a battle between the Communists vs. the ALP the workers tend to support the Industrial Group ticket. Therefore, we must revise our approach to workers who oppose us and extend the hand of unity.

The defeats of the Communist party in the trade unions brought about a basic change in the Australian labor picture. The shift of power freed the ACTU from day-to-day pressure by Communist-controlled unions. For the first time in its history, the ACTU was in a position to develop a continuous line of policy with a measure of confidence that it reflected the views of Australia's workers and would be carried out by the trade-union movement. The federation of metal trades unions completely changed its orientation while the Communist-sponsored building trades federation collapsed and disappeared. The Australian Labor party was relieved of serious internal pressure from unions which had had Communist officers. The non-Communist trade unions strengthened their contact with the free trade unions in other countries—especially in Great Britain and the United States—and isolationism took a back seat. On the other hand, the formal links that six Communist-

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dominated trade unions had had with the WFTU were broken as the revolt of the rank and file within the unions spread and pressure from the ACTU (an affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) increased. The Australian Seamen's Union, whose Federal Secretary, E. V. Elliott, has kept his post on the WFTU Executive Committee as representative of its Transport, Port and Fisheries Department, was suspended by the ACTU in January 1954 for failure to comply with a Congress decision to end all association with the WFTU.[16] The WFTU now has no legitimate claim to representativeness in the Pacific area.

Political strikes have virtually disappeared. Though no analysis has been made, there have been significant industrial developments, much of which can be attributed to anti-Communist pressure which became intense in 1950. In 1951 when public controversy over methods of dealing with Communists reached a climax and Communists went for cover, strike time dropped 60 per cent below the previous year. The Australian Stevedoring Industry Board reported that by early 1953 the turn-around time of ships fell to half of the 1951 average while man-hours lost in disputes continued to drop steadily. Working days lost in coal mining dropped from a peak of 870,000 in 1949 to 287,000 in 1952—about the same as the pre-war rate. Since 1950 there have been substantial increases in coal output which have taken Australia off a starvation diet of its basic fuel, and permitted substantial increases in production in heavy industry and services. Working days lost in all land and sea transport fell from the peak of 1,500,000 in 1950 to 261,000 by 1952. All this has meant that for workers and business men a constant threat to the continuity of their income and planning has been removed.

[16] In an attempt to comply with the ACTU ultimatum and yet retain *de facto* affiliation with the WFTU, the Seamen passed the following resolution: "The seamen disaffiliate from the Transport Department of the WFTU. We declare that we take this retrogressive step because we are forced to by the ultimatum of the ACTU to expel us if we did not disaffiliate. We believe now, as we did in 1945 and 1949, that the WFTU is the only Union medium through which the necessary unity of the working class can be built. We declare we will do everything possible to popularize the WFTU and to carry out its policy."

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For its part, the Communist party was forced to undergo a reorganization and reassessment of its position in terms of its shrunken power. Party leaders have had to overcome schisms stemming from criticism of fallen trade-union officials. E. F. Hill, secretary of the Victorian branch of the party, warned against "an impatience with trade union leaders because they failed to do what we or a section of us believe they should do." [17] The party has had to decide which displaced union officials it would transfer to its own payroll, as was done with Hughes and McPhillips, and which of those, once highly placed in the unions, would have to start over again at the factory level and work their way back, as in the case of Rowe and Thornton, who returned to Australia (in September 1953) after his overseas assignment. Party membership which had been declining since the end of the war fell from 12,000 in 1949 to 6,000 in 1953. The party had to launch a "build the party" campaign to win new recruits (that is, cadres), replace dried up sources of finance, and increase the circulation of its publications. It has had to soften its tone even toward its enemies. "Criticism must be soundly argued, never accompanied by invective and must always distinguish between the right-wing leaders and workers." [18]

In the unremitting conflict between the Communists and the anti-Communists, the anti-Communists have natural advantages which the Communists, trying to regain strength, will have to overcome. The anti-Communists have a broad base of voluntary support from which new leaders can arise. Anti-Communist leaders are under no political obligations to a foreign Power, the demands of whose policy periodically put local Communists "out of phase" with their surroundings. Anti-Communists can cater to the immediate day-to-day demands of the general trade-union membership, time their actions, and use methods in harmony with the Australian climate. They can follow a course of moderation which can win the greatest amount of rank-and-file support as well as public approbation as substantiated by the experience of the Communists who gained their greatest

[17] Report to the Central Committee, Communist Party of Australia, 1952.
[18] Luigi Grassi, Secretary of the WFTU in the *Communist Review*, Sydney, October 1953.

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trade-union influence while pursuing the most conservative and least militant policies. Legislation now in effect bars a clique, having once gained control of a trade union, from perpetuating itself in office by refusing an effective voice to the opposition in trade-union elections. The Communists will have to win large consistent voluntary support which may force them into contradiction of their own rationale by making it necessary for them to lean heavily on their anathema—economic unionism —to hold their union jobs. This will be made more difficult since now there is a general awareness of the methods and objectives of communism brought about by the educative process of the Australian experience in the last eight years. Tolerance of Communists as merely of a different political philosophy has given way to distrust. Party-trade union cadres, though still comparatively young and experienced, are obsolete, because they have been largely discredited by unsavory circumstances associated with the removal of many of them from office. This means that the Communists' task of finding and training new faces to do their work in the trade unions has put them years off the pace in organization when compared with the anti-Communist leaders already in office and gaining stature and experience by virtue of their incumbency and accomplishments. However, the immediate worry of the Communists is to prevent their further isolation from the trade-union movement. Thus, they have desperately intensified their "united front" strategy under the slogan of the October 1953 Vienna Congress of the WFTU, namely, "Unity—Unity Everywhere"; that is, a "united front" with any one, anywhere, any time if it will enable the party and its trade-union captives to carry out their political objectives in the democratic-totalitarian conflict.*

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* All factual information herein is either common public knowledge or has been published in Australia or the United States.

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REORGANIZING THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

THE Council of Economic Advisers, which barely survived the reorganizations and decapitations concomitant to the change of administration, is probably the most paradoxical government agency in Washington. Its original bipartisan sponsors, reflecting popular yearning to achieve a less disordered and capricious economy, sought to make it a quasi-independent body whose scientific accuracy would serve it as a shield against political distortion and self-interested manipulation. With this confidence, the sponsors attached the Council to the Executive Office of the President, hoping thereby to increase its effectiveness and save it from becoming a mere statistical voice crying in a vacuum.

The result of these two concepts—scientific detachment and administrative impetus—has left the Council in a difficult position. If, relying on presidential prestige, it seeks to attune its recommendations to all the modulations of administrative policy, it will soon be in trouble with the minority in Congress and may even be consigned to the guillotine in a change of parties. If, contrariwise, it becomes overly proud of its statistical exactness and impartiality, ignoring means for ends, it may lose administrative support and, hence, effectiveness. This dilemma, of course, is not peculiar to economic advisers of political administrators. It is part of the climate in which all specialists in policy formulation, private as well as public, must work.

The Employment Act of 1946, which set up the Council, proceeded from an inspiring if controversial assumption. This was that the growing canon of economic knowledge should enable the executive and legislative branches of the federal government to maintain "conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those willing, and seeking to work, and to promote

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maximum employment, production and purchasing power." [1] This thesis would appear to have some basis in logic and experience, since man is still generally regarded as a rational animal, but it does not always pass unchallenged. In the first annual economic report submitted by President Eisenhower, there is more than a hint that he and perhaps his advisers do not accept it fully:

> As we turn from 1953 to the current year, we must first of all recognize the limitations of attempts at prevision. Despite the great improvement of statistical knowledge, it is impossible to deduce the future from statistics of the present, or to infer it from records of the past. Only those who adhere to a mechanistic view of history and of human behavior, or who are enamored of forecasting formulae, can entertain such illusions. The best we can hope for is to minimize errors or miscalculation through making full use of available data, and to give due recognition to those elements of uncertainty that attach to both the present and the future.[2]

This quotation should not be emphasized beyond its intended meaning, which may be merely that the President's advisers are statistically modest. Again, it may be nothing more than a mild expression of the economically conservative thinking now predominant in Washington. Certainly, in the recommendations which follow these deprecatory remarks, the report draws with obvious confidence on statistics of the present and records of the past. Some critics, particularly of the recommended farm program, might say that the Administration is overconfident of its powers of prognostication.

In fairness to the present Council, we might note the views of a distinguished economist who also questions the scientific exactness of economics. Dr. Roy Blough, one of America's leading economic analysts, a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers, and now principal director, Department of Economic Affairs, United Nations, got to the core of the problem in a lecture before the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois:

> No *scientific* solution is even theoretically possible of the problem of what people ought to want, and whether one person's pattern of

[1] Employment Act, *U. S. Statutes at Large*, Part I, vol. 60, p. 23.
[2] *Economic Report of the President* (Washington, 1954), p. 59.

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> value priorities is intrinsically better than that of another. And if this be true it is impossible for scientific study alone to determine the desirability of a policy and impossible for economists to arrive at authoritative determination of what ought to be done in the field of economic policy.[3]

Such professional modesty is commendable. Yet caution must be maintained in pursuing this philosophy beyond common-sense limits. While Dr. Blough implies that someone, if not the economist, eventually may have to adjudicate the "priority values", he emphasizes the pitfalls of subjectivity which he feels bar the way to a strictly scientific solution. A student of the "science" of government probably would approach the problem differently. He would be acutely aware of the paralysis which might strike a democratic society too devoted to the old Utilitarian concept that each, by serving his own interests, can best serve the interests of all. What he would ask of the economist is the most "scientific" forecast obtainable of the probable consequences of various possible courses. From that point, the nontechnical administrator should be able to fit his policies into the framework of majority interests with at least some confidence in the logic of his choice.

As controversial as the accuracy of economic prophecy now appears, it obviously involves questions of degree which are being hammered out at the forge of experience. If such policy bodies as the Council of Economic Advisers are permitted to continue and to evolve, they should show a record of successes and failures pointing up their own uses and limitations.

Once the correlative habits of canonizing or damning economic innovators are outgrown, conscientious students can grapple with the real problem which expert advisers face under our American presidential-congressional form of democratic government. Because of the constitutional stamp of our government—in which the President proposes legislation and pushes for its enactment with varying force according to the man, while Congress disposes—only two courses appear open to such a body as the Council:

[3] Blough, "The Role of the Economist in Federal Policy Making", *University of Illinois Bulletin*, vol. 51, No. 28, November 1953, p. 9.

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1. It can ally itself with the President who appoints it, winning as far as possible his support for its recommendations. This course, which the Council of Economic Advisers has largely followed so far, almost compels it to continue its support of presidential recommendations to Congress.

2. Alternatively, the Council may consider its job done once it has made its report to the President and turn its attention to the next series of statistical studies for the next report.

The Council got itself snagged on the horns of this dilemma at the outset, owing to the conflicting philosophies of a chairman, who felt that the Council should not become entangled in the legislative process even to the extent of committee testimony, and his two colleagues, who felt that they should testify. The chairman believed he might be forced sometime either to disagree publicly with the President's policies in so far as they deviated from Council advice, or to recommend to the legislators a course the chairman personally considered unwise. Since subsequent chairmen and co-members have testified before the Joint Committee on the Economic Report (although the present chairman has appeared only at executive sessions), the procedural question now appears resolved permanently in favor of testifying. The test is still to come on what Council members will do if the President adopts a course with which they strongly disagree.

The specific wording of the Employment Act, by requiring the Council to submit its conclusions to the President, closes another possible channel. That would be for the Council to submit reports like an independent investigatory commission, leaving its proposals to shift for themselves before an interested, indifferent, or hostile Congress. Since the Employment Act makes the Council submit a report to the President but does not require him to transmit it in its original form to Congress along with his own economic report, the Council's observations on the economic climate may never reach the public except as filtered through the presidential philosophy or prejudice.

Thus, there is no dodging the question of whether the public's interest in maintaining "maximum employment" is best served by subordinating the Council to the personality of the President. Is it practicable in our government to make the Council a more

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independent body and still have it function with the indispensable support of the Administration? An academic answer to this question would have little value, but some empirical judgments can be offered on the basis of the Council's experiences.

I

We have been able to observe the Council's functioning for nearly seven years under the Democratic Administration, which created it with bipartisan support, and now have seen the first economic report by a Republican President with Council assistance. Even those who originally opposed creation of the Council must by now recognize that it deals with problems of tremendous importance, probably with matters affecting the happiness of more Americans than any other one agency in the executive branch of the government, not even excepting the defense establishment. Is the Council, as set up by the Employment Act and modified by President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1953, exerting its full potential in helping the American people avoid the sibling hazards of boom and bust?

As originally organized, the Council was to consist of three persons named by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The chairman was an Augustan "first among equals", with no special functions or powers except to preside when the three met. There also was a vice chairman who presided in the absence of the chairman. The chairman enjoyed no prerogatives, even in his relations with the President, which the others did not share; regardless of any consultations the Chief Executive might have with the Council members as individuals, his formal contacts with the Council were with all three unless one happened to be away.

Section 4 of the Employment Act specifically states that each councilman is to be a person "who, as a result of his training, experience, and attainments, is exceptionally qualified to analyze and interpret economic developments, to appraise programs and activities of the Government in the light of the policy declared in section 2, and to formulate and recommend national economic policy to promote employment, production, and purchasing

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power under free competitive enterprise." It would appear that only a professional economist could meet these requirements, except that it would be hard to define an economist in the specific way that a doctor or a lawyer can be defined. For instance, a former Council chairman holds a law degree but no degrees in economics, although he has done graduate work in that field and held several government posts in which he was classified as an economist. Each Council member was to receive $15,000 annually. The total budget was not to exceed $345,000.

On June 1, 1953, President Eisenhower sent his Reorganization Plan No. 9 to Capitol Hill. While brief, it made far-reaching changes whose effect on the Council could not be fully grasped at first reading. This reorganization plan tipped the balance in favor of retaining the Council, which had appeared headed for the discard more than once during the early months of the new Administration. While the President was making up his mind on what he wanted to do about the Council, an appropriation of only $25,000 was asked to keep the old body barely alive.

Republican leaders, particularly those in the conservative camp, had expressed strong objections to the old Council on many occasions, even accusing it of "leftist" tendencies. Those who disliked the way the Council had operated doubtless would not have objected to seeing it disappear, except that such a step would have required virtual repeal of the Employment Act, which had received bipartisan support. Some of the President's entourage were known to favor retaining the Council in modified form. While this debate was proceeding behind the scenes, Congress gave the Chief Executive a new aide, called Economic Adviser to the President. To fill the post, Mr. Eisenhower named Dr. Arthur F. Burns, a professor of economics at Columbia University, director of research for the National Bureau of Economic Research, and one of the country's distinguished analysts. He was later to hold the dual posts of presidential adviser and chairman of the reorganized Council, although drawing only one salary.

The reorganization plan achieved its substantial change in Council organization in fewer than a hundred words, which said:

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> The functions vested in the Council of Economic Advisers by section 4(b) of the Employment Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 24), and so much of the functions vested in the Council by section 4(c) of that Act as consists of reporting to the President with respect to any function of the Council under the said section 4(c), are hereby transferred to the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. The position of vice chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, provided for in the last sentence of section 4(a) of the said Act, is hereby abolished.

In a letter to Congress accompanying the reorganization plan, the President affirmed his belief in the "basic principles of the Employment Act". He declared his "purpose to take the appropriate actions to reinvigorate and make more effective the operations of the Council of Economic Advisers." He asserted that by making the chairman rather than the whole Council responsible for "certain administrative functions of the Council", that body would be strengthened internally. The second objective of the reorganization he described as establishing "a clearer relationship with the President." This was to be achieved by having only the chairman rather than the whole Council report to him. The Chief Executive said he felt he now would be able "to deal with the Council more directly through the Chairman."

Both the reorganization plan and the President's letter were couched in the rather formal vocabulary characteristic of inter-official communications in a bureaucracy. At the same time, "administration informants"—those anonymous spokesmen so useful to journalists but suspect to more serious students because of their nebulous responsibility—were giving a more readily grasped explanation of the Administration's attitude. They said the President favored a "return to the original conception of the council as a permanent, strictly professional, non-political body." These sources said the Administration felt the old Council had been too closely identified with the "Fair Deal" program, even to the extent of testifying on its behalf before Congressional committees.[4]

Whatever the motive, it was evident the chairman had become the pivot on which the successful functioning of the Council depended. In attempting to appraise how well the Council

[4] Associated Press dispatch from Washington, February 23, 1953.

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can be expected to function administratively and in its advisory capacity under the new dispensation, one happily can ignore personalities. Dr. Burns's prestige is so considerable that even those economists who disagree with his policy recommendations regard him as one of the country's leading analysts. All appear confident that he can make the Council function efficiently if anyone can.

Perhaps the best way to judge the probable effect of the reorganization is to attempt to analyze it from the perspective of the old Council's functioning in its greatest test, the recession of 1949. This is not an infallible method. Conceivably, the new Council might operate for several years without facing a similar challenge, although, as of the time this article was written, that unhappily does not appear likely. Also, as with all human institutions, chances of success depend considerably on the abilities and psychological make-up of the President and the Council members. Whereas one combination of men might work well under the worst circumstances, another combination might work ill under any conditions. Nevertheless, a few broad conclusions can be reached from a brief survey of the Council's work in a trying time.

In the second Truman Administration, the Council was badly torn at times by clashes of personalities and, to some extent, of philosophies. Yet it managed to acquit itself well in its final analysis of the 1949 recession. The differences on Council procedure between the chairman, Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, and the vice chairman, Mr. Leon H. Keyserling, particularly with regard to what the Council's relations to the Congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report should be, were reported in all the papers. Whereas Dr. Nourse felt the Council was primarily an analytical and advisory body and should not become involved in the political process even to the extent of letting its members testify before the Committee, Mr. Keyserling thought the members should so testify, always reserving the right to resign if they felt the Administration's major economic recommendations were unsound. While Dr. Nourse himself never testified, his associates did, and subsequent members and the present chairman have continued the practice. The

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question now appears to have been settled permanently in Mr. Keyserling's direction.

Less well known—even denied in some quarters—were the differences within the Council over the interpretation of the economic statistics on the eve of the recession. Dr. Nourse has disclosed some of these differences in his book, *Economics in the Public Service.*[5]

In *The Economic Report of the President,* the annual statement which the Employment Act requires the President to make and which was sent to Congress in January 1949, the general emphasis was on curbing what the President and his advisers obviously feared at that time would be a continuation of spiraling inflation. To meet this, the President recommended in brief that Congress increase taxes by four billion dollars; social security contributions were to be increased "under existing and extended social insurance programs". At the same time, it is true, the President cautioned that national tax policy should be flexible for prompt adjustment "to the changing needs of business and consumers." [6]

The President's *Report* was accompanied by *The Annual Economic Review,* signed by all three Council members. While devoting itself primarily to analysis rather than policy recommendations, the review did say in its final section that "stabilization policy for the immediate future is still concerned mainly with restraining inflationary forces, breaking bottlenecks, and selectively adjusting the markets and prices of some commodities." [7]

It is of prime importance to our study to note this sharp formal line between presidential and Council views, even when they were in substantial agreement. Since the Employment Act says that the President may make such reports on the economy as he deems necessary, in addition to his annual statement, the Chief Executive and the Council had adopted the practice of making mid-year reports each July as well as the annual reports in January. And Dr. Nourse says that, *at the President's*

[5] New York, 1953.

[6] *The Economic Report of the President,* January 1949, p. 10.

[7] *The Annual Economic Review,* January 1949, p. 74.

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own request, presidential and conciliar observations had been separated since mid-year 1948.[8] This was to meet certain criticisms that Congress and the public could not tell wherein the President had modified the advice given to him by the Council.

The differences that developed within the Council almost immediately after the January 1949 report and review appear to have split the body along substantive as well as formal lines; yet it is difficult to say that these differences regarding the interpretation of economic statistics and consequently in policy views, of which the President was fully aware, did not serve a good purpose in the end. Dr. Nourse has told us that he had in 1948 finally decided against the view of a colleague that the Council "should speak in one voice by following a majority rule." He preferred, rather, to "disclose to the President such differences of view on economic matters as were important but irreconcilable." [9]

By early 1949 this decision had great significance. The monthly confidential memorandum which the Council sent to the President on February 4 to keep him abreast of economic developments cited a "slow decline" in the cost of living, a drop in wholesale prices for foods and other farm products, and an increase in unemployment. Yet it concluded that "this is not the performance of a softening economy" and that "the situation is strong. . . ." But the most significant thing about this memorandum was the insertion, before these conclusions, of the following paragraph, double-spaced and indented to make sure it would catch the presidential eye immediately:

> Mr. Nourse believes that there are other facts than those cited above, additional developments not yet reducible to a statistical basis, and questions of business attitudes which lead him to an interpretation materially different from that contained in the remaining paragraphs of this memorandum. In a word, he does not believe there are clear indications that inflationary pressures are increasing or unabated, although developments are conceivable which might renew the process of inflation.[10]

[8] Nourse, *op. cit.*, pp. 216–218.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 218.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 234.

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Two weeks later, the chairman told White House reporters just before he left for a speaking trip on the West coast that he regarded the current stage of the business cycle as one of "disinflation". A month later, addressing the Executives' Club of Chicago, he elaborated this analysis, saying that it was like reducing air pressure in an automobile tire to prevent a blowout. By contrast, he added, the blowout would be "deflation by the depression route".[11]

During this time the Congressional Joint Committee was holding hearings on the President's economic report. While Dr. Nourse was away from Washington and was opposed to testifying before that Committee even if present, the other two Council members appeared before it. The vice chairman, Mr. Keyserling, although pointing out the "mixed" trends in the economy, emphasized at one point that "to stop worrying about rising and excessive prices in some areas of the economy because employment and demand may be softening in other areas would be to neglect the real problem of inflation just when it becomes most dangerous." [12] The third member, Dr. John D. Clark, was even more explicit on this point. He told the Committee that "the administration should have the anti-inflationary measures the President has requested without delay, for the risk in delaying action until spiraling prices are more actively at work and are establishing the base for the ultimate crash is too great." [13] In March, while Dr. Nourse was still out of Washington, the other two Council members sent the President the monthly charts on the economy, accompanied by a memorandum of their own. They informed the Chief Executive that "the fundamental conditions for very high-level employment and production in 1949 are all present."

Thus there is ample evidence of fundamental differences on interpretation within the Council—undoubtedly differences honestly arrived at and sincerely held. By April, however, the Council indicated that its members were drawing together

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

[12] *Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Congress of the United States, Eighty-first Congress, First Session*, Washington, 1949, p. 20.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 442.

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again as the economic clouds closed in. A quarterly report, signed by all the members, told the President that "there is the possibility of another spurt of inflation. This seems least likely unless the Congress votes large appropriations not offset by new taxes. . . ." [14]

In July, when the economic indices were in the doldrums, the President and the Council spoke to the country with remarkable unanimity. *The Midyear Economic Report of the President* and the Council's *The Economic Situation at Midyear 1949* were two of the most extraordinary government statements regarding a recession that have ever appeared in our country. They were notable for frankness, prescience, and freedom from panic. Changing course 180 degrees from the previous annual report, the President said:

> Employment is still high, but unemployment has been increasing, and veterans and others leaving school are finding it much harder to obtain work than a year ago. Production is still high, but it is lower, particularly in some industries, than it was a year ago. Business investment is at a high rate, but plans for new investments are being made with caution.
>
> The 1949 decline has been moderate, and the opportunity is now ours to reverse the trend and achieve maximum production and consumption of goods and services without the evils of inflation.[15]

The President, following Council advice, did not give way to panic. He dropped his recommended tax hike of four billion dollars of the previous January. Instead, he asked for repeal of the tax on transportation of goods, liberalization of provisions for carrying-over losses by corporations, and an increase in estate and gift taxes. He also called for an extension of the time limit fixed by law on the maturity of Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans to business, an increase of the minimum wage to at least 75 cents an hour, broadening of unemployment benefits, old age and survivors' insurance benefits, and an improvement of farm income supports. Most significant was the fact that he did not call for a huge public works program at that time, declaring that "the economic situation does not now

[14] Nourse, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[15] *The Midyear Economic Report of the President*, 1949, p. 2.

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call" for it.[16] He pointed out that three billion dollars in federal civil public works and a similar amount for local and state projects were already appropriated.

Conciliar and presidential wisdom was largely vindicated six months later when the next annual economic report came out. The Council had advised the President to "ride out" the recession, as one Council member said, and he had taken the advice. While trends were somewhat mixed throughout the remainder of the year, year-end statistics showed improvement in several important sectors of the economy: industrial production regained nearly half the ground it had lost, prices became relatively stable, and consumers' disposable income (income after taxes) actually was higher in 1949 than in 1948.

I have discussed in some detail the Council's serious initial difficulties and ultimate brilliant success, in the first recession it had encountered, in order to establish certain criteria. Would it have been better in that time of troubles if the chairman had had greater authority and had used it to obscure honest differences within the Council in making his reports to the President? Would the President, if he had been making an economic report before conflicting views within the Council had been reconciled or perhaps even before he knew they existed, have been likely to confuse both himself and the public? With these pitfalls clear, it is possible to use the experience of the old Council in appraising the architecture of the new.

II

The major purpose of having a three-man council was to get a broad check on conclusions drawn from statistical analyses. The fact that it also afforded a division of administrative responsibilities was secondary. The importance of obtaining a wide sampling of opinions is probably more important in the economic field than in any of the other social sciences. Economists still tend to divide at the great watershed separating the "classicists" from the "modernists"— primarily the Keynesians. While a President may, as far as he does any economic thinking at all, tend to do it along Keynesian or "classical" lines, he should

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

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certainly be made aware, at least, that different views are held by many responsible economists of the other school.

This does not mean that a President should undertake to balance his Council of Economic Advisers delicately between the two schools. The clash between extreme views would probably paralyze a council trying to formulate public policy. But at least the President, Congress, and—as far as it is let in on the discussion—the public should realize that economic views on a given problem may not be unanimous. The dissenting opinions of the United States Supreme Court justices have always been respected in principle. Not infrequently they have served noble ends, even pointing the way to future majority decisions.

Dissenting views of members of the Council of Economic Advisers, when honestly presented, should not be condemned unless their frequency indicates basic and continuing disagreement within the body leading to chaos and paralysis. The last economic review by the Truman Council even incorporated a partial dissent boldly within the published report. In this instance, the retiring vice chairman took issue with certain precautionary long-range analysis and policy discussion which was apparently endorsed by the other two members and a large segment of the staff. The vice chairman said he could not see "changes in business conditions (within the next three years) which would bring about a recessionary trend threatening enough to require new conterdeflationary action by the Government." [17] The fact that he may have been overly optimistic is irrelevant. What is important is that he held certain views which he felt his colleagues did not fully share and made a point of passing them along to the President and the public. In the same report, the retiring Council chairman felt constrained to issue an "amplifying comment" on the long-range analysis.[18] Again, the correctness of his views is not as important to us as the fact that he was able to express them publicly as well as privately.

In the new Council, this question, whether decisions will be reached with the full play of individual differences, is another

[17] *The Economic Report of the President; The Annual Economic Review*, January 1953, p. 102.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

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which hinges on the chairman's personality. As long as Dr. Burns heads the Council, there appears little doubt that his colleagues' important dissents will reach the presidential—if not the public—ear. In the hearing on the reorganization plan before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, a Democratic member, Representative John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, asked Dr. Burns:

". . . but suppose there is disagreement between the chairman and the other members; what then?"

"Well, then, in that case," the chairman-designate replied, "much would depend on the chairman, would it not? A sensible chairman who knows how to work with people would try to bring about agreement."

McCormack: "I think that is correct. All of us in Congress have our experiences along such lines."

Burns: "If he didn't succeed, and if he is a man of good sense and judgment, he will insist that his colleagues accompany him to the meeting with the President." [19]

How will the Council fare in this regard if it should some day acquire a chairman who lacks such breadth?

The reorganization plan tends generally to build up the chairman while whittling down his two colleagues. It is no reflection on the two distinguished economists whom President Eisenhower and Dr. Burns have persuaded to join their official advisory body to say that it may be difficult to keep first-rate men in the two subordinate posts for any length of time. It may not be too difficult to find conscientious and capable economists with the proverbial passion for anonymity that the reorganization plan envisages. It may be harder to induce such men to accept positions of responsibility in which their professional independence hinges on the personality and methodology of their senior partner.

Referring to this dilemma, a former Council member, Dr. Blough, said in the lecture quoted above:[20]

[19] *Hearings Before Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations*, House of Representatives, 83rd Cong., 1st Session, July 14 and 17, p. 7.

[20] *Supra*, pp. 414–415.

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> The chief comment that I would make about this arrangement is that the position of the Chairman would be a distinguished one while the positions of the other members would be anomalous. Would the Chairman really do justice to Council opinions in which the other members both disagreed with him? If he failed to press his own view, would he not feel that he was guilty of sponsoring error?[21]

There are those who say some of the questions I have raised are rather academic, that Dr. Burns has succeeded in making himself as Council Chairman, if not the Council as a whole, exert definite influence on Administration policy; they would ask whether organizational form is more important than substance. Such views have a strong appeal to common sense, but they should not be pursued to uncritical lengths.

In the first place, on the basis of the scant disclosure of the present Council's own policy recommendations, it would be difficult to say who are the leaders and who are the led. We know that Dr. Burns has been a key man in liaison work among the executive departments in formulating economic policy, but at what cost to his own views and those of his colleagues? President Eisenhower has told us at a press conference that Dr. Burns in person has been giving the cabinet a weekly summary of economic developments. The question is, to what extent has he been recommending policy and how far has his advice been accepted by the Administration as a whole?

We can only presume that because Dr. Burns continues in his post he is basically satisfied with the rôle the Council is being permitted to play. However, in appraising the plan for the Council's reorganization, one cannot escape the thought that in some time of crisis the political administrators may disagree sharply on policy with the Council chairman and on grounds not wholly economic and detached. Under such circumstances the quality of the chairman's colleagues and the degree to which he can bring their judgments to reinforce him before the President would pass well beyond the formal and enter the substantive stage.

As for the old Council, it is too much to say, as some have said, that it merely "toed the administration line." Certainly Dr.

[21] *Blough, op. cit.*, p. 24.

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Nourse never limited himself to doing that, even though he may have paid for such independence in reduced influence at the White House. And there is little evidence that the Council subsequently was in subjection to Administration pressure, at least at the level of the three top councilmen. There has seldom been an example of a more unified presentation of an administrative program—Dr. Nourse absent and dissenting—than was made by heads of the departments dealing with the economy in their appearance before the Joint Committee to recommend the President's anti-inflation campaign in early 1949. But the two Council members appeared at the hearings of their own free will, at least without direct presidential order. The fact that this impressive array of witnesses proved to be slow in perceiving the business downturn is not material.

It has been said that members of the Truman Council staff below the top three councilmen felt at times that their work was seriously modified before being presented to the President. There is nothing in the Council's organization to prevent this from happening again. And it must be said that, since final responsibility always rests with the top administrators, there is nothing inherently wrong in this situation, provided administrative prerogatives are not flagrantly abused.

It would be tempting to try to judge President Eisenhower's first economic report from the standpoint of its prescience and economic philosophy. Such an approach would be beyond the scope of this study, which is an attempt to appraise the Council's reorganization. However, there is one formal change from the economic reports by the previous Administration which demands comment. Except for certain appendices, mainly statistical or tabular, the Council's own views on the economy and recommendations for dealing with it are not known. In brief, the Council's *Economic Review* appears to have been discontinued. The guiding light furnished by the experts is made to pass through the presidential crystal ball, leaving the reader to judge for himself the degree of political distortion. This is unquestionably a step backward from the procedure which Dr. Nourse tells us had been followed by the previous Administration since mid-year 1948.

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It appears likely that the President in this latest report largely followed the recommendations of his expert advisers. But, because of the form of the presentation, one cannot be entirely sure. This contrasts with earlier reports and reviews in which it was possible to detect shadings of somewhat divergent views held by the Chief Executive and his experts on controversial points—the Brannan plan for agricultural supports, for instance.

Those who favor the present arrangement have a strong argument which runs like this: since the Council is supposed to offer disinterested advice, while no Administration is disposed to tolerate internal critics, has not Dr. Burns hit on the best solution possible by giving his advice privately? A big objection to this course is that it deprives the Council of all opportunity to enlighten the public directly. It is true that the Employment Act does not require publication of the Council's recommendations, but economic developments that may require understanding response by the people are not appropriate for top secret or even confidential classification. The fight to maintain economic stability is one in which we all are soldiers.

Even in the military establishment, the Chiefs of Staff have found it advisable to share some of their views with the public. When they took a new look at the "New Look", it was clear that their endorsement of the Administration's defense program was not absolute in every detail. There were even public portions of their testimony before the Congressional military committees, while the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers had his say on the President's economic report before the Joint Committee in executive session.

Certainly under the old Council there were too many speeches by members in conflict with each other or with Administration recommendations. This raises the question whether the members should undertake extensive speaking engagements on economic policy at all, at least without reconciling views as far as possible. Dr. Burns himself has appeared, without reluctance, before newsmen at press conferences to answer with candor their questions on economic trends.

All of these means of communicating views and recommendations lack the full, formal impact of the annual and semi-annual

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economic reviews by the Council as distinguished from the President's own reports. It should not be asking too much for the public to see these. While they might at times disclose some discrepancies between the experts and the political administrators, at others their very detachment and independence could win support for presidential policies.

I shall touch shortly on the advisability of providing some continuity in Council administration, even and especially when the political color of the government changes. At this point I can say that it will be difficult for any new Administration to justify retaining economic advisers whose views are not generally known and whose recommendations at given turns in a shifting economy could not be learned without extensive research.

President Eisenhower himself, as final judge of how far his advisers should disclose their views to the people, has made a clear and emphatic statement. Answering a question, which was somewhat critical of his economic policies, at a press conference in Washington just two days before these lines were written, he said, in the rather awkward "third person" style in which he releases such comments to the newsmen:

> Please go to see the chief of his economic advisers and see what had been done, what had been the measures that had been adopted from time to time, how they had worked, what they were prepared to do, and what the Administration believed about this whole situation; in other words, get his side of the story.
>
> And, he might say this, ladies and gentlemen, when he got a man of the caliber of the head of his economic advisers, he gave him just one order.
>
> That he was never, by any chance, to develop an opinion and bring it in here to him or to anyone in the Cabinet or in the Legislature that supported someone's political view, including the President's. He was to dig out the facts of this economy, and present them as honestly as he and his associates could possibly do it, not only to the President but to the public—and he [the President] thought they would get very honest answers from him [Dr. Burns].[22]

While President Eisenhower can speak only for his own Administration, it will be difficult for his successors to take a less forthright view.

[22] Press conference text, Associated Press, *New York Times*, June 3, 1954, p. 18, col. 4.

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Before leaving the question of how the latest economic report was organized, we should note the first appendix in which the three councilmen make a factual report on the Council's broader activities in 1953. They mention the Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability, which was "not specifically spelled out" in the reorganization plan but was "announced in the President's Transmittal Message" to Congress. Besides the Council chairman, this Board includes representatives of the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor Departments; of the Bureau of the Budget, the Federal Reserve Board, and the White House office. In addition, an Auxiliary Staff Committee has been set up, composed "mainly of members of the senior staff of the departments and agencies represented on the Advisory Board." [23] The Council reports that the Board, which meets weekly, "has been an effective body for reviewing and evaluating economic programs and policies of the Federal Government, and for considering measures designed to strengthen the economy. It has also proved effective in achieving a mutual understanding necessary for coordinated action of the various departments and agencies to accomplish the objectives of the Employment Act of 1946." [24]

In fairness to the new Council, it must be said that if the "coordinated action" claimed has been largely achieved, the economic advisers apparently have improved on the "interagency committees" with which the old Council worked. Contrasting views could be heard in Washington among representatives of other departments and agencies serving under Council chairmanships on these committees. One such representative described the old Council as "rather sloppy in coordination", adding that a "sense of the meeting" was seldom reached and that judgments were more or less suspended. A different view, expressed by a government departmental economist who also sat at some of the committee sessions, was that the Council ultimately was responsible for its own conclusions and that a "sense of the meeting" was not expected or necessary. In the case of the new Council, it is to be hoped that any "co-

[23] *Economic Report of the President*, 1954, p. 121.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

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ordinated action" is initiated only after detached appraisal of the economic statistics and that the Council is not being required to subordinate its best judgment to administrative or political pressure.

III

In attempting to judge the over-all way in which the new Administration has chosen to implement the Employment Act, most thoughtful Americans—whether qualified economists, students of government, or mere laymen—will probably feel grateful that the Council of Economic Advisers was preserved in some form. However one may feel about the way the old Council functioned, it is most unfortunate that the Council's staff was so drastically dismantled during the period of uncertainty regarding the incoming Administration's intentions. It must be added, to Dr. Burns's eternal credit, that when he arrived in Washington he did all he could to salvage key personnel. Even though one may object to the way a governmental agency has been administered, there is little justification for the root-and-branch method of reorganization under a new régime. There are always highly trained experts whose experience and loyalty can well be used to preserve administrative and technical continuity.

Britain's experience in a similar change-over is instructive. The Churchill Conservative government has been receiving its coördinated economic advice from the Economic Section of the Cabinet Secretariat, headed by Sir Robert Hall. This is a group of about a half-dozen top-level economists who, under the Treasury, have the official if private ear of the government leaders on economic policy, from the prime minister down. From whom did the Labor government receive such advice? Not only from the same group but largely from the same men.

Campaign rhetoric aside, there are probably few responsible Republicans who would insist that their economic philosophy differs more radically from that of the Democrats than do the corresponding views of the British Conservatives and Socialists. Yet the Churchill government did not find it necessary to dismiss the distinguished economists who had been advising the Laborites.

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There are doubtless reasons in addition to the traditional British respect for the civil servant why the changing of governments appears better ordered in London than in Washington. Two such reasons are obvious in the field of economic policy formulation. First, economic thinking in Britain in both the Conservative and Laborite camps tends to accept more generally the broad lines of the Keynesian school. In the United States, however, Keynesian economics is still a fighting word even among academic economists, and its opponents among politicians and other laymen express their horror in terms they usually reserve for subversive movements. Dr. Burns himself is not uncritical of Keynes.[25] The second obvious reason for the relative security of official British economists, despite the vicissitudes of politics, stems from the climate in which they operate. Their relation to their nonexpert administrative and political superiors is essentially private, thereby sparing them most of the slings and arrows of partisanship.

Now a case can certainly be made for the confidential expert adviser to the nonexpert administrator. But the American passion for exposing to the public gaze the minutest functioning of officials is generally a preponderant counterweight. The American governmental machine is like one of those exhibition engines which, deprived of the ordinary metal housing, is encased in transparent glass or plastic. Nearly everyone, including our potential enemies, can study our Administration at his leisure. Consequently, we can expect our top government economists to continue working under as bright a light as those—in private life and in government—who are interested in their activities can play upon them. Certainly the Council of Economic Advisers cannot avoid public scrutiny, as long as it continues in the stellar rôle assigned it by the Employment Act. And, after the risk recently incurred of depriving a new President of the Council's advice, this is no time to attempt drastic alteration of the Act. Also, as has been pointed out, the wide understanding and support needed to implement any economic policy argue against moving the Council's functions completely into the confidential realm.

[25] See the first essay in the new collection by Dr. Burns, *The Frontiers of Economic Knowledge* (Princeton, 1954), pp. 3–25.

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Any attempt to detach the Council from the presidential office would have dubious value, despite all the openings the present system leaves for the little foxes of politics. A body of independent economic experts in the federal government would hardly be a popular agency, given our Jacksonian prejudice against most experts and our tenacious belief that virtually any American of normal intelligence can fill any governmental post. The only way to make such an independent body of economists, deprived of presidential support, a real force in our government would be for the Joint Committee on the Economic Report to make strong bipartisan annual reports and follow them up energetically with the necessary legislation, if any is required. Anyone who reads the partisan majority and minority reports which the Committee has turned out, with two somewhat illusory exceptions, will not be encouraged over the prospects for such economic unanimity.

Some consideration might be given to staggering the terms of members of the Council so that a new President would find administrative continuity in that body. Unless extremists had managed to entrench themselves in the Council, the President would have more to gain from the experience of Council members than to lose to any lame-duck economic philosophy they might harbor. Here, as in nearly every branch of the government, the current insistence on applying as a test of fitness the "policy formulation" experience of government officials far below the political heads of departments has reached absurd extremes.

Stephen Kemp Bailey, in his authoritative work on the formation of the Council, *Congress Makes a Law*,[26] has told us that early drafts of the Employment Act in the House would have created a Council that was intended to be a completely independent agency in the executive department, with its members holding office for five years. Secretary of the Treasury Vinson, an Administration leader in the move to set up the Council, insisted that such rigidity would handicap a President, particularly a new one.[27] Regardless of its theoretical value, such

[26] Stephen Kemp Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law* (New York, 1947).

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

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a plan probably would stir up such resentment from a new Administration as to reduce greatly the Council's efficiency.

The staggered terms of Council members would tend to preserve some continuity without binding the President indefinitely to an economic adviser with whom he heartily disagreed. And there would always be the opportunity for a new President, once he had become convinced of the devoted service of an economist who had advised his predecessor, to reappoint him. It should be repeated that the change in the Employment Act which even this modest proposal requires should be made without inviting the Congressional foes of anything even remotely resembling economic planning to launch a mass assault on the Act as a whole.

Perhaps one of the best—and simplest—things that could be done to strengthen the Council with those who wish it well would be to return to the practice of having the President and Council submit separate reports. Since the Council is bound to be held responsible in large measure for the soundness of the President's economic policies, it is of great importance to be able to distinguish between economic and political considerations.

Finally, there is the question of unanimity. There is the old jest that if all the economists were placed end to end, they would not reach a conclusion. Sometimes, in fact, they reach too many and too conflicting conclusions. But despite the continuing if slightly diminishing disagreements between the "classic" and "modern" schools, the area which is accepted as canonical for all economists is gradually increasing. This was evident in the first Eisenhower economic report, which, while conservative in tone, could not conceivably have been written by the last Republican Administration. Despite the way in which this report deprecates the accuracy of economic forecasts, it nevertheless directly or by implication proceeds to indulge in them.

The evolution of economic canons is the hope of all who sincerely want to eliminate or at least ameliorate the miseries of recurring crises. Patience and avoidance of too great expectations from the work of the reorganized Council as it takes a

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fresh start will help it build itself into a bulwark of national welfare. Similar advice was given by the first chairman, Dr. Nourse, in a lecture to the American Philosophical Society in 1950:

> It will take time for successive Presidents to learn how to use a nonpolitical advisory staff agency effectively. It will take time for successive council members to learn how to bring the most competent and realistic analysis of economic problems simply and effectively to the President's aid.[28]

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NEW YORK CITY

[28] Nourse, "Economic Analysis and Political Synthesis", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 94, No. 4, 1950, p. 316.

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FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION IN PARLIAMENTS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

WHEN, under the Ministers of the Crown Act of 1937, a salary was provided for "that member of the House of Commons who is for the time being the Leader in that House of the party in opposition to His Majesty's Government having the greatest numerical strength in that House", formal recognition was given by the United Kingdom to a function that had long since become vital in the parliamentary process. Canada, Union of South Africa, Australia, and many of their provinces and states already had established salaried positions or sessional allowances for opposition leaders.

I

By way of introduction, two matters that are prerequisite to a consideration of leadership of the opposition, yet outside the scope of thorough consideration here, must be dealt with in a general way. They are the methods of selecting leaders in the major parties of the countries, and the rôle of the opposition in theory and practice.

The most common mode of selecting leaders for political parties of British countries is election by party caucus of members of Parliament; this device is used by the United Kingdom Labor party, and by major parties in Australia and New Zealand. The British Conservative party vests final selection in a body composed of its M.P.'s, Lords, candidates, and officials of the party organization.[1] In Canada the parties sometimes elect leaders by large national conventions and at other times leave the selection to a caucus of parliamentarians.

[1] National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, *Interim and Final Reports of the Committee on Party Organization, 1948 and 1949* (1949), pp. 32–33. In the past, however, the party has often waited until it secured a Commons majority and the monarch has appointed one of its number as Prime Minister before convening the selection body to ratify the choice.

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Now that extra compensation or perquisites are available to leaders of the opposition, there is perhaps more likelihood that the post will be filled promptly when it falls vacant. Under present-day conditions of recurring crises, moreover, the necessity of having a clearly defined alternate for the prime ministership is very great indeed.

The rôle of the opposition in parliamentary government is widely known and has been capably described.[2] The opposition performs two key functions: it provides an alternative government and it provides criticism of the government of the day. In the give and take of the parliamentary arena the typical situation involves government proposal and defense of a policy line; the opposition then directs its attack along lines that its appraisal of the situation indicates will be most fruitful. Although the skirmish often leads to a test of strength in a vote of confidence, the opposition rarely has hopes of defeating the government; its goal, more likely, is to influence public opinion to the extent that at the next election the government will be retired.

Ordinarily the opposition organizes itself in such a way that its criticism shall be well conceived and responsible. Leadership takes the form, in most cases, of a "shadow cabinet", composed of ex-ministers and potential ministers with particular competence in some area of public business.

II

In view of the reluctance of the British to give statutory recognition to the prime ministership, it is hardly surprising that the leadership of the opposition was not institutionalized earlier. Prime ministers there were from Walpole onwards, but they were paid as First Lords of the Treasury, and their powers and duties followed custom and usage, not the statute book.

[2] Sir Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government* (Cambridge, England, 1947), pp. 15–16, 361, 384–88, and *Parliament* (Cambridge, England, and New York, 1940), pp. 70–74, 144–46, 152–70; Lord Campion, "H.M. Opposition: A Happy Solution", *The Canadian Liberal*, vol. 6, Spring 1953, pp. 5–12, and "H.M. Opposition in Parliament: Its Role and Its Opportunities", *ibid.*, Summer and Fall 1953, pp. 191–201; Hugh Gaitskell, "The Job of the Opposition—Responsibility", *New York Times Magazine*, October 5, 1952, p. 13.

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The Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937[3] altered this situation by providing a salary and a pension for the Prime Minister as such. It also classified and standardized salaries of Cabinet members and other ministers. Of greatest pertinence to this topic, the act specified a salary for the Leader of the Opposition. The latter provision was rather simple: "There shall be paid to the Leader of the Opposition an annual salary of two thousand pounds." Compared with other salaries in the same act, the amount is the same as that for the Minister of Pensions, much less than those of ministers usually of Cabinet rank, but more than those of junior ministers.

A pension of identical amount is provided for former prime ministers, but if the Leader of the Opposition is also a former prime minister (as was Churchill, 1945–51, and Attlee, 1951–) he is entitled to draw only one salary. In case of question regarding which party of the opposition has the greatest numerical strength or who is leader of that party, the Speaker of the House of Commons makes the decision which is "final and conclusive".

Commons and Lords debate on that portion of the bill providing a salary for the Leader of the Opposition was not extensive, but it did bring out most of the cogent arguments for and against the proposal. The case in favor of a salaried opposition leader was stated in terms of the following:

1. *Vital rôle.* He has "a definite and distinct part to play in constitutional government".[4] The opposition is recognized, for the first time, as an "integral part of this House."[5]

2. *Heavy task.* "It cannot be a wrong principle that the Member of the Opposition who has the heaviest duties, who gives the most constant attendance . . . should receive a higher salary."[6]

3. *Full-time job.* Leadership of the opposition is a "whole-time job" and its incumbent should not engage in outside work.[7]

[3] 1 Edw. VIII & 1 Geo. VI, Ch. 38.

[4] Viscount Hailsham, 105 *House of Lords Debates*, c. 616.

[5] Arthur Greenwood (Labor), 322 *House of Commons Debates*, c. 661.

[6] Sir John Simon (Liberal National), *ibid.*, c. 650.

[7] Viscount Wolmer, 322 *H.C. Deb.*, c. 677.

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4. *Independence unimpaired.* "It would not impair his freedom in any way, because the appointment of the Leader of the Opposition does not reside on the Government side of the House."[8]

5. *Serves the House.* The opposition leader has a share in the Prime Minister's responsibility to arrange the business of the House of Commons.[9]

Objections to the proposal came from a minority, but included individuals from all parties:

1. *Earned recognition.* "The function of an Opposition is to gain recognition from the electors of the country and to force it from the Government, not to receive it from the Government as a gift." [10]

2. *Pay from supporters.* "But I had far rather it came from the party and from his friends than that it should come from the Government and the Consolidated Fund. . . ." [11]

3. *Constitutional objections.* The method of payment is "tinkering with" the Constitution; there is no such official body as the opposition; it is anomalous to pay a legislator for executive duties.[12]

4. *Organizational rigidity.* While it may be convenient for the government if the opposition is organized in a particular way with an individual as head, actually it is the opposition's business how they want to organize.[13]

5. *Stereotyped alignment.* If the Leader of the Opposition is an officially certificated and salaried person, he will have a vested interest in the prime ministership, and the two-party system would tend to become stereotyped.[14]

In summarizing arguments on the salary provision for the Leader of the Opposition, the Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, reassured the House that the salary was no hand-out from the

[8] Arthur Greenwood, *ibid.*, c. 660.

[9] H.B. Lees-Smith (Labor), *ibid.*, c. 738.

[10] Sir Archibald Sinclair (Liberal), *ibid.*, c. 670.

[11] Col. Josiah Wedgwood (Labor), *ibid.*, c. 691. Similar sentiments were expressed by George Lansbury (Labor) and K.W.M. Pickthorn (Conservative).

[12] Captain H. Balfour (Conservative), *ibid.*, cc. 693–95.

[13] K. W. M. Pickthorn (Conservative), 323 *H.C. Deb.*, c. 620.

[14] *Ibid.*, c. 624. Mr. G. le M. Mander also was concerned over the problem arising if there is more than one opposition, *ibid.*, c. 627.

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government, that opposition independence would not be impaired, and that no bargain had been made between government and opposition leadership on the matter.[15]

The bill was passed on second reading by a vote of 228 to 136, with Labor voting against it.[16] Labor objections were to other portions of the legislation, not to the opposition leader's salary. In committee stage (Committee of the Whole), the clause providing the salary for the Leader of the Opposition passed 215 to 41, with most Labor members voting for it.[17] The whole bill passed third reading by a vote of 156 to 112, again with Labor opposing.[18] The Royal Assent was given July 1, 1937, bringing into force in the United Kingdom an arrangement long since made in the larger Dominions.

In operation since 1937, the salaried opposition-leader plan has become an accepted feature of British parliamentary government. Neither of the two men who have held the post, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Churchill, has been in financial need; the salary was drawn from 1937 until 1940, when the Coalition Government was formed. After the war the opposition leadership was filled by former prime ministers who were entitled to pensions. Few questions concerning the position have arisen, and these—except for the Attlee-in-Spain incident recounted below—were relatively unimportant.

Shortly after the Act went into effect, Mr. Attlee visited Spain and took sides in the Spanish civil war then raging. He expressed his personal and the Labor party's sympathy for the Republican cause. Having previously signed an undertaking not to implicate His Majesty's Government in the Spanish conflict, Attlee soon was confronted with a motion of censure proposed by a private member of the House. Mr. Attlee protested vigorously, and redefined his status:

[15] 322 *H.C. Deb.*, cc. 745–48. Mr. Greenwood had told the House earlier that the Labor party was not consulted and that there was no "plot" between the two front benches, *ibid.*, c. 660.

[16] *Ibid.*, c. 750.

[17] 323 *H.C. Deb.*, c. 660. "No" votes were cast by 16 Laborites, 11 Liberals, and 10 Conservatives.

[18] 324 *H.C. Deb.*, c. 1276.

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> The Leader of the Opposition is a private Member. He owes no allegiance to the Government. No action of his can in any way implicate the Government. He is responsible only to his constituents and to the Members from whom he derives his position. He is, I think, under a special obligation to defend the rights and privileges of private Members, particularly the right of every Member to express his opinion freely on all matters of public policy.[19]

The motion was withdrawn. The validity of Mr. Attlee's position with respect to an opposition leader's independence of government control is not likely to receive serious challenge.

When, in 1940, the Labor and Liberal parties joined with the Conservatives in forming the Coalition Government under Mr. Churchill's leadership, there existed no formal opposition in the House of Commons. Members belonging to small parties and a few independents did constitute an unofficial opposition. The salary for the Leader of the Opposition was held in abeyance.[20] After the 1945 election, Mr. Churchill assumed the responsibilities of Leader of the Opposition.[21]

III

Although the institution of the opposition originated in the United Kingdom, it was in Canada that the Leader of the Opposition was first accorded statutory recognition and awarded a salary. In 1905 a resolution was introduced in the House of Commons at Ottawa, providing that the member occupying the recognized position of House opposition leader should be paid a sessional allowance of not exceeding $7,000, in addition to his stipend as M.P.[22]

Discussion of the item was brief. The Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, declared that the sessional indemnity represented no new departure constitutionally but another in development. The rôle was important: "The leader of the

[19] 330 *H.C. Deb.*, c. 824.

[20] 361 *H.C. Deb.*, cc. 20–21. Mr. Churchill indicated that no legislation was necessary.

[21] 413 *H.C. Deb.*, c. 801. Mr. Herbert Morrison, as Leader of the House, in reply to a question, stated that this was purely an administrative matter and had been "taken care of."

[22] Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 1905, vol. V, p. 9727.

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opposition under our system is just as much a part of the constitutional system of government as the Prime Minister himself." [23] Since Canada lacked men of leisure and means, and because the opposition leader cannot both discharge his duties and carry on his ordinary vocation, a salary was required. Another member recalled that the existence of the opposition leadership had been recognized in the practice of many years' standing of appropriating funds for clerical services for the leader.[24]

The near-objection came from a supporter of the salary item, Mr. W. F. Maclean, who warned that the action would be interpreted as Parliament "assuming to itself to dictate who shall be the man the Crown must send for to form a new Cabinet."[25] Mr. MacLean himself declared that the Crown retained the "undoubted" prerogative to choose whomever it sees fit to form a new administration. The Prime Minister assured the House that, whether or not the leader receives an indemnity, his position is well known to the Sovereign, and that the Sovereign will not be limited by this action.

The measure passed the House July 18, 1905,[26] and made Canada the first entity in the British Empire, probably the first in the world, to pay a state salary to an opposition leader.

Edward Porritt called the period in which the salary was provided an "era of good feeling" and declared that this accounted for the brevity and looseness of the provision:

> There is no provision in the law for a certification of election, nor for a report to the house of commons of the result of the election. The member elected in caucus takes his seat on the bench on the opposition side of the house, assigned by custom to the leader of the opposition, and his appearance there is the warrant for the payment of the salary.[27]

Despite this early recognition, the term "Leader of the Opposition" had only occasional use in the Canadian House of Commons

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 9729.
[24] Mr. Stockton, *ibid.*, p. 9728.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 9731.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 9792.
[27] Edward Porritt, *Evolution of the Dominion of Canada* (Yonkers, 1918), p. 389.

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until the selection of Mr. Mackenzie King as leader of the Liberal party. He was hailed as "Leader of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition". [28]

The salary provision was revised in 1920 when Parliament considered salaries legislation which, among many items, raised the Leader of the Opposition to $10,000. One member raised a question regarding the time space covered by an indemnity; the original law was loosely drawn and permitted, he declared, Mr. King to draw $7,000 twice during 1919 when two sessions were held.[29] Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister, spoke in favor of the opposition leader's salary and reassured the House that the independence of the opposition was not in any way affected.[30] The bill containing the salary raise was passed. The provision of the House of Commons Act was: "To the member occupying the recognized position of leader of the opposition in the House of Commons, there shall be payable in addition to his sessional allowance an annual allowance of ten thousand dollars." [31]

On the occasion of Mr. Bennett's appearance in the House in 1928 following his selection as leader of the Conservative party, Prime Minister King referred to him as "leader of His Majesty's loyal opposition" and declared that, "contrasted with the position of the leader of the government, it differs in degree rather than in kind." [32] A decade later Mr. Bennett told the House: "I occupy a position in which I am placed by statute, and one of my duties is to do exactly what I am doing, to try to safeguard the liberties of parliament from encroachment by the government of the day. . . ." [33] Later the same year he mentioned his rôle in investigating the expenditure of public funds.

World War II brought no political truce in Canada and no coalition government was formed. Mr. R. B. Hanson, Conservative head and Leader of the Opposition, protested in 1940 over the failure of the government to take him into its confidence

[28] Canada, *H.C. Deb.*, 1919, vol. I, pp. 27, 51, 254, 567.
[29] *Ibid.*, vol. V, p. 4442.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 4427.
[31] 10–11 George V, Ch. 69, Sec. 39.
[32] Canada, *H.C. Deb.*, 1928, vol. I, p. 3.
[33] *Ibid.*, 1938, vol. III, p. 3339.

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with respect to the war situation and plans.[34] Later in the war Mr. King consulted the leaders of opposition parties on a number of crucial matters. Nevertheless the Prime Minister deplored the practice that had grown up in the House of giving precedence in debate to leaders of smaller opposition groups, such as the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and Social Credit. He declared: ". . . this is giving more in the way of recognition to an opposition in this House of Commons than was ever intended under a procedure conducted strictly on opposition and government lines. It was never intended there should be two or more leaders of the opposition." [35]

Mr. King also criticized the situation that prevailed in 1943 after a Conservative convention had elected Mr. John Bracken as leader of the party. Because Mr. Bracken had no seat in the House, another member was chosen as leader of the parliamentary group. The Prime Minister insisted that the British parliamentary system demanded the presence in Parliament of the leader of the party occupying the rôle of official opposition.[36] The next year Mr. King pressed the point again:

> Parliament has given to the position of leader of the opposition a place of exceptional significance and importance. There has been assigned by statute to the leader of the opposition a position which places upon him certain definite obligations, one of which is to be in Parliament and watch the administration, to criticize the administration fairly, and presumably also to make known what alternative policies he would present to those which are being proposed. . . . Now, I submit that Parliament never intended that this position should be occupied by someone acting in the place of the leader of the party.[37]

Soon afterwards Mr. Bracken contested a by-election and secured a seat in the House.

At the time the Ministers of the Crown bill was under consideration in the House of Lords, the possibility of providing a salary for an opposition leader in that House was discussed.[38]

[34] *Ibid.*, 1940, vol. II, p. 1518.
[35] *Ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, p. 134.
[36] *Ibid.*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 3–4.
[37] *Ibid.*, 1944, vol. I, p. 31.
[38] But only in the unlikely event that the Leader of the Opposition (in Parliament as a whole) were a Lord. 105 *H.L. Deb.*, c. 616.

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The idea was dismissed as inconsistent with the general pattern of nonpayment for legislative duties in the Lords. In Canada, however, there was a long tradition of salary payment to senators, and it was not surprising when, in 1947, an additional salary was provided for the Senate opposition leader.[39] In speaking for the Senate opposition-leader stipend, Prime Minister King declared that the position required studying measures, helping to arrange the conduct of Senate business, associating himself with the work of committees, and other useful functions. The positions of opposition leader in House and Senate differed only in degree, not in kind.[40]

The Canadian provinces recognize the position of Leader of the Opposition in their legislative bodies. In 1945 a questionnaire on the subject revealed that substantial payments were made to leaders of the opposition in Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Saskatchewan.[41]

In Canada, then, where the payment of leaders of the opposition originated nearly a half-century ago, the practice is now well established. Canadian national experience indicates resistance to the idea of recognizing the importance of several opposition parties. A special problem of Canadian parliamentary government arises from the party convention plan of selecting leaders: A new leader of the opposition party occasionally is not a member of the House of Commons, but as long as he secures a seat within a reasonable time the operation of the system is not likely to be handicapped.

IV

Australia in 1920 followed the Canadian example in providing a stipend for the opposition leader in its House of Representatives. In a debate on a motion to increase the general parliamentary

[39] The opposition leader in the House received the same salary as did a Cabinet member, namely $10,000, plus an automobile allowance of $2,000, plus sessional indemnity allowances as a member of the House. The Senate opposition leader was paid an extra salary of $4,000 beyond his senatorial indemnity and allowance. 11 Geo. VI, Ch. 73. These salaries were increased materially in 1954.

[40] Canada, *H.C. Deb.*, 1947, vol. II, p. 5351.

[41] *Journal of the Society of Clerks-at-the-Table in Empire Parliaments*, vol. XIV (1945), pp. 226–29—hereafter cited as *J.S.C.T.E.P.*

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salary, one member remarked: "This is the only Australian Parliament in which the Leader of the Opposition does not receive a special payment." [42] The leader of Labor opposition forces declared: "As a good unionist, I believe that I should be declared 'black' by all other Leaders of Oppositions in Australia." Not long afterwards the government included in the parliamentary allowances bill a provision for additional compensation of £400 for House opposition leader and £200 for Senate opposition leader.

The Prime Minister, Mr. W. M. Hughes, after stressing the heavy work load and important rôle of the opposition leaders, concluded: "Parliamentary government has long recognized the necessity for an Opposition, and it is about time we gave statutory authority for the office. It should have been done long ago. We will do it now."[43] No serious objections were raised and the bill passed both houses by a comfortable margin. The salaries were raised to £600 and £300 in 1947, and to £1,750 and £750 in 1952.

The rôle is the customary one. The opposition "submits the work of the government to constant criticism, and constantly provides an alternative administration. Its great constitutional importance is officially recognized under federal law, and that of several states, by the grant of an additional parliamentary salary to the Leader of the Opposition."[44]

In Australia the first innovation was the inclusion of the Senate opposition leader in the stipendary arrangement. The necessity for this arose in part from the more coördinate rôle of the second chamber in the Australian federal government, and because of the substantial popular base that comes from direct election by the people of the states. No such potent arguments could be made for the hereditary-appointive House of Lords or the appointive Canadian Senate.

The Australian Senate opposition leader sometimes has the additional onerous task of keeping in check a majority of senators who could defeat measures desired by the government and House

[42] Australia, *Parliamentary Debates, H. of R.*, 1919–20, vol. 92, p. 2099.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 2359.
[44] Geoffrey Sawer, *Australian Government Today* (Melbourne, 1949), p. 32.

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of Representatives if they chose to exert their power. They must exercise restraint, both to avoid irritating the voters and to save themselves from a possible double dissolution. But, as Warren Denning says: "At the same time, he may take a stand on a principle involving his party's policy consistent with that of his colleagues in the House of Representatives with the exception that here in the Senate the Leader of the Opposition may have power to act as well as talk. . . ." [45]

Another new departure in Australia is the provision made for leaders of smaller opposition parties. Since 1947 the federal law has authorized payment of an allowance to the leader of an opposition political party with not less than ten members in the House of Representatives, provided that leader is not Leader of the Opposition, and no member of his group holds ministerial office.[46] This frank recognition of the three-party alignment was advocated by Dr. H. V. Evatt, then Minister of External Affairs and Attorney General, but speaking as a private member.[47] A fuller statement came from Mr. Archie Cameron, who argued that the leader of the Country party had a task almost equal to that of the Leader of the Opposition (then Mr. Menzies), that he must travel a great deal, that he must lead in the House a party group nearly as large as that of the Liberal party.[48] The debate also brought out a precedent in Victoria, where payment of an allowance was made to the leader of any party having a specified number of members.[49] Legislation was enacted later in the session to make payments to third-party leaders in the House. In periods of Liberal-Country coalition governments, such as that following 1949, this salary is not drawn.

All six of the Australian states pay salaries to leaders of the opposition in one or both of their legislative houses. In comparison with the sums available to opposition leaders in the

[45] Warren Denning, *Inside Parliament* (Sydney, N. S. W., 1946), p. 191.

[46] *J.S.C.T.E.P.*, vol. XVI (1947), p. 54.

[47] Australia, *Parl. Deb., H. of R.*, 1947, vol. 192, p. 3351.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 3389.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 3434. Mr. Menzies also favored some such plan in the federal Parliament. Actually extra clerical assistance was provided for the third-party leader as early as 1920. *Ibid., Senate*, 1920–21, vol. 98, p. 13756.

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federal Parliament, the state stipends are generous. In 1951 the opposition leaders of the popular houses (Queensland alone is unicameral) received median salaries of £500 in addition to their stipends as members.[50]

Among the older Dominions, New Zealand was the last to provide a salary for the Leader of the Opposition. Until 1951 only an allowance for clerical assistance was given. After a careful study, a Royal Commission recommended a substantial salary for the opposition leader, as well as increases for ministers and members.[51] The Commission reasoned: ". . . this office is comparable with that of a Minister rather than an ordinary Member." General justification for the salaried post was contained in its statement: "It is an office of great importance in our parliamentary system, where, to balance a commanding Cabinet and Government party, there must be a united and challenging Opposition. A Cabinet is strengthened and not weakened by the presence of a strong Opposition." [52] The Commission recommended and Parliament provided a salary of £1,600, an expense allowance of £400, travel of £150, and two full-time clerical assistants.

The debate on the Leader of the Opposition salary was limited solely to the Prime Minister, Mr. Sidney S. Holland, who said in part:

> I know what it costs to be leader of the Opposition. . . . It would have been utterly impossible for me to have discharged the obligations of the office of leader of the Opposition without being assisted from another source. I could not have afforded it, and, frankly, I think it is not in the best interests of the country for a person to be put into that position and be subject to outside assistance.[53]

[50] The latest complete tabulation in *J.S.C.T.E.P.* is in vol. XIV (1945), pp. 226–29. Changes may be followed in subsequent volumes. The usefulness of the figures compiled by the New Zealand Royal Commission, cited below, is limited by the failure to make clear whether the salaries listed for opposition leaders include or exclude their salaries as members.

[51] New Zealand, Royal Commission upon Parliamentary Salaries and Allowances, "Report . . .", in *Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives*, session 1951, vol. III, H.-2.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[53] New Zealand, *Parliamentary Debates*, 1951, vol. 295, p. 171.

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This was one of two subjects on which the Prime Minister made representations to the Royal Commission: a salary comparable to a minister's and a staff adequate to carry out the important work of the opposition, without which, Mr. Holland declared, "we will soon have a totalitarian State."[54]

In the Union of South Africa, the only one of these nations that makes provision in its Constitution for the leadership of the opposition,[55] the office and salary appear to have occasioned no controversy. The provision is straightforward: ". . . the Leader of the Opposition shall receive an allowance of one thousand pounds per annum in addition to the allowance provided for . . . (Members)." The leader is, under 1946 legislation, that member of the House of Assembly "who is for the time being the Leader in that House of the Party in opposition to the Government having the greatest numerical strength . . . ."[56] Cases of doubt are settled by the Speaker. In 1951 the salary was set at £1,300 plus the sum of £1,400 as a member of the House of Assembly.

V

One of the British concepts emerging from what Gladstone called the "long gestation of progressive history" is the institution of the opposition in parliamentary government. Although the idea may appear contradictory at first glance it works well and meets the pragmatic test.

The extreme concentration of power in the British parliamentary system has gone so far that some critics, such as Mr. Ramsay Muir, declare that cabinet dictatorship prevails. In practice, omnipotence of the Cabinet may be modified by various practices, forms and procedures. Intra-party democracy can curb and has curbed excesses by governments of the day; in Australia and New Zealand Labor parties, Cabinet members are "elected" by party caucus. In Canada and Australia the central government is checked through the necessity of sharing powers with provinces and states. Where more than two parties of substantial size exist, the interplay that is required to form a coali-

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 173.
[55] South Africa Act, 1909, 9 Edward VII, Ch. 9, Art. 56, Sec. 1, as amended.
[56] *J.S.C.T.E.P.*, vol. XIV (1945), p. 229.

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tion government may constitute some deterrent on arbitrary exercise of authority.

In all of the British nations, however, the institution of "His Majesty's Opposition" is present and makes a substantial contribution to "checking" the government. It pours forth a persistent stream of criticism. It constitutes an alternative government, ready to take over responsibility when the opportunity comes.

The idea of parliamentary opposition emerged naturally in the decades and centuries following 1688. During the second half of the nineteenth century the forms and conventions associated with the "loyal opposition" took something like their present shape. In the twentieth century the opposition has been institutionalized in statute and standing order. All of the older British nations have now provided state salaries for opposition leaders. Since 1900 the Dominions have led the way and have set the general pattern later followed by the United Kingdom.

Although there is some validity to arguments against formalizing the leadership of the opposition, they are outweighed by those in favor. Existence of the position induces earlier determination of personnel for an alternative government, and consequent greater preparation and a fuller sense of responsibility. Provision of a salary is recognition of the plain fact that parliamentary life is no longer restricted to rich gentlemen. The opposition leader, as "pretender to the parliamentary throne",[57] performs a vital function in the legislative body, and it is proper that it should be acknowledged in tangible form. Finally, the Leader of the Opposition stands as a symbol of tolerance and of faith in the deliberative process in a world deluged with autocracy.

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[57] The words are from Warren Denning, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

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REVIEWS

Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century. By ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953.—xii, 491 pp. $6.50.

This publication of the University of Chicago Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy offers a moderate version of the thesis that national self-interest defined as power is a better guide than democratic idealism for the conduct of American foreign relations. Mr. Osgood avoids the overt claim of the Director of the Center, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, that study of the power factor in international relations is a science capable of yielding predictions. His scholarship corrects the superficial account of American diplomatic history on which Mr. George F. Kennan in *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* based his criticisms of idealism in United States policy. Nor is he as sure as Mr. Daniel J. Boorstin in *The Genius of American Politics* that American idealistic crusading is entirely naïve, dangerous, and contradictory of national self-interest. All this besides its positive contributions makes Mr. Osgood's the most valuable book issued by the Chicago Center.

It contains the richest lot of material ever assembled on the ideas and emotions that impelled America's international conduct from the Spanish-American War to Pearl Harbor. It is almost a virtue of the book that the evidence frequently bursts free of the author's rather arbitrary labels, definitions and judgments. Preliminary definitions give no great semantic advantage to the "realist" over the "idealist". Even the "utopian", who "believes that the essence of international relations is spiritual power", is not hopelessly absurd as he also "has an abiding faith in man's ability to direct his conscience and reason toward restraining, controlling, or overcoming the self-seeking and aggressive impulses that foul national sentiment and conduct" (p. 9). The author furthermore occasionally warns his readers that his abstract categories are intended as conveniences rather than judgments. The difficulty is in himself heeding this warning.

Mr. Osgood understands very well that the imperialism of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, which he deplores, included elements of justifiable national interest, which he approves. But, like

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pre-Pearl Harbor isolationists and post-Pearl Harbor "realists", he does not recognize that internationalism, which he equally deplores, also contains elements of minimal national interest of the sort he approves. Instead he treats internationalism and nationalism as a purely antagonistic symbiosis. Absolute literalism in interpreting the pronouncements of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt leads the author into the strange position of condemning the first and approving the second of these two greatest leaders in the same cause of American internationalism.

Certainly Wilson laid himself open to such misinterpretation by his insistence on the unselfishness of his cause first in asking for war and then for entry into the League. Still one wonders whether his literal words made anyone believe, for example, that the United States had no selfish interest whatever in opposing German unrestricted submarine warfare. In the case of Secretary of State Stimson's handling of the Manchurian crisis, Mr. Osgood confusedly accuses Stimson of unwillingness to base American policy on "any narrow, immediate national interest, such as the protection of commercial rights, when great moral issues were at stake," and in the very next sentence describes Stimson's belief that it was precisely the "enlightened self-interest" of the United States that required support of collective security (p. 354).

Confusion arising from discrete use of the categories of idealism and self-interest coupled with extreme literalism in the interpretation of selected texts is grievous in the treatment of Franklin D. Roosevelt. His realism in basing American policy toward the Axis Powers "on the lowest common denominator, self-defense" (p. 421), is extolled as the generator of "The Great Transformation", while his work in simultaneously forging a policy and system of collective security as the best way of achieving self-defense, thereby marrying idealism to realism, is almost completely ignored.

If Mr. Osgood had observed his own caveat that American self-interest and idealism are interrelated (pp. 16–17), his study might have approached definitiveness. As it is, this book probably represents the farthest reach of the political scientist fearful of professing the use of art in historical analysis, zealous to present his work as exact science, but using history primarily to validate categories intended to deprecate idealism and glorify power.

BASIL RAUCH

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De Roosevelt à Eisenhower: La politique étrangère américaine, 1945–1952. By JACQUES FREYMOND. Études d'histoire économique, politique et sociale sous la direction de Jacques Freymond et Jacques L'Huillier. Genève, E. Droz, 1953.—154 pp.

The point has been made that the debate surrounding the investigation of subversive activities in the United States, quite apart from other considerations, has had the effect of detracting attention from the more important realities of American foreign relations. This makes it all the more interesting to note the impression conveyed to an outside observer by the record of the American people and their government in the foreign field during the period since the cessation of major hostilities in 1945.

In his approach, Professor Freymond of the University of Lausanne enjoys several advantages which he puts to excellent use. The perspective that distance provides better enables him to avoid losing sight of the wood for the trees, while his American sojourn has given him good insight into the operation of the American complex; toward Europe, he has the advantage of belonging to the traditionally neutral Swiss milieu. The brevity of his essay, well documented for that matter, does not detract from the keenness and accuracy of his observations.

Two things clearly emerge from this analysis. One is the importance of the rôle of opinion and of the peculiarities of the American constitutional structure, which latter places heavy fetters on the executive implementation of policy. This was clearly manifest in the difficulty of reversing the Rooseveltian wartime policy of coöperation with and trust in the Soviet Union, a policy which fitted well a popular bias in favor of confidence. Fortunately, from the point of view of the free world, the Soviets have served us well: such episodes as the Berlin blockade and the North Korean aggression greatly simplified the task of educating opinion.

At the same time, this American opinion, operating in a generally optimistic climate, is apt to react with sharpness and to look for short cuts where none may exist. This explains much of the prevalent confusion due to an over-violent reaction stemming from the feeling that confidence and good intentions have been taken advantage of; it explains the lack of realism displayed at San Francisco, "as premature as the post-first World War isolationism was retrograde" (p. 23); it explains also the impression of intransigence sometimes conveyed abroad and which the Soviets know how to exploit to the full. In some cases American impatience has led to precipitate action as in the matter of German rearmament where it failed to take proper account of other peoples' feelings and reac-

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tions. But there is an equal appreciation of the impact upon American opinion of outside criticism, often captious and sometimes less than fair.

Yet, when all allowance has been made for the vagaries of public and Congressional opinion, the other point that emerges is that the record is one of remarkable, perhaps unhoped for, consistency and steadiness, accompanied by a notable breadth of outlook. Once the illusion had been pricked that isolationism could serve, America faced and accepted the responsibilities of power with courage and forthrightness; the vigorous and occasionally acid debates that have accompanied the change tend to obscure the fact that its degree and thoroughness are unexampled. In analyzing the operation of the process, Professor Freymond draws heavily, and appropriately, on the contributions of Vandenberg and Forrestal, in themselves excellent manifestations of America's new temper.

This larger view of America's policy is at once sound and a source of optimism for the future; but it does not mean that this future is not beset with difficulties. Appropriately, the essay closes with a double caution. To America: "the weight which they [the United States] carry in world affairs is such—and such the weakness of their associates—that, unless they themselves see to the curbing of their power, they stand in danger of crushing their partners" (p. 146). To Europe: "international relations are perhaps conditioned by the clash of wills even more than by the relationship of power. And disquieted Europe holds in her hands, to a greater degree than she may sometimes think, her own fate and the future of peace" (p. 150).

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

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Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court. By C. HERMAN PRITCHETT. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1954.—xi, 297 pp. $5.00.

The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Vinson (1946–1953) had scant regard for the Bill of Rights. When the state, under the hydraulic pressures of the passing hour, took uncivil liberties with the individual, the Vinson Court was inclined to the view that constitutional limitations should not strait-jacket majoritarian government in the struggle against communism or crime. Encroachments were deplored but not nullified by a Court which equated disuse of judicial review with proper deference to *vox populi.* But deference was confused with surrender, and the vigilant state approached the threshold of the vigilante state—with judicial acquiescence. This view of the matter is sustained by Professor Pritchett's study of the Vinson Court in relation to "the most significant problem of our times—civil liberties."

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Two thirds of this book consists of summaries of cases which are classified as dealing with free speech, legislative investigations and loyalty oaths, race discrimination, aliens, and criminal justice. Five pages inadequately treat the establishment-of-religion clause, first interpreted by the Vinson Court in cases on "released time" and public aids to sectarian schools. Compared to earlier cases involving religious heretics, these were of greater public consequence, like the "disloyalty" cases precipitated by the Cold War. Generally the Court genuflected toward the Bill of Rights but submitted to *force majeur:* public opinion expressed legislatively. Protections to aliens and the criminally accused also suffered erosion. Doctrinally, the clear-and-present-danger test was severely limited, and the "preferred position" theory of the First Amendment freedoms was abandoned. Except in race discrimination cases, the trend of decision was strongly anti-libertarian.

Pritchett's case summaries are clear and accurate, but too often are over-brief digests which perfunctorily tell what the Court did in a case without reasoned evaluation of the grounds of decision, discussion of policy, or explanation based on more than immediate facts. There are accounts of particular cases without the benefit of relevant accompanying essays on the subject, be it self-incrimination, group libel, academic freedom, test oaths, or some other perplexing problem on which information and opinion by Professor Pritchett would be helpful. On specific cases he narrows his sights to those of an expert court reporter, disregarding historical analysis, grand theorizing, or constructive suggestion.

By contrast the last third of the book is a brilliant exposition of the positions of the individual justices. Pritchett again employs the "box scores" which distinguished his earlier volume, *The Roosevelt Court.* Acknowledging the limitations of the statistical approach to the complex business of judicial decision, he does not substitute an IBM machine for scholarship. Indeed he is at his best when analyzing the influence of values in constitutional adjudication. He holds that a particular decision will be shaped by the direction and intensity of a judge's libertarian sympathies and conception of the judicial function. While he is not free to vote his inner convictions, "personal choice plays a deciding role." Pritchett seeks the degree to which each justice found it "desirable or possible *as a judge* to prefer libertarian values over others. . . ." The box scores suggest tendencies of individual and bloc voting in various types of non-unanimous civil liberties cases. We learn that the preponderance of decision has been against the rights claimed; that Murphy, Rutledge, Black and Douglas, "the libertarian activists", usually supported the right in every type of case, that the four Truman appointees and Reed just as usually voted contrarily; and that Frankfurter and

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Jackson have mixed voting records, the former distinctly libertarian in federal cases, the latter much less so.

The signs of the four crusading activists, according to Pritchett, are: intense and overriding convictions on the essentiality of human freedoms; a concept of the judicial function which permits, even requires, judicial effect to be given to those convictions; the doctrine that civil liberties hold a preferred constitutional position; sympathetic identification with "underdog" litigants; and a deep sense of personal responsibility for the consequences of a decision. Pritchett gently chides the libertarian activists for absolutist and label-thinking tendencies which neglect the claims of competing interests. He does not, however, criticize their basic approach, though it might be argued that judicial activism for liberal ends is scarcely more consonant with political democracy than judicial activism for illiberalism. If, "for the judicial activist, the *result* is the test of a decision," then there are striking similarities between a Black and a McReynolds.

It is debatable whether Reed and the four Truman appointees are as dedicated to judicial self-restraint as Pritchett implies, or whether they are also activists who place greatest weight on the claims of security and order. The individual analyses of these five and of Jackson are too sketchy. They and Frankfurter are presented as expositors of the weak judiciary—strong legislature formula, according to which self-government increases with diminution of judicial review. The formula, according to Pritchett, is valid for review of economic legislation, but, as to civil liberties, the Constitution equates democracy with limited government, not majoritarianism. Unquestionably the Court, in the name of judicial self-restraint, sanctioned many violations of the Bill of Rights, forgetting that man is free if the state is not and that the purpose of security is to protect liberty.

Pritchett's acumen is tested to the breaking point by Frankfurter, a greatly gifted intelligence of unparalleled complexity, whose concept of the judicial function precludes crude instrumentalism and personal choice. An attempt to understand this exponent of "libertarian restraint" approaches balanced appraisal only to explode in sarcastic and scorching exasperation. One may strongly disagree with Frankfurter without absurdly alleging that he oversimplifies the problem of judicial motivation or demonstrates the "hollowness" of self-restraint. To speak of his "pathological extremes" suggests, at the least, that the author might benefit from a dose of Frankfurter's self-restraint and humility.

Excepting this distasteful lapse, Pritchett has increased our understanding of the Vinson Court. Needlessly brief, the book is excellent in

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the later chapters. The final chapter persuasively calls upon the Court to check the dry rot of freedom that accompanies judicial submission to zealots, well-meaning and vicious, who lack understanding of our democratic constitutionalism.

LEONARD W. LEVY

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition. By RICHARD W. LEOPOLD. The Library of American Biography. Edited by Oscar Handlin. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1954.—x, 222 pp. $3.00.

This book does not purport to be a full-length biographical portrait of Elihu Root or a complete study of conservatism in American history. It is a skillful and very readable blend of distillations of the two subjects. Professor Leopold never intrudes his own philosophy but his definition or description of "a conservative" reveals the liberal who is taking a broad-minded look at the conservative. This is not to imply that he looks with condescension; it is the approach of analytical objectivity. Under his scholarly microscope, "Elihu Root stands out as the ablest, most constructive conservative in American public life since 1900" but one who in terms of creative achievement will always rank below Hamilton and Marshall. He quotes the *New Republic*, as representative of the most intelligent liberal thought of the second decade of this century, paying high tribute to Root's abilities and contributions to the public good but asserting that he lacked initiative and vision. Professor Leopold's own account of Root's career emphasizes both initiative and vision while stressing his caution about innovation especially in terms of the economic and governmental reforms advocated in the progressive era. Root was pilloried as a "corporation lawyer"; Professor Leopold's historical verdict is that he was guilty of "an unconcern for or an unawareness of the social injustices of the 1880's and 1890's" but not guilty of "prostitution of his legal talents in behalf of corporate wealth."

In terms of a general historical survey, Professor Leopold lists five major contributions which Root made. First was the establishment of the colonial system between 1900 and 1902 when Root was Secretary of War. Here the author includes the measures in the transition of Cuba from military occupation to independence, as well as the longer-range program in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. For an understanding of Root's attitude toward other peoples and races, the instructions to the Second Philippine Commission merit more attention than they receive in this book. Here, as in his then revolutionary attitude toward Latin

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Americans and in his appreciation of problems of Chinese and Japanese immigration, Root showed that he was devoid of that basic feeling of racial superiority which characterized the English and other colonizers of the period as well as Americans like John Hay. This was true even though Root admired British initiative in spreading "civilization" and though he was violently attacked by the anti-imperialists and other "liberals" who saw only his defense of the army. In this field, with the passage of time, the author sees Root receiving "credit" but not "glory".

The second contribution was the reform in army administration, the importance of which, after the scandals of the Spanish-American War, is emphasized. This achievement, the author thinks, will always be acknowledged.

Third, Professor Leopold lists Root's "anticipation of the Good Neighbor policy" in our dealings with Latin America. Here he finds historians ranking Root with Clay, Blaine and Hull.

The fourth contribution "was a realistic approach to diplomacy, an approach that embraced a proper regard for means as well as ends, an acute understanding of what was attainable at the hour, and a healthy respect for the constitutional framework within which statesmen must operate . . . he was an internationalist but not a Wilsonian." With the use of various personal papers and other works now available (desribed in "A Note on the Sources"), Professor Leopold deals fully with the period of World War I and the fight over the League of Nations. He contributes an interesting analysis of Root's relations with Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, Lodge and Wilson. He notes how Root's position suffers at the hands of the Wilsonians but that he received the award of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation.

Professor Leopold's fifth item goes to the heart of his thesis and deserves to be quoted at length:

> In an age eager for constitutional change, he opposed almost every alteration of the basic charter; to the demand that government be made more directly responsible to the people, he countered with a brief for the superiority of representative institutions. In the face of a vast accretion of Federal power, he urged the States to reassert their regulatory authority in social legislation; against every inroad on the rights of private property he issued sterner and sterner protests. At a time when many citizens were carried away by the New Nationalism, the New Freedom, and the New Deal, he stressed the older ways and warned that, in their zeal for a broader concept of democracy, Americans must not ignore the need for efficient administration and the values of the conservative tradition. His was a useful, though not always constructive, voice of caution in an era of change.

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He goes on later to suggest that Root's place in history is nonetheless insecure. "When he died, his brand of conservatism was at a discount . . . if Root could not fire the imagination of his contemporaries, it is unlikely that he will move men's minds and hearts in the future." This book is evidence, however, that a thorough critical study of Elihu Root by an objective scholar leaves a deep and favorable impression in spite of the conclusion that "Inevitably, the conservative of yesterday becomes the reactionary of today, just as the liberal of today becomes the conservative of tomorrow."

PHILIP C. JESSUP

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Interpretation. By DAVID RIESMAN. New York and London, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.—xiii, 221 pp. $3.00.

The devotees of Riesman will relish this little book; the devotees of Veblen will not. It bears the traits and mannerisms that the Riesman fan finds delightful: an illuminating psychological hypothesis; and iconoclasm applied to Left-wing idols; a tremendous erudition; and a habit of stringing several thoughts and afterthoughts on the stem of a single sentence. Unlike most of the other authors contributing to Scribner's Twentieth Century Library series, this one does not take his subject at face value, or find much of high value in his subject. Riesman regards Veblen as "more often interesting than attractive, more often pungent than wise". He finds ambiguities in Veblen's thought and traces them to confused motivations. He shows how much Veblen borrowed from his age, and how little of the present age he foretold. The net result is that Riesman ably discloses wherein Veblen was entirely subjective, sometimes ordinary and often wrong. But he does not succeed in disclosing wherein Veblen also was great.

Of all his methods of deflation, Riesman's technique of psychological speculation is at once the most suggestive and the least convincing. A good part of Veblen's thought, Riesman assumes, can be understood as an "internalized colloquy" between his parents, between the father speaking for a hard Darwinian universe run by matter-of-fact, super-efficient engineers, and the mother pleading for softness, for the peaceful ways of the savage, for coöperation and the "parental bent". Moreover, even as he identified with and oscillated between these two archetypical parents, Veblen, according to Riesman, also tried to escape them. Like other immigrant parents who expect much of their children but do not love them, Veblen's parents made inordinate demands upon him, to

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which he characteristically responded by withdrawing from competition and responsibility. A cultivated pose of helplessness, a masochistic avoidance of success, a claustrophobic fear of constraint, molded his character and career. There is much to be said for Riesman's psychological approach. It corrects the picture we have had of Veblen as a victim of academic Babbittry: Riesman brilliantly exposes the extent to which Veblen deliberately courted defeat. It may also shed light on some of Veblen's inconsistencies, for example, on his curious hatred both for the unproductive leisure class and for vocationalism in higher education. But it cannot hold up as anything more than speculation. Riesman never met Veblen; Veblen left no autobiographical records. Psychoanalysis at second hand will seem dubious, if not presumptuous.

Not all of the inadequacies in Veblen's thought are explained by a conflict of genders and by unconscious maneuvers of escape. The reader who does not go beyond the first chapter will mistakenly believe that the whole analysis rests on the genetic fallacy. But Riesman is too sophisticated to think that the truth of a system of ideas is determined by its origin. He reserves the larger portion of the book to an analysis of Veblen's intellectual shortcomings. Beneath the foliage of Veblen's ironic dissent, Riesman sees the trunk of borrowed commonplaces—an instinct theory and a theory of evolutionary stages that since have become outmoded, and a Populist overestimation of the evil powers of the city business slicker. At the same time, Riesman points out that Veblen failed to hear some of the most instructive voices of his own generation. He did not learn from Weber that large-scale bureaucratic organization had rendered the difference between socialism and capitalism in some respects insignificant; he did not learn from Durkheim that religion and religious ritual are a source of economic energy; he did not learn from his own social environment many things that would have provided an empirical corrective to his theoretical formulations (for example, the fact that wealth, when old and large enough, frequently leads to indifference to display, and that economic waste may be one of the essentials of full productivity). The argument should give pause to those who insist on the unique precocity of Veblen's thought and to those who regard him as a great practitioner as well as a herald of institutional economics.

But what, then, is the source of Veblen's power over us? If social science must shed some of his pet abstractions, why does he still weave a spell over modern American intellectuals? Except to suggest that modern intellectuals sense in Veblen's mood of despondency a mood that prefigures their own, Riesman does not furnish an answer. Nor

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can we, in this short review. But surely one of the clues to an answer lies in Veblen's appeal not as a man of science but as a man of letters, who contributed irony to the literature of protest and who came upon his truths through symbol and exaggeration, the very things for which Riesman calls him to account.

WALTER G. METZGER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A History of the Southern Confederacy. By CLEMENT EATON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954.—ix, 351 pp. $5.50.

The academic historians of the South have, within the last thirty years, felt the need of supplementing the ample accounts of the military events of the Civil War with explanations of the social, economic and political life of the Confederacy. These scholars realized that the struggle of 1861 was the first "total war" in history whose outcome can be explained as much in terms of events behind the lines as in terms of battles. The pioneer in this task was Professor Nathaniel W. Stephenson, an ex-novelist who possessed narrative powers rare among Southern historians. But his *The Day of the Confederacy* was not based on wide researches. After him came twenty-odd years devoted to the collection of source materials and to the writing of a hundred or more monographs on everything influencing the inner life of the Confederacy from the salting of pork to the pleas of women to soldiers to desert the army.

Professor Charles W. Ramsdell conceived the Goethe-like task of bringing these materials together in a great encyclopedia. Ramsdell did not live the eighty years necessary to do this. Where he left off, Professor E. Merton Coulter took up, producing in 1950 *The Confederate States of America*, a book telling everything about conditions in the Confederacy from why divine intervention did not save the Southern cause to the failure of the Confederate government to erect an effective propaganda front. Coulter's work is a prodigy of research enlivened by sagacious surmises.

The nonmilitary history of the Confederacy is largely a record of financial and diplomatic ineptitude, disloyalty and disunity, rags and poverty, and misplaced leadership. So Professor Clement Eaton essays a compromise between drama and reality. "Here I have sought to achieve", he says in the Preface to his book, "a balance between the social, political, and military history of the Southern Confederacy."

Many of the topics Professor Eaton discusses are familiar to those who have read standard works on the Civil War. His accounts of military events lack the vividness necessary to make such materials entirely

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effective. This Southern author, in order to be "objective", accepts the clichés about national unity and democracy which publicists of the late nineteenth century made acceptable to the "progressive" South. He seems to deplore secession and war, the events without which his book could not have been written. He regards the society of the Old South as "fragile" and slavery as "archaic". He repeats the saw about "the small privileged class" that slavery produced; he is slightly humorous in reference to Confederate "relics" and to the "gentle old ladies" who keep Confederate shrines; and he regrets that the Old South changed from being "the most liberal section of the nation" to "one of the most conservative areas of civilized life in the world."

Yet in detail Mr. Eaton is too careful a scholar not to be tolerant of the ways of the South. He is appreciative of the secessionists and lets the Confederate leaders justify for themselves their deeds. He fortifies his repetitious topic sentences with a wealth of homely illustrations gleaned from a wide variety of manuscripts. If he does not give us "the human drama", he does give us "the significance of military campaigns" with an understanding worthy of the best in military history. He emphasizes many neglected areas of military events—the logistics, the strategy, and the Western campaigns. We learn that Pea Ridge was as important as the First Manassas, and that Lee made mistakes. Mr. Eaton tells us everything about life in the beleaguered South—from how gunpowder was made to how a soldier boy felt while looking for the body of a friend. His achievement is notable. He has, in a compact narrative, produced the most well-rounded account of the Confederacy in print.

FRANCIS B. SIMKINS

LONGWOOD COLLEGE

The Future of Underdeveloped Countries: Political Implications of Economic Development. By EUGENE STALEY. New York, Harper & Bros. for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1954.—xiv, 410 pp. $5.00.

This book is a remarkably good statement of a thesis of central importance to the free world. Staley's thesis is that basic American interests require "successful" economic development in the great underdeveloped areas of the free world. For "success", economic development must bring not only higher material levels of living but also democratic growth, involving increased individual freedom, human dignity, popular participation in the political process, and assured rights and opportunities for all.

Why does the American interest require economic growth and democratic progress in far distant lands? Staley argues that: (1) the United

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States and its allies cannot survive economically or militarily if the rest of the world comes under Communist domination; (2) the drive for a better life is so intense in the underdeveloped countries that prolonged economic stagnation is very likely to bring revolution, and revolution to bring Communists into control; and (3) the *wrong kind* of economic development, the kind that is characterized by feudal or monopolistic controls run by authoritarian cliques (as happened in Japan and Germany), is also dangerous to the interests of the free world, as it is likely to produce a society much easier for Communists to take over than one based on a wide distribution of individual initiative and power. Communism already makes a powerful appeal to the people of underdeveloped areas by championing—hypocritically but at present effectively—their desires for political and economic independence, for status and respect, and for rapid economic development.

This thesis is not a new one, but nowhere have the facts and analyses of past experience and present conditions been so convincingly marshaled to support it. Unusually effective are Staley's elaboration of the American interest in economic development abroad, even in a world without a Communist threat; his exposition of Communist strategy and tactics in the underdeveloped areas; his analysis of the political, social and institutional requisites for "successful" economic development, including the need for much better social science research in the underdeveloped areas themselves; his stress on the importance of colonialism as an issue in the battle for men's minds; and his advocacy of enough economic aid in time, rather than too much military aid too late.

Prescriptions are given throughout the book, and concentrated near the end in an excellent chapter on "Guidelines for United States Policy". Staley emphasizes the need for United States legislators and administrators to face up to the plurality of United States interests, to appreciate the real character of the Communist threat, which is *both* military and politico-economic; to formulate development programs tailored to widely differing areas and cultures; and to include in such programs, wherever suitable, measures to aid agrarian reform, advance well-conceived industrialization, improve business and public administration, foster labor unions and modern banking and credit institutions, and build up a literate, skilled and enterprising middle class. He advocates greater use of and coöperation with private international activities, in business, finance, education, research, and religion. The interrelationships of United States government information activities, military aid, tariff policy, diplomacy, and technical and economic coöperation are properly brought out, with a plea for greater coördination of such activities and their concentration on

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the central problem of making the free world's way more attractive than the slave.

Dr. Staley is to be congratulated on this remarkably fine book, as is the Study Group of the Council on Foreign Relations that discussed with him in a series of meetings in 1952 the material to be presented here.

There are some shortcomings despite this preparatory work. First, there is too little emphasis on the inadequacy of our knowledge of what the peoples of the underdeveloped areas want. Drawing on analogies with Western peoples, or from observations of non-Western peoples by economists, historians and political scientists, Staley lists "political and psychological motives", "common values of mankind" and "basic human wants", as though we really know what these are throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. Even the cultural anthropologists, who get scant attention from Staley, cannot tell us very much about the values pertinent to successful economic development in these areas. This is particularly unfortunate because, as Staley recognizes, development depends more heavily on social and psychological factors than on finance or natural resources. Much research needs to be done on these factors before final and detailed prescriptions can be written.

Secondly, Staley makes no more than scattered and offhand references to the whole United States Government Point Four program, as carried on by TCA and ECA, both now absorbed into the Foreign Operations Administration. The much smaller United Nations effort gets more space and provides a number of case histories as illustrations. (Fortunately, there is now available an admirable description of at least the TCA program, in another new book, Jonathan B. Bingham's *Shirtsleeve Diplomacy, Point 4 in Action.*) As a result, it is not apparent that many of the policies advocated are already being applied by United States government agencies.

Curiously, Staley stresses the importance of stable and expanding markets for the export products of underdeveloped areas, and the great weight of America in such markets, but makes no mention of commodity agreements (like the wheat agreement), of long-term purchase contracts, or of other devices to stabilize the prices and demand for food and raw materials.

Despite these shortcomings, which are certainly unimportant in the face of the remarkable job done as a whole, this book is of the first importance and value.

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How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion. By WILLIAM BUCHANAN and HADLEY CANTRIL, and others. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1953.—viii, 220 pp. $5.00.

After the UNESCO General Assembly in 1947 authorized a study of tensions affecting international understanding, it seemed natural that one of the first resolutions adopted should call for "Inquiries into the conceptions which the people of one nation entertain of their own and of other nations." One might suppose that since the area of greatest tension exists in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, these two lands would be prime targets of inquiry. However, the methodological tools of study dictated otherwise. Once the decision was made to conduct public opinion polls, the Soviet Union became an area of secondary study.

Nine countries—Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Mexico, and the United States—were the subject of inquiry of a questionnaire of fourteen items. Five general areas of opinion were covered:

1. The individual's estimate of his own position in the class structure of his country, and its relation to his view of other people at home and abroad.
2. His feeling of personal security in matters unrelated to international affairs, and his satisfaction with life in his own country.
3. The peoples toward whom he feels friendly or unfriendly.
4. The stereotypes he carries in his own head of his own and certain foreign peoples.
5. His ideas about human nature, peace, world government, and national character.

If the reader is puzzled by the universality of approach and bewildered as to how a relatively small questionnaire can elucidate these areas, there is a simple answer. This work is intended solely as a pilot study—one that attempts to be merely descriptive and suggestive, written without underlying theory or hypothesis. There are some, of course, who will read no further. But for those who continue, there is reward to be found; for, some of the extensively cross-tabulated data are highly suggestive.

Chapters deal with national comparisons for each area of study, and there is an enlarged chapter covering each nation as a unit. The findings in the area of class best illustrate the manner in which the data have tangential value for many social scientists. Rather surprising, at least to this reviewer, was the discovery that it appears that *fewer* people consider themselves members of the "middle" class in America and

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Britain than in any of the countries surveyed. Another less surprising but nonetheless interesting point was the discovery that "Class and nation are not opposite poles of affiliation but are complementary to the extent that the more fortunate people are more likely than others to feel they have something in common with both reference groups." And, coming as a surprise to no one, the survey found "social class" to be a meaningful concept to people in all these countries which are a part of Western European society.

A word of high praise should be written at this time for the general excellence of the production job on this study. The appendices provide complete breakdowns of the data; the methodological difficulties are amply discussed; and good summaries are found after every chapter and at the conclusion of the work. The major substantive findings are indicated to some degree by the authors' audacious act of including "Suggestions for Action" for the individual—he ought to enlarge his own perceived world, bring this world into perspective, improve his facilities for communication and perception, be given an opportunity to act; and be given opportunities for common action.

Students of public opinion should find this book of value for the volume of raw data and the discussion of problems of international surveys. Many social scientists will be helped by insights derived from the findings. However, there are serious questions to be raised concerning this Gallup-type approach. How much light has this survey really thrown upon the psychological causes of war or how has it helped to explain some of the effects of tensions? How helpful is this survey for makers of foreign policy and information programs? Would not an operating hypothesis have offered at a minimum the same raw data and descriptive material and, if success had attended the venture, some significant findings that could be translated into meaningful programs? This volume is probably destined to endure the cruel fate of suffering much criticism while enjoying wide use.

R. M. Darrow

Princeton University

Ambassador's Report. By Chester Bowles. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954.—xii, 415 pp. $4.00.

Seldom in the annals of diplomacy has an American Ambassador had so favorable an impact on so large a nation in so short a time. Out of his eighteen months' experience as United States Ambassador to India and Nepal, Bowles has written a deeply earnest and vitally serious book. If, indeed, the great decision of our times is to be made in the Asian cauldron, it is to be hoped that United States policymakers present and future may

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profit from the penetrating observations of a persuasive and engaging American, consistently aware not only of Asian difficulties and dilemmas but, more important, of the West's limitations in Asia.

To judge from the volume at hand he is equally facile and perceptive in explaining Indian attitudes and policies to the West as he was in presenting the logic of United States viewpoints to Indian audiences. Time and again he puts himself in the Indians' place and tries to look at things from their point of view. The result is an extraordinary performance in international understanding.

Mr. Bowles arrived in New Delhi in the fall of 1951 and served until the spring of 1953. In this short period he saw more of India than any other United States Ambassador, traveling 60,000 miles through the country, visiting thousands of villages, talking with everyone—cabinet ministers, students, business men, farmers, laborers. His candor, friendliness, and down-to-earth, shirt-sleeve approach to his job seemed to win the confidence of Indians on every level, and within a matter of months he became one of the most successful envoys our country has ever sent to Asia.

His report describes the Gandhian revolution in India, offers a vivid close-up picture of Jawaharlal Nehru, traces the bickering and blunders of India's Communists, analyzes the tactics of the Chinese and Soviet Communists throughout Asia, paints a vivid picture of India's economic difficulties, of the work of Point Four in Indian villages and the deep determination of the people to create a new birth of economic as well as political freedom through the democratic process. The Indian national election, the Five Year Plan, land reform, community development, the world outlook of India and its "independent" foreign policy, United States relations with India, the Voice of America and United States information program in India, all come alive in his stimulating presentation.

"It is not America and Russia who are wrestling for the political soul of Asia," Bowles declares, "it is primarily India and China" (p. 229). In replying to a Communist charge in Parliament, that China had made more progress than India, Nehru replied bluntly that he would like to see free India compared with Communist China in every way and declared that works of irrigation, hydroelectric power, and so on, were being undertaken in India to a far greater extent than in China. He then said that India, functioning in a democratic way, would pay higher dividends, both material and spiritual, in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom, than would totalitarian China. This, Bowles feels, is the real test now under way, which all the rest of Asia is watching closely. "The people of non-Communist Asia have heard more of progress in Red China, often in the most exaggerated form, than they have of the remarkable gains

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being made in free India" (p. 169), he declares and he urges the United States to look at the broader stakes and the longer future and help India win this contest.

"The tragic fact is that if democratic India ever fails, and if a Communist civil war ever breaks out there, the West would spend billions to save India from Communism. In defense of tiny, strategic Greece, with 8 million people, the United States in four years contributed more than twice as much as India needs to make a success of her Five Year Plan. One would think that the time to aid India is now while she is saving herself, and while her chance of success is good" (p. 172). He is critical of those Senators who would cut off aid to India because Nehru is at times critical of United States foreign policy. "But it is immature and ridiculous for us to jump to the conclusion that because he [Nehru] is not 100 per cent for us, he must be against us" (p. 110). Bowles argues that Americans should understand India's new foreign policy better than any other people "because with its oratorical wrappings removed it is practically indistinguishable from the foreign policy of the United States from 1787 to 1937" (p. 235). He cites an anti-Communist Indian college professor who once asked him, "What would you Americans have said if Britain had demanded in 1939 that you must either support her in her struggle against Hitler or be classed as a nation of Nazi sympathizers?" (p. 233). Bowles holds that "we can gain nothing and will lose much, if we insist on trying to badger or buy key Asian governments into line" (p. 396).

Reflectively Bowles notes that the United States has never had an Asian policy and suggests that it is high time we hammered out one. In this process he suggests that there are several intractable facts we must face whether we like them or not. "There is an Asian viewpoint held by half the people of the world from Tokyo around to Cairo. We need to understand this and make use of it, not attempt to impose ours." Secondly he believes that an Asian policy must recognize that "we have only a very limited control over the course of events in Asia" (p. 388). He suggests a Monroe Doctrine for South Asia to be enforced by Asians. He has firm and forceful views on China and Indo-China. "The most hardheaded and the most hopeful policy is one based on restraint, firmness, patience and flexibility" (p. 393).

A short review cannot hope to do more than present a most fleeting view of the flavor of Mr. Bowles's astute analysis. One cannot help but agree with Harper's that this "is the most important book written on Asia since the war, and a must reading for every thoughtful American."

JEROME B. COHEN

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

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Poland: White Eagle on a Red Field. By SAMUEL L. SHARP. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953.—vii, 338 pp. $5.00.

Passionately written, this book was designed for the nonspecialist and describes the tragedy of "a country without natural frontiers, most awkwardly situated between two strong and dynamic neighbors who tended to meet or to clash over the prostrate form of Poland" (p. 5). Mr. Sharp's arguments are that there can no longer be a place for states which are neither great Powers nor buffer states nor satellites of a great Power—that the harsh realities of the period and geography dictate that an independent Poland is an impossibility, and that she is doomed to play the rôle cast for her by either Russia or Germany.

In the author's view Poland was lost to the Soviets at Yalta and Potsdam primarily because the Polish problem was considered à minor aspect of larger European issues to be settled among the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. By the end of the book, after a discursive examination of recent Polish economic and political history, Mr. Sharp has rejected liberation or freedom within the framework of a federated Europe, and sees Poland doomed to be shackled to the chariot of the Soviet Union "because Poland is a vital Russian interest" and only "incidentally . . . an object of American interest" (p. 305).

This gloomy prospect is unwittingly relieved for the specialist by the author himself; for his high selectivity of data so distorts facts and figures, and his version of pre-communist Polish internal affairs, economic development and history is so manipulated to make them fit a point of view, that the entire validity of his thesis is seriously suspect.

Thus he assumes any Polish farm smaller than five hectares was "of a size insufficient to maintain the cultivators or their families at subsistence level" (p. 102). This assumption is belied by the fact that, although farms in this category comprised more than half of all peasant holdings and supported roughly 40 per cent of the population, the Polish death rate fell constantly through the period, and in 1938 compared favorably with that of France and Italy. In his treatment of the fundamental Polish agrarian problem the author neglects a definition of subsistence level, and omits many pertinent facts. He takes his data from the Polish census, but does not point out that it included as peasants many for whom farming was not the only source of income, nor that the last census was taken in 1931, and reflected the reduced hours of employment provided by Polish industry and mining in the world economic crisis.

It is acknowledged in the author's treatment of communist land reform that only part of the confiscated land was distributed among the peasants

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(p. 233). No mention, however, is made of the fact that, despite a smaller population and 13 million hectares taken over by the state in 1944–1945 as against only 2.6 million hectares parceled out from 1920 to 1939, the percentage of five-hectare holdings remains substantially unaltered. The picture is further distorted by assigning 24 per cent of the total area to thirty thousand landlords (p. 102). The correct percentage was slightly higher (25.8 per cent), but of the land used in agriculture only 18 per cent belonged to farms over 50 hectares. In general, the author's generalizations on the "minimum level of farms" yields but little, and filtered, light on the Polish agrarian problem.

There is little improvement in the superficial discussion of foreign investments in Poland (pp. 104–6). Strong disapproval is registered for the Polish use of loans to keep the currency sound, but the vital point that neither foreign nor domestic investment will materialize under conditions of financial instability is ignored, as is the flight of foreign capital from Poland, which began with the depression and ended only with the imposition of exchange controls in 1936 and drastically affected the foreign balance. The author stresses such intangibles as "national pride", but summarily dismisses such tangibles as cartel control, German ownership of defense industries, and labor relations. On all matters economic the reader is left with a distinct impression that Mr. Sharp would not be happy in 1953 with whatever the Polish government of the 'thirties had or had not done.

If Mr. Sharp is somewhat sketchy in his treatment of Polish economic development, his treatment of documents relating to political developments reflects an unfortunate enthusiasm to make them fit his viewpoint. This is particularly evident in his treatment of the Polish underground movement. He states that Polish plans were such that, "should the Russians enter the Polish territory, an uprising against the Germans will be carried out under any circumstances even if the Germans are not ripe for it [i.e., not sufficiently weakened]. I will start the struggle sufficiently early to forestall the entry of the Russians . . . " (p. 171).

Mr. Sharp takes this quotation out of context from a signal to London from General Rowecki (C-in-C Home Army) of January 12, 1943 and attributes it to a report of Rowecki to General Sikorski of February 28, 1943. Writing of the revision of plans in favor of several regional uprisings (p. 171), Sharp says that "The basic assumptions underlying the plan were expressed earlier, on January 12, 1943, in a telegram to London in which it was stated that 'almost the entire nation is convinced that Russia is our Enemy Number Two. . . .' " Enemy Number Two is not capitalized in the original, and this document, which is not quoted in its entirety by Mr. Sharp, was an answer to an order from Sikorski,

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and clearly shows General Rowecki's acceptance of and obedience to Sikorski's order to treat the Red Army as an ally and not to fight it. At the least, it is a disservice to the memory of General Rowecki, arrested and executed by the Gestapo, to describe him as one who "did not live to fight the Russians as was his desire." To state or imply a basic assumption that for the Home Army Russia was Enemy Number Two is gravely to mislabel and grossly to misjudge the situation.

Had Mr. Sharp restricted himself to a study of Poland as an example of a small Power in a world of great Powers, the listed objections would be unnecessary. In an essay in diplomatic history, expounding a power theory of international relations, there would be little to criticize save theoretical considerations, and a contribution could have been made to our understanding of developments in Eastern Europe.

Such, unfortunately, is not here the case. This work suffers from an overriding philosophy of realism and the confusion of present power systems with permanent political arrangements. Finally, Mr. Sharp's cavalier treatment of facts and data, his preformed analysis, and his rejection of the Polish heritage lead to the unhappy conclusion that his motives in the writing of this book were more polemic and political than scholarly.

J. B. HOPTNER

MID-EUROPEAN STUDIES CENTER
NEW YORK CITY

'Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History. By STEPHEN H. LONGRIGG. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1953, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.—x, 436 pp. $6.15.

The author of this book, Brigadier General Longrigg, had a distinguished career as a military and political officer in the Middle East during and after World War I. In Iraq he served as an Administration Inspector during the Mandate period. Before his recent retirement he was an oil-company executive. Although busy in his official work, he found time while in Iraq to prepare a history of that country entitled *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (1925), dealing with the period from 1500 to 1900. The book under review is a continuation of the *Four Centuries* to the middle of the twentieth century. The author, combining the qualities of a scholar and the practical experience of a former administrator, has produced a work that is particularly valuable for its account of the internal conditions of Iraq and her personalities in the years during which he was intimately connected with the country.

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The half-century of history is divided into the Ottoman period, to which two chapters are allocated; the War and British Occupation (chapter 3); the Mandate period (chapters 4–6); and the period of independence (chapters 7–10). Almost everything that the author deemed it necessary to record—from important matters of public policy to such isolated events as the assassination of a certain missionary—is described with accuracy of detail. He has given the names and recorded the achievements of all Britishers who held important positions in Iraq, but his narrative, if read by an Iraqi patriot (as indeed has been the case, judging from local Baghdad papers), must be very disappointing because of its omission of the names and achievements of the Iraqi heads of several government departments under whom the British advisers have served. Perhaps this was an oversight, since the names of these advisers are given.

The author shows not only remarkable knowledge of the political and administrative details in the history of Iraq during half a century, but also such precision and accuracy that one can hardly detect an error in his treatment of the periods of the British occupation and the Mandate. However, this is not always true for the later years. For example, he is vague about the events that led to the fall of Midfa'i in December 1938 (p. 274) and confuses them with the dissension of the army and the fall of Nuri in February 1939 (p. 281). He states that permission was given for the formation of political parties in 1939 and that these failed to take shape (p. 275), while in fact permission was never given. The events that led to the intervention of the army in politics are vaguely described, with no background or explanation as to why the army intervened at all. He also fails to trace the chain of actions and reactions within the army since the fall of Bakr Sidqi which caused parallel repercussions in the political sphere. His evaluation of certain personalities tends to be subjective and is not always accurate: he describes Abbas Mahdi as "competent" (p. 229) and Chalabi as of "unusual ability" (p. 334). There are several misspelled words and names and his system of transliteration is not uniform. These minor errors and misspellings should be corrected in a second edition of this worthy continuation of General Longrigg's earlier scholarly volume. On both he is to be congratulated.

MAJID KHADDURI

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BOOK NOTES

The concerted attack on the foundations of our free society by heresy hunters, amendment mongers, and rewriters of history is now producing its antibodies—a popular literature in defense of civil liberties. Norman Thomas' *The Test of Freedom* (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1954; 211 pp. $3.00) is a vigorous but unoriginal contribution to this growing literature. His thesis (to which few intellectuals will now take exception) is that communism and McCarthyism are twin evils, and that we cannot fight the first with the weapons of the second without destroying our liberties. "Heresy", he writes, "is by no means always right—false prophets have probably outnumbered the true—but heresy has been the growing point of society; society uses force to check dissent at its peril. Every great religion and the whole body of science began with a challenge to accepted traditions" (pp. 42–43). In the early chapters Mr. Thomas briefly reviews the Soviet dictatorship—that "horrible tyranny over the bodies, minds, and souls of men" (p. 53)—and he has some acidulous comments on those liberals who were slow to face the facts about Stalinism. Then he turns to the methods that have been used to, or that purport to, combat communism. Here Mr. Thomas finds much to criticize. McCarthyism, he writes, is "a more widespread challenge to the Jeffersonian ideal than communism; by its consequences, it operates in the long run as a kind of sixth column in support of Stalin's successors" (p. 79). He is equally firm in his attack on the censorship of suspect books, on the blacklisting of actors, on the interference with our public schools by paranoid patriots, and on the atmosphere of fear and confusion that has produced loyalty oaths and the excrescences of our security procedures. The occasional glimpses of autobiography are the most satisfying parts of the book and I, for one, would have welcomed far more detailed accounts of Mr. Thomas' clashes with Communists, fellow-travelers, and reactionaries than he has given us here. Some of his opinions, especially concerning Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and the Jenner Committee, may be questioned as somewhat complacent. But, these flaws apart, Mr. Thomas' little book is a welcome addition to the literature of sanity and decency.—PETER GAY, Columbia College.

The paradoxes involved in the administration of a wartime wage stabilization policy through a tripartite structure receive scholarly analysis in Allan R. Richards' study of *War Labor Boards in the Field*

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(Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1953; vii, 281 pp. $1.25). These paradoxes were fairly numerous and complex—so complex, in fact, that, while the author is apparently quite critical of the shortcomings of tripartitism, he is not quite able to recommend any substitute for the structure in view of its advantages. The basic problem in administering the wartime wage stabilization and disputes program was how to reconcile all-pervasive controls with the maturing voluntary process of collective bargaining. One alternative was to establish controls without regard to collective bargaining; the other was to seek to fuse the requirements of controls with those of the democratic process at the plant and regional levels. That the latter was the alternative chosen, and that the program was generally a successful one, was no mean achievement. The virtue of Mr. Richards' study is that it looks to the detailed problems and irritations which accompanied the tripartite setup, while not ignoring its broad achievements. The disadvantages of tripartitism in turning public members into compromisers and in retarding internal administration are analyzed, as are the advantages of tripartitism in ensuring realistic decisions and in obtaining compliance with board orders and with the "no strike, no lockout" pledge. The author found contradictory the effects of the National Board's granting of apparent freedom in many respects to the regional boards. The freedom grew out of directly opposed factors: to minimize labor-management disputes and intervention in bargaining, the National Board consciously decided to make national policy fairly flexible, and to allow regional boards to make their own adaptations of these policies; on the other hand, some of the lack of preciseness in national board policy was frequently the product of irresolution in the face of threatened or anticipated tripartite dissolution. Regional requests for adoption of specific standards frequently met with national board inaction; requests for grants of specific authority often met with a similar fate. Efforts by regional boards to fill a policy void—in effect, policy formulation by regional boards—might be vetoed by the National Board through the appeal process or through administrative review. The author, although rather critical of tripartitism, does not recommend any substantial alternatives to the wartime policy and program. He limits his recommendations thus: first, to require greater independence of the public members in expressing their positions, and, secondly, to require more careful planning by the national agency prior to decentralization. His analysis might have been enhanced, had he chosen to analyze the possible impact of a unilateral structure on wage and disputes controls, geared to maximum possible retention of collective bargaining. Furthermore, study of the most recent tripartite control

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experience—that of the "defense production" Wage Stabilization Board—would undoubtedly show that the wartime administrative experience was largely recapitulated.—JOSEPH P. GOLDBERG, Washington, D. C.

Three small countries—Greece, Czechoslovakia and Finland—in which democracy has been firmly rooted and in defense of which they jeopardized their sovereign independence, have had more than their share of turmoil and tragedy during the last fifteen years. All three were drawn into the last war against their will; innocent peoples in all three of them endured untold miseries and suffered much; and, when they regained their independence, these once thriving, prosperous and progressive countries were heaps of ruins in desolation. Of these three peoples the Czechoslovaks turned out to be the most unfortunate; fate seems somewhat less harsh on the poor but gallant Finns; and the Greeks, whose full freedom was not actually regained until 1949, fared even better. Today, after nearly a decade of warfare on both internal and international fronts, waged against the Axis and the Communists, they are free and independent. The story of this warfare, Greece's rôle in World War II and the Communists' desperate but fortunately unsuccessful bid for the control of that country is told by Dimitrios G. Kousoulas in his *The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939–1953* (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1953; xi, 210 pp. $4.00). On the eve of the war Greece was steeled for the coming events under the stern and unbending leadership of General Metaxas; for, without him his countrymen would not have shown unexampled bravery against Mussolini's legions in the winter of 1940–1941. Greeks were outmanned and outmaneuvered only by Hitler's crack divisions. From the end of May 1941, for more than three years Greek underground forces fought their Axis adversaries. In this fight all patriots were united, but a group of Left-wingers and Communists had ulterior and evil motives; they wanted to make sure that after the overthrow of the Axis Greece would be ready to place herself inside the Soviet orbit. Through the zealousness of a small, well-organized Communist group under such names as the National Liberation Front (EAM), and Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), this was almost accomplished. Had it not been first for the British and then for our resolve to save that unhappy country from the clutches of ravaging communism, Greece probably would have become just another satellite long before we intervened effectively in March of 1947. This story of gallantry in the midst of misery, generosity, altruism and cooperation is well told by one who was a participant in many of the events described in this book.—A. O. SARKISSIAN, The Library of Congress.

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Of the eleven authors of *Challenge in Eastern Europe: 12 Essays*, edited by C. E. BLACK (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1954; xviii, 276 pp. $4.00), six are exiled statesmen from Central-Eastern Europe: Ladislav Feierabend of Czechoslovakia, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk of Poland, Branko M. Pešelj of Yugoslavia, Hubert Ripka of Czechoslovakia, Géza Teleki of Hungary, and Jan H. Wszelaki of Poland. The other five are American scholars: C. E. Black of Princeton University; Karl W. Deutsch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Jacob B. Hoptner, Research Director of the Mid-European Studies Center; Henry L. Roberts, of the Council on Foreign Relations and now at Columbia University; and Arnold J. Zurcher of New York University. Within the framework of the sections covering "The Politics of Eastern Europe", "The Development of an Agrarian Society", and "The Search for Regional Security", these authorities discourse on the social, political and economic problems of the region, stressing especially the transition now taking place there, and especially as the changing history there affects the West. The total effect of the book is rather vague, if not sometimes boresome. This is due to the fact that the contents of the individual chapters were delivered as lectures at the Institute of Public Affairs and Regional Studies of the Graduate School of Arts and Science at New York University in the summer of 1953. The volume tells nothing new not already covered in the ever-growing number of books and articles covering this field. (Even Joseph C. Grew's "Foreword" appears to be quite superfluous, consisting mostly of some well-worn-out clichés and exhortations.) It is only in some specific sections that a substantial contribution to our understanding of the "challenge in Eastern Europe" has been made—and, curiously enough, only in the chapters prepared by the American scholars. In this respect, C. E. Black is to be congratulated for his chapters on "Eastern Europe in Historical Perspective", Arnold J. Zurcher for his "Authoritarian Forms of Government between the Wars", Henry L. Roberts for his "International Relations between the Wars", Jacob B. Hoptner for his "The Structure of the Soviet Orbit", and Karl W. Deutsch for his "Problems and Prospects of Federation". But even these chapters suffer from being basically only "lectures"; there are hardly any footnotes and no bibliography whatever. In short, the book is guilty of telegraphing its punches at night-letter length in about half of the chapters. But, at the same time, dull as some of the statements are, they form invaluable material not only for the momentous period with which they deal, but also for the objective knowledge of the region which is geopolitically so important to the United States today. In this respect, the American people may well ponder Black's concluding words in regard to the policies of the Western democracies toward Central-

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Eastern Europe: "The Western democracies cannot publish a timetable for the development of their policies, but they can make it unmistakably clear at each step that they will not consider their own peace and security assured until the states of Eastern Europe can freely participate in European affairs" (p. 266).—JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, University of Bridgeport.

In *As It Happened* (New York, The Viking Press, 1954; viii, 312 pp. $5.00), the Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition, Clement R. Attlee, forthrightly confesses, at the outset, that he does not wish to tell the story of the socialist movement in Britain. Yet in spinning out his personal memoirs Mr. Attlee, almost inadvertently, bears witness to the distinctive character of Fabian socialism. While at Oxford he was a Conservative, took no part in politics, and thought little about social problems. Rarely speaking in university debates, he for a long time was "afflicted with a most painful shyness." In 1905, at the age of twenty-two, Mr. Attlee began his social work among the poor of East London. He writes: "I found abundant instances of kindness and much quiet heroism in these mean streets. These people were not poor through their lack of fine qualities. The slums were not filled with the dregs of society. Not only did I have countless lessons in practical economics, but there was kindled in me a warmth and affection for these people that has remained with me all my life" (pp. 30–31). The impressionable young Oxonian began to read widely, concluded that the economic and ethical basis of society was wrong, and became a Socialist. In relating his subsequent personal and political experiences, the author is as sober as the socialist movement he has led for so long a time. His narrative lacks a sense of the tidal movement of events. The names of the great are mentioned, but do not come to life. It is disappointing, for example, when Mr. Attlee refers fleetingly to his disagreement with Aneurin Bevan as merely of a "personal nature". "There was", he adds, "in my view no real difference of principle" (p. 289). The leader of British socialism never seems to get angry, never appears to dispute the big decisions of history, never ceases to wonder good-naturedly at the trick fate played on England by designating him prime minister of the realm.—BERNARD E. BROWN, New York City.

Mr. Henry Pelling has written a book, *The Origins of the Labour Party, 1880–1900* (London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd.; New York, St Martin's Press, 1954; ix, 258 pp. 21*s.*; $4.00), that might well have been subtitled "the case of the complacent trade unionists and the blind revolutionists". Mr. Pelling has confined his discourse to the crucial period preceding the formation of the Independent Labor party. In the decades from 1880 to

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1900 many English trade unionists refused to recognize their growing incompatibility with the majority parties and opposed any movement leading to a separate and distinctive labor political group. Similarly, many socialists recoiled from the actuality of a physical overturning of society but refused to accept the only practicable alternative, a political party based on the workingman. The author traces the path of labor politics and shows how the unions reconciled themselves to separatist political action and the socialists to a political party working through constitutional methods and competing with the parties of capitalist society for the same commodity, votes. Little attempt is made to develop the political or social theories of the various factions active in labor and socialist politics during this period. Theory as such seems to be avoided by choice; only those elements of doctrine which made for major factional differences are discussed, and then only briefly. Mr. Pelling has concentrated on the politics of the development of the Labor party rather than its ideology. In some respects this is a very wise decision. The history of labor socialism would lead one to believe that many theoretical distinctions were grounded in personality rather than ideas. It is the personality, and the organization, which we have presented here—many, many personalities and organizations. The ebb and flow of labor politics, its minor successes and defeats, its leaders, its name-calling, and the gradual formation of a united political group out of many dissident factions and people—these are well chronicled and betray an amazing amount of research into the papers, public and personal, of the period. One short chapter deserves mention, the growth and decline of the Labor Church movement (pp. 132 *et seq.*) which is detailed clearly. The book will have special interest for the student of the structure and organization of political parties.—WILLIAM L. ROFES, Flushing, N. Y.

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

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